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ABSTRACT
This thesis examined the effect of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in
Nigeria from 1970 to 2015.The specific objectives examined the trend of trade tax revenue in
Nigeria before and after joining WTO and estimated the buoyancy of trade tax revenue to total
tax revenue in Nigeria. It was undertaken given that in the quest for development in the midst of
unsustainable fiscal deficit, Nigeria is pursuing economic integration which also has revenue
consequences thereby exacerbating the fiscal deficit if not controlled. The study sourced
secondary data mainly from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin over the period of the
study applying an ex-post facto research design. An econometric model was specified and
Ordinary Least Squares estimation technique was used to estimate the parameters of the model.
Empirical findings indicated that economic integration inversely (-0.29) affected trade tax
revenue in Nigeria, and this effect was statistically significant. Also, the buoyancy of tax result
showed that trade tax revenue is inelastic (0.77) to total tax revenue, which is also income
inelastic (0.95) to Gross Domestic Product these are evidences of leakages due to corruption.
Based on these findings, the study recommends the full understanding of foreign trade
agreements using experts with the requisite knowledge to ensure conducive environment is
created for its full implementation with the needed political will. There is also an urgent need to
implement macroeconomic policies like stable interest and exchange rate that will create
conducive environment to improve the productive capacity of the domestic economy to develop,
reinvigorate and widen domestic tax revenue bases, while anticorruption agencies like the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices
Commission (ICPC), and the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) should be motivated by building their
capacity and independence, including improved welfare conditions to carry out their duties
effectively, so that tax laws can be enforced and offenders are arrested and prosecuted as
deterrent to others.
1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Nigeria’s trade policy since 1986 was targeted at economic integration to achieve
greater liberalization and greater openness with the global economy to expand market access,
create trade opportunities, ensure economies of scale and improve revenue generation. The
country then signed bilateral, multilateral, regional and continental trade agreements with
different countries. Nigeria is one of the founding members of Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and a signatory to the
Lome Convention, the G- 15 nations, the G- 32 nations, and recently the economies of
Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey (MINT). The fact is that global economic borders
have become much more liberalized over the last three decades, thanks to WTO which has
created a credible multi-lateral rules based system which ensures trade policies can be
enforced by an international court.
Economic integration is an arrangement of socio-economic cooperation among some
countries of the world. It gained momentum partly as a strategy to cope with global economic
problems, and as a necessary condition to enhance world trade for sustainable growth and
development. Attempts at economic integration are more in developing countries where it is
viewed as an alternative to accelerate growth and development. Today, practically every
country is involved in some form of economic integration, such that the choice of whether to
maintain a protected economy or to open up to the rest of the world will not be available
indefinitely as pressures for trade reforms intensify, and in- order to remain relevant Nigeria
needs to take measures that will be of benefit to the country.
Evidence (Mwaba, 2000; Igberi, Awoke, Nwaibu and Odo, 2012; Ogwumike and
Olukayode, 2012) suggests that greater economic integration is an important element in
2explaining economic growth and development. However compelling evidence linking greater
economic integration to growth is, the direction of the interaction between trade, revenue and
growth is less clear. Some authors like Ogwumike and Olukayode (2012) suggest that trade
openness triggers inequality, instability, and migration, for where there is low living
standards as is the case with developing countries, the best brains with the requisite skills to
drive development process migrate to more prosperous climes, thereby undermining
development in such countries. Also, recent developments in the European Union on the
issues of “Brexit” (British exit from the European Union) and the economic crisis in Greece,
Cyprus and Croatia seem to indicate that with time and growth there may be issues with
economic integration. Despite the pressure from the international organizations and foreign
governments, a high number of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are still experiencing
high levels of tariff and non- tariff trade barriers. One of the strongest reasons behind this
reluctance to integrate trade stems from the uncertainty related to the revenue and fiscal
consequences following a drastic and needed further reduction in tariff barriers. It benefits
some while adversely affecting others. Hence, from a trade perspective, while economic
integration is associated with a substantial increase in the volume of trade and trade tax
revenue, there is no guarantee that every country participating in it will experience a
considerable growth in trade tax revenue from it. This fear of the impact of economic
integration is substantial in developing countries because trade tax revenue is an important
part of total tax revenue. Nigeria which has this type of tax structure and commits itself to
policies of economic trade integration must be concerned about how to mitigate this trade tax
revenue loss and control the effect on the macro-economy. This is the reason for this research.
Trade tax otherwise called international trade tax revenue is the sum of import duties
charged on foreign goods and services that are imported into the country, and export duties
which are charged on exported goods. Its introduction in Nigeria dates back to 1860 and they
3are charged either as a percentage of the value of goods (ad-valorem tax) or at a fixed amount
contingent on quantity (specific tax). The taxes are administered by the Nigerian Customs
Service (NCS) and their rates have ranged from 150% to 300% ad valorem in the pre
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) era, to between 2% to 75% in the post SAP era
when the country became a member of WTO. Some are presently being charged in line with
the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) with bounds ranging around 5%, 10%, 20%,
35% and 50% respectively, based on agreements reached at the various forums mentioned
above.
A prominent feature of Nigeria’s tax revenue has remained its heavy dependence on
oil revenue which has consistently contributed about 80% to the revenue generated in the
country since the oil boom days of the 1970’s, the point at which it became a prominent
component of trade tax revenue making it the highest contributor to total revenue. The
country has since then concentrated on oil revenue source while paying less attention to other
sources, resulting in undue pressure on the volatile oil revenue which in times of low prices
induces fiscal deficits, necessitating the need for the diversification of the revenue base. More
so, that the mismanagement of the oil revenue is so much at variance with economic
development in the country and the country is counted amongst countries for which oil is
regarded as a ‘Resource curse’ and suffers the ‘Dutch Disease’.
The most important argument in economic integration is its effect on tax incentives in
the economy, that is, the issue of revenue generation which is what is of interest to this study.
It has been contended that in economic integration the revenue sacrifice through liberalizing
trade rules and regulations, elimination of trade barriers, the lowering and harmonization of
tariffs will be compensated for through growth in the tax base of trade tax revenue, the
development of domestic tax bases and other sources of revenue. This is so because tax cuts
4induce tax payers to be more tax compliant which makes tax evasion and tax avoidance
unnecessary thereby encouraging the growth of the tax base.
Theoretically, Hinrichs (1966) advanced that developing countries focus on indirect
tax revenue as a major source of revenue at the initial stage of development, a position
supported by Rostow (1971) and Musgrave (1995). The free trading Neo-Classicals and the
Protectionists argued in favour of trading blocs generating economic gains, not until Viner’s
penetrating analysis in Customs union in 1950. The former saw only the benefits of free intra
bloc trade while the latter emphasized the benefits of protection from non-members’ goods
and services. Viner who supported “liberalizing trade rules and regulations, elimination of
intra-trade barriers, the lowering and harmonization of tariffs by members of a group against
non-member countries introduced the key concepts of trade creation and trade diversion and
demonstrated that trade blocs are not necessarily growth improving, whether for member
states or globally, as it could also harm economic growth.
The findings in literature are also mixed revealing that there is no clear-cut evidence
on the issue. One of the strongest reasons behind the reluctance for economic integration
stems from the uncertainty related to the revenue and fiscal consequences following a drastic
and needed removal or reduction in tariff barriers, as efforts to liberalize trade may result in
revenue losses and may worsen the fiscal deficit if the potential decrease in trade tax revenue
is not replaced by revenue from other tax sources. More so, the experiences of many of the
successfully integrating developing countries has shown that the potential trade tax revenue
losses following tariff reduction can be much and may require some level of fiscal discipline
and adjustments. It is in the light of this conflicting evidence in literature that this study
investigated the effect of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria
from the period 1970 to 2015.
51.2 Statement of the Problem
Economic integration is as an important element in explaining trade tax revenue
growth and is a central component of successful development. However, while the evidence
linking greater economic integration to trade tax revenue is compelling, the direction of this
interaction is not clear. The last decades have witnessed a large decrease of trade closure
altogether, with many countries trying to find new forms of trade agreement under the
guidance of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). One of the aims of the Doha
Round Agenda was to create new trade opportunities for developing countries following a
sharp decrease in their trade barrier level. This study is expedient given the continued push
imploring Nigeria to engage in further economic integration (like that of Economic
Community of West African States Common External Tariff) in the face of uneven initial
conditions among the integrating nations, inadequate impact assessment of implemented
related policies, including the effect of corruption which is alleged to be prevalent in
Nigeria’s trade relations.
Nigeria’s trade policy for about three decades now aimed at integrating with the
global economy. Traditional trade theories like Customs union and studies such as Khattry
and Rao (2002) and Cage and Gardenne (2012) indicated that there are potential losses in
trade tax revenue, but advocated that the loss in revenue from this policy will be compensated
by the improvement in the base of trade tax and other sources of revenue. However, the
country over the years witnessed inadequate revenue generation resulting in progressive
increases in fiscal deficits, depleting reserves and deepening public debt that has become a
hindrance to economic development. It is therefore important to examine the trend and
buoyancy of trade tax in Nigeria.
6Uwatt (1999), and Ariyo (1997) examined the performance of major revenue sources
and their productivity in Nigeria, trade tax was reputed to have great potential for revenue
generation they suggested further study on it. These studies are no longer contemporary so
this study for the period of 1970 – 2015, is of a longer period and a time update. It did not
just focus on performance of the trade tax revenue, but also weighed it in terms of economic
integration, including the effect this may have on the productive capacity of the economy due
to the factors of exchange rate, interest rate and corruption, which this research examined to
determine if the condition of fiscal squeeze will exacerbate and trigger economic imbalances.
This study improved on a study on Nigeria by Nwosa, Saibu, and Fakunle (2012), who used
data of a shorter period, a different theory and analytical method, it is not just by being
contemporary, it also aims at examining the implementing environment as stated, and also the
inclusion of a significant variable, corruption in the model in line with Ogbeidi (2012),
Baghebo (2012) and Ibraheem, Umar and Ajoke (2013). Also, unlike some other studies
Suparerk (2009) this study avoided the use of dummy variables, but built a model that used
only admissible data set from reputable organizations to avoid spurious results.
There are also arguments that tariffs create an incentive for smuggling, tax evasion,
corruption and the need to seek tax exemptions which in turn may affect the productivity of
the tax system leading to a less than proportionate increase in trade tax revenue. There is an
agenda that Nigeria needs to address to create the conducive environment for implementing
economic integration policies, for the conclusions that it leads to higher growth and revenue
rates have drawn caution from some researchers, indicating that these outcomes could be
conditional upon certain factors (Harrison, 1999, Grossman and Helpman,1991). It is
imperative to examine which side of these argument the data for Nigeria supports before it
leads the country to profound problem of deficits which includes both trade deficit and fiscal
deficit with adverse effect on economic growth and development.
71.3 Research Questions
(i) What is the effect of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in
Nigeria?
(ii) What is the trend of trade tax revenue in Nigeria before and after joining WTO?
(iii) What is the buoyancy of trade tax revenue to total tax revenue in Nigeria?
1.4 Research Objectives
The main objective of the study is to examine the effect of economic integration on
the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria. The specific objectives are to:
(i) Evaluate the effect of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in
Nigeria.
(ii) Examine the trend of trade tax revenue in Nigeria before and after joining WTO.
(iii) Estimate the buoyancy of trade tax revenue to total tax revenue in Nigeria.
1.5 Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses for the study are stated below in their null forms:
Ho1: Economic integration does not significantly affect the growth of trade tax
revenue in Nigeria.
Ho2: There is no significant difference in the trend of Trade tax revenue in Nigeria
before and after joining WTO.
Ho3 There is no significant buoyancy of Trade tax revenue to total tax revenue in
Nigeria.
81.6 Significance of the Study
The study of economic integration and the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria
covered the period from 1970 to 2015. The study is significant given the need for the
government to raise adequate revenue to provide social goods, execute public works and
provide services to improve the standard of living of the people of Nigeria. The study
investigated the implementation of economic integration policy as it affects trade tax revenue
in Nigeria, to ensure the implementation of an effective system that will reinvigorate trade tax
revenue, develop existing taxes revenue and harness alternative sources of revenue for the
country. This should improve revenue generation that would curtail deficit expenditure,
control increasing government debts, replenish dwindling external reserves, and in general,
lead to greater and meaningful tax development and administration in the country that would
off- set the revenue loss from implementing economic integration policy.
It addressed Nigeria’s trade relations with respect to international trade organizations
by analyzing how these trade agreements have affected revenue generation in Nigeria, and
the effectiveness of the implementation of such policies and tariff administration in Nigeria.
This is expedient given the continued push for further economic integration (like the
ECOWAS CET) in the face of uneven initial conditions among the integrating members, the
inadequate impact assessment of implemented related policies. As it examines the effect of
corruption on trade tax revenue in Nigeria, this will have effect on smuggling, generous
waivers, frivolous exemptions and unwholesome concessions that are prevalent in the country.
On policy issues, faced with inadequate revenue the government often resorts to
multiple taxation and tax rate increases without minding the impact on trade, and the
possibility of the Laffer effect on trade tax revenue and deadweight loss on the economy.
This study provides a basis for an effective trade and tax discretionary policies that would
yield expected favourable results. It focused on obtaining an effective result that will be an
9incentive system to normalize Nigeria’s international trade fault regime and improve revenue
generation, as it curbs disincentives that diverts trade from Nigeria, and the rent seeking
behavior of powerful political elites. It examines and provides information on a significant
link in the transmission mechanism between trade and economic growth. That is, trade tax,
which when properly harnessed will become a veritable source of revenue for economic
development.
It examines and provides information on a significant link in the transmission
mechanism between trade and economic development. That is, trade tax, which when
properly harnessed will become a veritable source of financing economic development. The
study developed a model with variables that indicates not only the direction of the effect of
Economic integration on trade tax revenue in Nigeria, but also provided evidence on the
productive capacity of the economy to create conducive environment for the expansion and
improvement in existing and alternative sources of tax revenue. In doing this, the study only
used explanatory variables with admissible data excluding dummy variables in-order to avoid
the issues of multicollinearity, even as it controlled for the stationarity properties of time
series data to obtain good estimates.
The findings of this research work transcend beyond mere academics. It will be of
immense benefit to federal agencies, policy makers, intellectual researchers and international
trade and tax think tanks that occasionally prescribe policy options to the government on
trade and tax related issues. In recent years, some developing countries have made significant
gains in trade and development, while many others, especially LDCs, are struggling to keep
up. It will help such governments to implement effectively economic trade integration policy
on the growth of trade tax revenue. This research work will further serve as a guide and
provide insight for future research on this topic and related field for students who are willing
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to improve on it. It will also educate the public on various government policies as related to
trade and trade tax revenue issues.
1.7 Scope of the Study
The study covered the period from 1970 to 2015. A period of increased economic
integration and the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986,
in which the Nigeria economy is said to have been more liberalized and outward oriented for
improved trade relations with the global economy, and the joining of the WTO in 1995. And
more so, with the dawn of democracy in 1999, there is greater integration which improved
trade relations with the rest of the world. Within the period th ine Nigerian government made
fundamental changes to its fiscal policy, such that in 2010, the country did a total review of
its tax policy by adopting a new National Tax Policy. It also covers a period, in which the
fiscal regime with respect to tax generation witnessed its highest tempo with the re-
invigoration and re-structuring of the Federal Internal Revenue Service (FIRS) and the
Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) in 2007.
In the international trade arena, the West African region of which Nigeria is a part
approved the West African Common External Tariff (CET) with five bounds external tariff
aimed at expanding trade within the sub-region. Forty five years is a period long and good
enough to assess the effect of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in
Nigeria. It is a period that spans years of protectionism and of economic integration. In
analytical terms, motivated by the argument in Wacziarg and Welch (2002) that the between
country approach yields results that are sensitive due to data inadequacy, the study focus on
Nigeria.
Economic integration policies span four different spheres of trade flows, cash and
foreign direct investment flows, labour and migration flows, and information communication
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and technology transfer. This study focused on trade integration because of the importance of
trade to the Nigerian economy, and based on its contribution to trade tax revenue.
1.8 Organization of the Study
The study is organized logically in five chapters. Chapter one covered the background
of the study, statement of the problem, the underlying research questions, and the objectives
of the research. This is followed by the stated research hypotheses, and subsequently, the
significance of the study, scope of the study, then this plan of the study. Chapter two dealt
with literature review which includes conceptual, theoretical and empirical literature of the
study. Chapter three is about the methodology of the research, the research design, source and
kinds of data and the method of data analysis. It also covered specification of the model and
the estimation technique. Given that time series data was used for data analysis, this chapter
also stated measures that ensured stationarity of the data, and other diagnostic tests that
ensured that the analysis made are adequate and conclusion drawn are valid, and good for
making recommendations. Chapter Four presented and analyzed the data obtained and finally,
chapter five presents the summary, conclusion and recommendations that are made, including
the limitations encountered in the course of the research. .
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 Conceptual Literature
This section deals with the major conceptual issues in this study. The specific
concepts that are discussed include; economic integration and trade tax revenue.
2.1.1 Economic Integration
Economic theory shows free trade on a worldwide basis as the first best outcome, in
as much as it allows specialization and exchange to take place globally, thus leading to
greater world output and welfare. Economic Integration among a group of countries is
therefore a second best solution. Integration creates trade among members as trade barriers
fall, and diverts trade from efficient non-member producers to members because of their
privileged market access. It should be noted that Economic integration can take a variety of
forms. These range from low-level integration by means of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or
Customs Unions (CUs) to higher levels of integration, such as a common market, economic
(and monetary) union, or even economic and political union. An EIA also refers to two or
more countries forming a union with lower tariffs (and other trade barriers) for goods and
services from member countries.
Markevicius (2011) opined that the first step in an EIA is to integrate economically
and after a set of trials and errors the countries can take steps forward to more complex
integration levels until arriving at further levels of integration, which Balassa (1961)
classifies as follows;(i) preferential trade agreement (ii) free trade arrangements (iii) customs
union (iv) common market (v) economic and monetary union (vi) complete integration. He
concludes that it is the agreement amongst countries which involves the liberalization of trade
13
regulations and rules, removal of barriers, lowering of tariffs and/or harmonization of
common external tariffs amongst members against non-members.
According to Balassa (1966) 'economic integration represents various measures
leading to the suppression of discrimination between economic units of national states, and
the resulting forms of economic integration can be characterized by the absence of
discrimination in various areas. Willmore in Mackay (1984) expands the categories defined
by Balassa to include trade suppression (high cost domestic production replacing low cost
non-member production) and external trade creation (low cost non-member production
replacing high cost domestic production). Apart from these we also have to take into
consideration the partial nature of trade creation and trade diversion, measured by changing
trade patterns as a reflection of trade integration (Mackay, 1984). Pinder (1968) went on to
define economic integration 'as both the removal of discrimination as between economic
agents of the member countries, and the formation and application of coordinated and
common policies on a sufficient scale to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives
are fulfilled'.
For the purpose of this study, economic integration is the trade agreements among
nations that have to do with the liberalizing of trade legislation and rules, lowering of tariffs,
having a common external tariff, and generally, reducing barriers to trade or trade restrictions
between the members of the trade agreement against non-members for the purpose of their
mutual interdependence and common benefit of economic growth. This definition is in line
with Markevicius (2011).
2.1.2 Trade Tax Revenue
One of the fiscal instruments employed by governments to influence economic
activities in a country is taxation. Put simply, this study identifies tax as a compulsory levy by
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the government of a country through an appropriate unit or agency, on individuals,
partnerships, and cooperate bodies to enable it provide social goods, do public works and
provide services that lead to economic development. In the case of trade tax revenue, the
Nigerian Customs Service is saddled with the responsibility of collection.
Trade tax revenue is imposed on imported and exported goods and services (otherwise
called tariff or customs duties). A specific tariff is levied as a fixed charge based on the
quantity of item and an ad-valorem tariff is levied based on the item’s value. Tariffs are used
to restrict trade and to provide revenue for governments. They are one of several tools
available to shape trade policy. Radcliffe (2014), states in its simplest terms, a tariff is a tax
revenue.
For this study, Trade tax revenue is a tax levied on imported and exported goods to
generate revenue for the government. This definition is in line with Anyafo (2006). The
concern for this study is the implementation of economic integration policies that may have
adverse effect on trade tax revenue, especially in the face of progressively increasing deficit
financing, depleting reserves, deepening debt with effects on exchange rate, and lending
interest rate, and given the high level of fiscal indiscipline and pervasive corruption, this will
lead the country into profound problem of fiscal squeeze with implication for macro-
economic stability and economic development.
2.1.3 Types of Taxes
It has been recognized by Hinrichs (1966) that a country's choice of tax mix depends
on its level of development. Rodrik (1995) argues that countries at an early stage of
development use mostly taxes on international trade as `revenue-hungry rulers in countries
with poor administrative capabilities know that trade is an excellent tax handle'. Ardant (1972)
in his in-depth history of taxation, reports that all states initially rely on the taxation of key
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trading points to provide revenues because transactions in ports and trading cities are the
easiest ones to monitor. This idea is reflected in differences in trade tax collection between
countries at different stages of development: Riezman and Slemrod (1987) present evidence
from the 1970s that countries that rely on tariff charges for a large share of their revenues do
so because the high administrative costs of domestic taxation make tariffs the first best option.
What happens in between is the `tax transition' described in Hinrichs (1966): governments
grow over time and they simultaneously decrease their taxes on trade and increase taxation of
domestic income and consumption. This was also the view of Rostow (1971) and Musgrave
(1989).
So the basis upon which Nigeria has been depending on oil revenue to finance
development maybe faulty, hence there is a need to re-invigorate trade tax and other indirect
taxes given her level of development. This also justifies the examination of trade tax handle
in-order to make valid recommendations that will ensure an effective implementation and
administration.
2.1.4 Principles of an Effective Tax
According to Anyanfo (1996), the principles of taxation mean the appropriate criteria
to be applied in the development and evaluation of the tax structure. Such principles are
essentially an application of some concepts derived from welfare economists. In order to
achieve the broader objectives of social justice, the tax system of a country should be based
on sound principles. Jhingan (2004), and Bhartia (2009) listed the principles of taxation as
equality, certainty, convenience, economy, simplicity, productivity, flexibility and diversity.
Equity Principle states that every taxpayer should pay the tax in proportion to his
income. The rich should pay more and at a higher rate than the other person whose income is
less (Jhingan, 2004). Anyanfo (2006) states that it is only when a tax is based on the tax
16
payer’s ability to pay can it be considered equitable or just. Sometimes this principle is
interpreted to imply proportional taxation.
Certainty Principle of taxation states that a tax which each individual is bound to
pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the
quantity to be paid ought to all be clear and plain to the contributor and every other person
(Bhartia, 2009).
Convenience Principle of taxation states that the time and manner should be
convenient to the taxpayer. According to Anyafo (2006), this principle of taxation provides
the rationale for Pay - As - You - Earn (PAYE) system of tax payable system of tax collection.
Economy Principle: Smith (1776) states that every tax should be economical for the
state to collect and the tax payer to pay (Jhingan, 2004; Bhartia, 2009). Anyafo (2006) argues
that this principle implies that taxes should not be imposed if their collection exceeds benefits.
Productivity Principle states that a tax should be productive in the sense that it
should bring large revenue which should be adequate for the government. This is the major
reason why governments in all parts of the globe continuously employ tax reforms.
Simplicity Principle: states that the tax should be plain, simple and intelligible to
common taxpayer. Anyafo (2006) argue that there should be no hidden agenda in the tax law.
Flexibility Principle: implies that there should be no rigidity in taxation. Diversity
Principle of taxation states that there should be different variety of taxes. Bhartia (2009)
argue that it is risky for state to depend upon too few a source of public revenue.
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2.1.5 Major Challenges of Trade Tax Revenue
A number of factors have been identified in literature as responsible for the low
performance of trade tax revenue in financing economic development in Nigeria. According
to Okwori and Ochinyabo (2014) the problems include inefficiency in tax regulation due
largely to inadequate legislative laws and unavailability of the right instruments to enforce
the laws enacted. There is also the problem of the officials engaging in outright corruption by
colluding with tax payers not to pay the correct required tax; tax evasion and tax avoidance
are also a major problems in Nigeria; and there is over-generosity in incentives and
allowances which have high negative consequences on trade tax revenue, some of these are
arbitrarily given by presidential fiat (Tambuwal in Kumolu, 2012).
WTO (2015) data showed decreasing trend worldwide of countries’ dependence on
trade tax as a major source of revenue, yet LDCs like Nigeria are still highly dependent on it.
As a consequence, even countries that enjoy substantial economic growth and can reap other
benefits from trade integration fear of the very high cost of economic integration in terms of
the loss of trade tax revenue. Ebrill (2001) alleged the situation of most African economies is
also worsened by their chronic fiscal imbalances. In fact, for these countries, any loss of
revenue due to cuts in tariffs or other trade taxes may generate further fiscal instability
exacerbating their deficit thus worsening their already weak macroeconomic status. This
represents an important element because macroeconomic changes play a crucial role in
determining the success of an economic integration program.
Ghani (2011) alleged the size of the informal sector is also important as it is likely to
be hard to increase domestic tax collection in a country where large share of transactions are
unobserved by the state. Information on the informal sector is even rarely available. In
addition, Acemoglu (2002), and Devereux, Lockwood (2003) in their studies revealed that
political characteristics and ethical values of a country also affect investments in tax capacity.
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They argued that countries that have inclusive political institutions and high ethical values are
more likely to invest in tax capacity because their governments have more interest in
increasing future public good provision.
The trade agreements generally aimed at assisting the smooth conduct of international
trade is hurting Nigeria. Okoh (2004), stated that the major problems facing Nigeria’s tariff
with respect to these trade agreements include (i) increase in cost as a result of the
depreciation of the Naira (ii) the market determination of the exchange rate of the Naira vis-
à-vis other strong currencies (iii) the high rate of market determined exchange rates which
has impact on relative price distortions (iv) Nigeria’s non oil merchandize cost
competitiveness as international price is below domestic cost, making traditional exports
disappear while competing against cheaper imports. Oyejide (1997) pointed out that the
impact of restrictive measures produced a large anti-export bias in the country. More
specifically, restrictions on imports translated effectively into a tax on exports; by making
import substitutes effectively more profitable, they increased the cost and reduced the
availability of imported inputs which enters the production of exports, thus forcing exporters
to use expensive inputs of doubtful quality. Emejo, (2015) agreed with this assertion.
Probably the reason Akeem (2011) alleged foreign trade has not helped in promoting
economic growth is because the Nigerian economy still experiences some elements of
economic instability and this trend has also turned the country into an import dependent
economy. Thorhauge, (2013) stated as an import-dependent economy, Nigeria’s international
trade has remained unbalanced as the volume of import trade remains at 92% import, and 8%
export.
There is no institutionalized tax culture in government and amongst citizens, this cuts
across all tiers of government and affects all the citizens irrespective of backgrounds,
experience and situation in life (Okauru in Kumolu ,2012), this makes the nation not to obtain
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the maximum value from the tax system for developmental projects. Ibraheem et al (2013)
also made assertion stating the hindrances to effective system of tax administration in Nigeria
includes poor community development and the pattern of government expenditure
encourages tax evasion as people do not see the reason for paying tax.
The informal structure of the economy in many developing countries like Nigeria
hampers trade tax due to financial limitations, as statistical and tax offices have difficulty in
generating reliable statistics. This lack of data prevents policymakers from assessing the
potential impact of major changes to the tax system. As a result, marginal changes are often
preferred over major structural changes, even when the latter are clearly preferable and this
perpetuates inefficient tax structures. Since the early 1990s, Nigeria has been moving away
from direct to indirect tax considered to be less distortionary, but the potential for
maximizing the benefits of this however, is constrained by structural problems in the
economy. The predominance of the informal sector, constituting more than 50 percent of the
country’s economy, enables most domestic production to circumvent domestic taxes.
With regard to trade tax, lowering these taxes will lead to more competition from
foreign enterprises. While reducing protection of domestic industries from this foreign
competition is an inevitable consequence, or even the objective, of a trade integration
program, reduced budgetary revenue would be an unwelcome by-product of the program.
Feasible compensatory revenue measures under the circumstances almost always involve
increasing domestic consumption taxes. Rarely would increasing income taxes be considered
a viable option on the grounds of both policy (because of their perceived negative impact on
investment) and administration (because their revenue yield is less certain and less timely
than that from consumption tax changes). Hence, this is avoided.
As trade barriers come down and capital becomes more mobile, the formulation of
sound tax policy poses significant challenges for developing countries due to ineffective tax
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laws and inadequate technical training of tax auditors. Also, the effectiveness of tax
incentives in the absence of other necessary fundamentals is highly questionable. A tax
system that is riddled with such incentives inevitably provides fertile grounds for rent-seeking
activities (Tanzi and Zee, 2001). Philips and Sul (2011) considers the paucity of
administrative capacity and tax multiplicity as a major impediment to the government in its
attempts to raise revenue in Nigeria arising from the states’ complaints about the mismatch
between their fiscal responsibilities and fiscal powers or jurisdiction. And, Ogbeidi (2012)
considered political corruption at least as serious as corruption of the tax bureaucracy for low
salaries for tax officials, political protection of prominent tax evaders, poor monitoring of
officials, high tax rates, and poor information, generally are some of the problems of trade tax
in Nigeria.
2.1.6 Economic Integration and Developing Countries
The trade policy-growth in trade tax revenue depend on the countries concerned and
may differ in poor countries such as in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), based on government
policy, domestic allocation and distribution (Wacziarg, 2001). But, the relationship between
trade openness and growth in trade tax appears to be robust over the long run opined
(Maddison 2008). There are doubts about this even within the International Monetary Fund as
trade reforms, in particular economic trade integration ensuing from IMF programmes and
WTO membership, have exhibited mixed gains in LDCs, and have in some cases generated
additional constraints – economic constraints (fiscal impact, sector impact due to lack of
competitiveness), and political economy constraints (problems of asymmetric information
and bargaining power) (Thirwall, 2000).
There is a multiplication of trade negotiations involving countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), following the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) negotiations of the Doha
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Development Round and the economic partnership agreements, but the countries have limited
negotiation capacities and are facing considerable pressure. To do so, they must be able to
compare the impacts of the trade agreements considered and make sure they are instrumental
to their development strategies, since these countries are among the most dependent on trade
for both their economic activity and tax revenues (Douillet, 2012). Sindzingre (2007), states
that although trade integration is usually associated with the reduction of trade restrictions
including tariffs, and hence tends to lower trade tax revenue, the effect of trade integration on
the overall tax system is ambiguous. Trade integration may either improve or deteriorate tax
bases, depending on many different factors. On one hand, fiscal revenue can be improved if it
is accompanied by such supportive situations as a large expansion in international trade
volume, economic growth, employment, a rise in income level, and devaluation of exchange
rate. On the other hand, fiscal revenue can be deteriorated if it is associated with a shrink in
trade volume, job losses, and deterioration in corporate profit. (Suliman, 2005) opined that
even if it is difficult to determine accurately the direction of change in overall tax revenue as
a result of trade integration, changes in tax revenue can be measured by applying the concept
of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity since tax revenue depends crucially on revenue
productivity and tax structure.
Migberiost trade-based integration initiatives in Africa have so far made little or no
contribution to trade or economic development. Forouton (1993) concludes his study of
regional integration in sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) by writing, the structural characteristics of
the SSA economies, the pursuit of import-substitution policies, and the very uneven
distribution of costs and benefits of integration arising from economic differences among the
partner countries, have thus far prevented any meaningful trade integration in sub-Saharan
Africa.
22
This conclusion is echoed by the authors of many of the applied papers in Oyejide
(1997) which examined the experience of regional integration and trade integration in sub-
Saharan Africa. Recent empirical work across developing countries as a whole supports this
pessimistic conclusion as far as regional trade agreements are concerned, but finds that broad
trade integration may not lead to faster growth in trade tax revenue. Research by de Melo,
Panagariya and Rodrick (1993) finds no evidence that regional integration among developing
countries exerted a positive effect on trade tax revenue and growth, except in the case of the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) where favourable growth effects were found for
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Vamvakidis (1999) takes 109 cases of participation in 18
regional trade agreements over the period 1950 to 1992 and concludes that their impact on
the growth of trade tax of members has been negative.
Douillet (2012) alleged that advocates of “fair” or “just” trade contend that trade
between developed countries and developing countries takes place along “coercive” and
“uneven lines” and should be made more equitable. They advocates argued further that trade
relations between rich and poor countries are based on the latter’s dependency on the former
and entail terms of trade which are injurious and unfair to LDCs. In their estimation, free
trade does little to protect poor countries which become increasingly dependent on the
wealthy countries. According to the proponents of fair trade, the current terms of trade
between developed and lesser developed countries are unjust because the prevailing market
prices for the goods produced in the least developed countries are too low for the labourers to
get wages that are compatible with human dignity. Conversely, fair trade practices help
alleviate poverty, enhance gender equity, and improve working conditions, the environment
and distributive justice. Free trade poses a threat to these goals. In the view of Lamb, Director
of the Fair trade Foundation, “world trade rules are currently topsy-turvy, protecting the rich
and leaving the poor vulnerable”. A key concern of fair trade advocates is the lack of free
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trade caused by dumping practices and protectionism (including agricultural subsidies) by the
developed (rich) countries. The conditions for trade integration to benefit LDCs remain a
matter of debate. It does not appear to have addressed and resolved a key obstacle to growth
in LDCs, that is, an excessive dependence on primary products. Trade integration may have
positive effects above a certain threshold of income, as it did for some emerging countries in
ASEAN region, and may create threshold effects which maintain low-income countries in
poverty (Sindzingre 2007).
From the review, if there are needs that require elements of protection, countries must
not be afraid to deviate from free trade or economic integration. There are legitimate
economic grounds for protection if it will raise income and output above what would
otherwise be the case. The classic economic arguments are: the infant-industry argument; the
externalities argument, and the case where the social cost of production is less than the
private cost, for example, the unemployment of labour. It is worth remembering that
historically no country has ever developed on the basis of free trade except the United
Kingdom, which was the first country to industrialize. The United States, the countries of
Europe, Scandinavia, Japan and other successful countries in South East Asia all adopted
various means of protection at one time or another. Trade integration can be an ultimate goal,
but the speed and manner of integration needs careful consideration on a country by country
basis.
2.1.7 Economic Integration in Africa
Sharma (2013) wrote that Africa’s geo-political configuration has been largely
determined by the European colonial powers. Afesorgbor (2013) asserts economic integration
has deep historical roots dating back as early as 1910 when the Southern African Customs
union (SACU) was formed. After wards, there was persistent call for it to be pursued at a
faster pace. This call was keenly associated with Pan Africanism as it was being proposed as
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a panacea to colonization especially since the pioneering leaders of Africa such as Nkruma,
Toure, Nasser, Kaunda, Kenyatta and Nyerere were seen as freedom fighters.
Over the years, (Gunning 2001; Yang and Gupta, 2005) labeled African integration
schemes as purely ceremonial and not achieving much economic benefits resulting in limited
success in creating intra-regional trade, and dwindling share of Africa in World Trade. In this
quest, United Nations Economic Commission of Africa spearheaded the signing of Africa
Economic Commission (Abuja) Treaty in 1991. It was in the same vein, the OAU
subsequently issued the Sirte Declaration for the establishment of African Union (AU) to
accelerate economic integration on the continent, proposing a step-by-step integration
through the process of strengthening existing regional blocs (ECA, 2010).
According to Venables (2003) natural resource-enhanced African countries are not
expected to trade largely among themselves but rather with capital abundant developed
countries. He argued that Least Developing Countries should focus on North -South
Preferential Trade Agreements rather than South- South Preferential Trade Agreements as
Least Development Countries are likely to derive potential benefits from North-South based
on the principle of comparative advantage or supply structure. Similarly, Yang and Gupta
(2005) concluded that Africa RTAs are ineffective in promoting trade because of limited
resource complement. Conversely, under the new trade theories like Customs Union with the
assumption of economies of scale (increasing returns) and imperfect competition, there is
rationale for international trade between countries with similar structure or capital-labour
ratio (Feenstra, 2004). These can take the form of intra-industry and inter-industry trade.
The customs union theory concentrates on deepening of integration up to the level of
joint coordination of fiscal and monetary policies that would enhance economic gains from
integration and balance trade, but membership alone does not guarantee better economic
performance. Akperan and Kayode (2010), and Calvo and Drazen (1998), showed that trade
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integration of uncertain duration could lead to an upward jump in consumption, including on
non-trade items. Another argument is that of revenue loss arising from the cut or removal of
tariff on traded goods (Sindzingre, 2007), Adam (2005) stated developing countries have
reaped little benefits from international trade compared to gains that have accrued to the
developed industrialized nations from trade, this is agreed to by the following studies (Yang
and Gupta, 2005: Venables, 2003: Gunning, 2001). Contrary, to the general pessimistic
connotation of integration not contributing significantly to intra-African trade, some PTA
have contributed significantly to trade, even though the pace of progress and performance is
highly unequal. This gives credence to ECA (2010) report that African PTAs have shown
contrasting outcomes with some achieving tangible and modest outcomes whereas others
have realized disappointing results. There are conditions that are necessary requirements
under which welfare gains will exceed welfare losses (Feenstra, 2004: Dijck, 1992: Baldwin,
2000).
2.1.8 Nigeria’s Economic Integration
Nigeria is one of the founding members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
which was founded on 15th April, 1994. The organization states the general rules that apply to
all members, and specific commitments made by individual governments through ‘schedules
of concessions’. Nigeria’s commitment to import tariff under the Uruguay round of
multilateral trade agreement on import tariff are bound at a ceiling rate of 150%. The tariff
barriers were reduced from 249% to 150%. Prior to the WTO agreement some commodities
imports were restricted by quotas and other non-tariff measures. The tariff process has led to
their replacement by tariffs that provide more or less equivalent levels of protection and all
tariff bindings took effect from 1995 (Okoh, 2004).
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The major problem facing Nigeria tariff with respect to its agreement includes (i)
increase in the cost as a result of the depreciation of the Naira (ii) the market determination of
the exchange rate of the Naira vis-à-vis other strong currencies (iii) the high rate of market
determined exchange rates (iv) this has impact of relative price distortions (v) Nigeria’s non –
oil merchandize cost competitiveness as international prices fell below domestic cost (vi)
traditional exports gradually disappeared while competing against cheaper imports.
In March 2013, Ministers of Finance of ECOWAS countries met in Praia, Cape Verde
and endorsed a new region-wide tariff regime in line with the vision of its 15 member states
to establish an integration area. The 5 Band tariff regime came after more than 10 years of
internal negotiations and it is envisaged that it will contribute to strengthening regional
integration. It covers some 5899 tariff lines with tariffs ranging between 0 and 35% for the
130 tariff lines that fall into the category of specific goods that contribute to the provision of
the region’s economic development. Under the review regime (i) 5% levy/duty is applicable
for 2146 tariff lines under the basic raw materials and capital goods category. (ii) 10% for the
1373 tariff lines that qualify as intermediate products category (iii) 20% levy/duty is reserved
for the 2165 tariff lines that fall into the category of final consumer products in order to
ensure uniformity in port charges in compliance with the requirement of the World Trade
Organization.
2.1.9 Conditions for Successful Economic Integration
Agbonkhese and Adekola (2012) reported that whether or not economic integration
would be beneficial to member countries depends on a number of preconditions which must
be satisfied, some of these preconditions are:(i) The incidence of trade among member
countries should be substantial. In other words, the percentage of their total trade represented
by trade among members should be substantial. It is therefore, clear that until Nigeria reduce
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the percentage of her trade with Europe and increase trade within the region and continent,
the prospect for economic integration in the sub-region would continue to be poor.(ii) The
competitive productive structure of member countries, that is, the more countries produce the
same industrial commodities within the community, the more likely it would be that the most
efficient producers would capture the enlarged market, with beneficial result of lower prices
and a more efficient utilization of resources. In addition, the more complementary the
distribution of raw materials and minerals, the more is the scope for industrial coordination
and cooperation among member countries. Nigeria seems to satisfy this precondition as
almost all countries in the sub-region produce textiles, soft drinks, processed food and other
light consumer goods, while the even distribution of raw materials and minerals as
demonstrated by the production of crude petroleum in Nigeria, Uranium in Niger to mention
only two provides a favourable atmosphere for industrial cooperation which promotes trade
among members. (iii) The larger the area constituting an economic community in terms of
income, population and geographical area, the greater the prospects accruing to member
countries. Nigeria satisfies this precondition as it extends from Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau
in the Northwest to Nigeria in the East; an area which is large by any standard and compares
favourably with other economic communities.(iv). Further precondition is stated by Mwaba
(2000) re-interacting that, countries such as those in West Africa where several sectors of the
national economy are controlled by foreign investors the less the benefits of integration
accrue to citizens of the member countries, and the more these benefits to non-member
foreign countries in the form of profits, dividends and other payments. Put in another way, for
economic integration to benefit member countries, national control and ownership of the
various sectors of the economy should be secured before integration. He also states in West
Africa the volume of trade between the member states is still in its infancy and not until the
obstacles discouraging free trade are dismantled the volume of trade will continue to be small
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and the benefits accruing from regional integration will be limited. It is also likely that
political tension may rise among members, such as Anglophone and Francophone interests
(Afesorgbor, 2013).
Likewise there is nothing in the theory of Customs unions that says that the gains
from trade will be equitably distributed between members. Indeed, the Customs union as a
whole may be welfare-reducing if trade diversion exceeds trade creation. The benefits of a
Customs union are likely to be greater the smaller the ratio of existing trade to GDP and the
less that members of the union trade with the outside world. These conditions maximize the
scope for trade creation and minimize the scope for trade diversion. These conditions are
often not met in regional trade agreements between developing countries; and do not seem to
be met in the specific case of Africa. Recent research suggests that regional trade agreements,
in the form of Customs unions and Free Trade Areas, reduce growth and investment, but
generalized trade integration in the form of unilateral tariff reductions (or the reduction of
non-tariff barriers to trade) improves growth performance.
2.1.10 Measurement of Economic Integration
Empirical studies measure economic integration by the openness of an economy
defined as the ratio of trade to GDP. That is, for time series studies the ratio (exports +
imports)/GDP seem more preferable and a viable choice. Dollar and Kraay (2004) agree that
adequate measures of trade policy are difficult in practice. It also refers to the degree of
dependence of an economy on international trade and measures the international
competitiveness of a country in the global market.
Indeed, it is due to lack of data on indicators of economic integration as a policy that
empirical studies resort to measures of trade outcomes as proxies for trade openness and
economic integration (David, 2007). It is assumed that positive trade outcomes are an
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indication of a policy environment that is at least not anti-trade. In formulating their policy
strategies international organizations and governments use heavily this trade openness
measure. Despite reservations that this measure is not very useful for cross-country
comparisons as it varies with the size of a country, researchers continue to use it and new
measures continue to be developed. Harrison (1996) states “it should be evident that no
independent measures of so-called ‘openness’ is free from methodological problem”, hence
this indicator measures a country’s 'openness' or 'integration' in the world economy. Wacziarg
(2001) also argued against the use of trade outcome measures for other measurement on the
grounds that they are more reflective of levels of integration. The trade openness measure is
popular because data are readily available for many countries and it is quite commonly used,
it allows for comparability across studies, and reputed to capture a policy component, a
gravity component, and other determinants of trade such as differences in political and legal
systems and languages (David, 2007). The words of Leamer (1988) are as applicable today as
they were decades ago: "The question is not whether a particular method produces perfect
measures of openness, since none will. The real question is which method seems likely to
produce the best measures."The theory of commercial policy also establishes a relation
between protection and volume of trade suggesting that trade to GDP ratios are market
determined variables subject to conventional theoretical analysis and empirical verification
(Rodriguez, 2000).
According to David (2009), there are various ways of measuring trade, some of these
include; the aforementioned widely accepted Trade Openness ratio, the adjusted trade flows
measure (Hecksher-Ohlin factor model and the gravity model), the Price based Measures,
Trade freedom index, Tariff measures, Non-Tariff based measures and the Composite indices.
Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) postulated that both misspecification and the
diversity of the openness measures contribute to the difficulty in measuring trade. The
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problems of finding measures of trade openness that capture the relationship between a
liberal trade regime and economic growth are explored further in Winters (2004). They cite
three sources of difficulty: i) measuring trade stances is a difficult exercise, ii) the direction of
causation between openness and growth is difficult to establish, and iii) the interaction of
trade policy with other policies has to be considered when determining the effect on
economic growth. With regards to the first issue, the essential problem is that trade policy is
multifaceted. Trade policy involves numerous instruments, including (but not limited to)
tariffs, non-tariff barriers (such as administrative classification of goods, domestic content
provisions, government procurement provisions, restrictions on services trade, and trade-
related investment measures), and quantitative restrictions such as import quotas. There are
problems with the quality of data, assessment, and aggregation both within and across
instruments.
In this study, the trade openness (outcome) method is used as proxy for economic
integration in line with Harrison (1996) and Wacziarg (1988). This is given that data are
readily available for Nigeria and it is quite commonly used and accepted especially for
country specific studies like this one. David (2009) also cautioned that it should be treated as
a measure of a country’s size of trade and integration into international markets.
2.2 Theoretical Literature
2.2.1 Revenue Productivity Theory of a Tax
According to Public Finance Experts at a United Nations conference in Monterrey,
France in 2002, this is an important criterion to judge a good tax. Smith (1776) also argued
that it made little sense to institute a tax system in which the cost of collecting the tax revenue
was higher than the realized tax revenue. The two aspects of revenue productivity agree that
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the tax base must be large enough and that the cost of operating the tax system must be low
(Anyafo, 2006).
Revenue adequacy is the basic elementary standard that a tax system ought to achieve,
and the existing budget deficits in many developing countries suggest that the tax systems are
not revenue productive. Some may overlook this and attribute the cause of deficits to
excessive spending, or temporary adverse economic conditions (Osoro, 1993). The
importance of taxation as a veritable tool of economic growth and development depends on a
proper tax system which has the capacity to generate revenue through tax implying that the
tax system must be efficient and effective which can be achieved through various tax
incentives. (Oriakhi and Osemwengie, 2013), states that in situations where budget deficits
persists for a long period, it suffices to think that increasing revenue should not be the main
objective of a tax, this is in line with (Osoro,1993). Developing countries cannot afford to
adopt tax reforms, no matter how desirable the might be on ground, if they lead to substantial
revenue losses. Goode (1987) argues that it is hard to gain serious consideration for any
revenue- neutral tax reform proposal especially in Africa, where most countries consider
revenue gain as the primary motive for a tax. Kusi (1998) alleged Governments are faced
with mounting budget deficits and having to cut expenditures as far as is prudently possible,
particularly on public investment and social spending, a number of developing countries have
undertaken to restructure their system of taxation to seek higher revenue or improve the
revenue elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system. To reduce the disincentive effects of
taxation, some countries have brought down the average and marginal effective tax rates by
eliminating ineffective tax preferences, thereby broadening the bases while leveling the rates.
These measures, however, compromise vertical equity. As Musgrave (1995) points out,
broadening the bases may raise the threshold of taxation and have fewer and lower tax rates,
but it does not pay adequate attention to the distribution of relative tax burdens across income
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groups.Lawrence (2011) states external developments in integrated economies affect the tax
base and hence the tax yield, both directly and indirectly, and relatively large foreign trade
sector tends to be related with a high tax level. It has been argued that this relationship is due
to the administrative ease of taxing imports and exports.
The justification for the use of this theory is that taxation is imposed for several
reasons, amongst which revenue purpose is the most important for developing countries like
Nigeria. in modern times, emphasis have shifted mostly from the mundane principles of
taxation to that which looks at improving the tax base and collection technology, hence
public finance experts included revenue productivity as an important criteria for taxation. It
draws largely from Smith’s economy principle of a tax, but emphasized the continuous
broadening of the tax base and collection technology to improve revenue productivity. The
application of this in the Nigeria economy is aptly captured by Ndekwu (2002), for the
country is in a fiscal deficit despite the myriad of taxes being collected, so there is a need to
examine the buoyancy of some tax handles like trade tax to ascertain their productivity.
2.2.2 Other Theories of Taxation
According to Bhartia (2009), a taxation theory may be derived on the assumption that
there need not be any relationship between tax paid and benefits received from state activities.
Also, a taxation theory may be based on a link between tax liability and state activities. This
reasoning justifies the imposition of taxes for financing state activities and also providing a
basis for apportioning the tax burden between members of the society. This reasoning yielded
the benefit received theory and cost of service theory. There is also the faculty theory of
taxation.
2.2.2.1 Socio Political Theory
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This theory of taxation states that social and political objectives should be the major
factors in selecting taxes. The theory advocated that a tax system should not be designed to
serve individuals, but should be used to cure the ills of society as a whole.
2.2.2.2 Expediency Theory
This theory asserts that every tax proposal must pass the test of practicality. It must be
the only consideration weighing with the authorities in choosing a tax proposal. Economic
and social objectives of the state as also the effects of a tax system should be treated
irrelevant (Bhartia,2009).
2.2.2.3 Benefit Received Theory
This theory propounded by Lindahl in 1960 proceeds on the assumption that there is
basically an exchange relationship between tax-payers and the state. The state provides
certain goods and services to the members of the society and they contribute to the cost of
these supplies in proportion to the benefits received (Bhartia, 2009). Anyafo (2006) argues
that taxes should be allocated on the basis of benefits received from government expenditure.
2.2.2.4 Cost of Service Theory
This theory is similar to the benefits received theory. It emphasizes the semi
commercial relationship between the state and the citizens to a greater extent. In this theory,
the state is being asked to give up basic protective and welfare functions. It is to scrupulously
recover the cost of the services and therefore this theory implies a balanced
budget policy.
2.2.2.5 Faculty Theory
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According to Anyafo (1996), this theory states that one should be taxed according to
the ability to pay. It is simply an attempt to maximize an explicit value judgment about the
distributive effects of taxes. Bhartia (2009) argue that a citizen is to pay taxes just because he
can, and his relative share in the total tax burden is to be determined by his relative paying
capacity.
2.2.3 Customs Union Theory
The Customs Union theory conceptualized by Viner in 1950 defined Customs Union
as the elimination of intra-trade barriers, the lowering and equalization of tariffs on imports
from members against non-member countries. He conceptualizes the condition under which
trade is created within an integrating area; that this occurs when the output of inefficient
producers are replaced after the lowering and elimination of tariffs by cheaper imports of
more efficient producers within the region to the benefit of both producers and consumers.
On the other hand, trade diversion effect occurs when imposition of common external tariff
puts suppliers from countries outside the integrating area in a competitive disadvantage by
encouraging imports from less efficient suppliers within the union. Thus, this condition leads
to trade diversion which reduces the economic welfare and benefits accruable to members of
the union. In general terms, conventional economic theories are hinged on the gains derivable
from changes in the existing trade patterns (Okoh, 2004).
The reallocation of resources from one sector to another as increased specialization
based on comparative advantage takes place are the trade-creation gains that arise within
Customs Unions as the barriers to trade are removed between members, but the gains are
once-for-all. This is in contrast to the dynamic gains from trade which continually shift
outwards the whole production possibility frontier of countries if trade is associated with
more investment and faster productivity growth based on economies of scale, learning by
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doing and the acquisition of new knowledge from abroad, particularly through foreign direct
investment. It is this dynamic gain from trade that is focused on in modern trade theory
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and in new growth theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1991),
and which constitute a vital link in the causal chain between integration and economic growth
and development.
There is nothing in the theory of Customs Unions that says that the gains from trade
will be equitably distributed between members. Indeed, the Customs Union as a whole may
be welfare-reducing if trade diversion exceeds trade creation. Thirwall (2000) suggests that
trade agreements, reduce growth and investment, but generalized trade integration in the form
of unilateral tariff reductions (or the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade) improves growth
performance. Export growth relax the balance of payments constraint on demand by
providing the foreign exchange to pay for the import content of higher levels of consumption,
investment and government expenditure. There can be no doubt that there are both static
and dynamic gains from trade, and that trade provides a vent for surplus production (Smith,
1776). What is in dispute is whether the overall gains to Nigeria could be greater if the
pattern of trade was different from its present structure, and if the other countries modified
their policies towards her. Specifically, it is still the case that over 60 percent of her export
earnings are derived from the sale of primary commodities and the price of primary
commodities relative to manufactures are low. (Thirlwall,2000). Also, while the developed
world preached free trade for developing countries, it continues to protect its own markets
from imports from developing countries particularly agricultural produce and textiles, an
indication of double standard.
Apart from trade creation and trade diversion, Customs Unions may also have other
important effects associated with the enlargement of the market which are neglected by the
static analysis. Firstly, the larger market may generate economies of scale. Secondly,
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integration is likely to promote increased competition which is likely to affect favourably
prices and costs, and the growth of output. Thirdly, the widening of markets within a
Customs Union is likely to attract international investment (Mackay, 1984).
The justification for the use of customs union theory for this study stems from the fact
that it fashioned a trade arrangement amongst a group of countries that amongst other
arrangement agree to have a common external tariff (customs union) against non-members of
the group. It is also focused on production for which this study is interested in determining
whether the present productive capacity of the Nigerian economy can spur tax bases that can
off set tariff loss from implementing economic integration policies. It is also noted that as
against other traditional theories of trade that focus on the advantages of international trade, it
alluded to the fact that there can be losses from it. The customs union theory remains the
bench mark for studies on economic integration, and the definition is amenable to
adjustments such that other later writers like Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) were able to
look at its shortcomings to incorporate dynamic effects to its static analysis, allowing studies
like this to conduct such analysis. Customs union theory also clearly incorporates a
comprehensive list of variables that are important in describing economic integration and
explaining factors necessary for its growth.
The application of the theory to Nigeria in this study is based on the fact that the
country is involved in many trade agreements like the WTO which it joined in 2005. She is
also a signatory to the ECOWAS CET agreement, and recently the MINT arrangement with
Malaysia, India and Turkey. In the implementation of these agreements the country has been
witnessing increasing fiscal imbalances with consequences for the macro-economy that need
to be examined especially as there are studies that report fiscal consequences of economic
integration. Another important reason is the fact that the theory allows the combination of
both free trade and protective policies which Nigeria and other developing countries prefer.
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Even though the theory may have limitations, the less restrictiveness of its definition makes it
possible to apply the theory in Nigeria, and it is not necessarily sufficient to reject the
assumptions of the theory based on the observations that it does not hold in particular
situation as relaxation of some of the assumptions do not substantially change the
implications of the theory.
When compared with trade related growth, there have been a relatively small number
of both theoretical and empirical studies on the revenue impact of economic trade integration.
This is an equally important area of research because if economic trade integration leads to a
reduction in tax revenues this can have serious implications for fiscal reforms in Nigeria that
has budget constraints.
2.2.4 Orthodox International Trade Theories
The influential role of trade in economic development has long been accepted since
1776 when Smith published ‘The Wealth of Nations’. The popular view is that countries with
more liberal trade policies have better economic performance than those with restrictive trade
policies (Sachs and Warner, 1985 and Kruegar, 1988). So the creation of United Nations
Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the adoption of General
Agreement for Trade and Tariff (GATT), which later metamorphosed to World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995 and also ECOWAS in 1975. However, free trade is without its
consequence as it encourages capital flight and job losses, dumping of sub-standard imported
goods into developing countries, which eventually destroy local industries. Hence barriers to
trade continue to exist, and the most obvious gain from tariff is revenue generation.
Conceptually international trade is defined as exchange of goods and services
between the residents of one economy and another. The positive impact of trade has long
been supported by the traditional trade theories such as Smith’s absolute advantage theory
38
and the Richardian and Heckscher Ohlin Learner Samuelson (HOLS) models which consider
differences in comparative advantage as the basis for trade. Though they differ in some of
their assumptions and explanations of the differences in comparative advantages across
countries, the latter theories emphasize the production and consumption gains from trade.
Granting critical shortcomings, Ricardo’s theory states that a country will tend to export the
commodity in which it has comparative advantage and import the commodity in which it has
disadvantage. The summary of the HOLS model is that ‘a country would export a commodity
which uses more abundant factors more intensively and import a commodity which uses its
scarce factors more intensively. Akperan and Kayode, (2010), and Calvo and Orazen (1998),
however showed that trade liberalization of uncertain duration could lead to an upward dump
in consumption including non-trade items. Another argument is that of public revenue loss,
arising from cut or removal of tariff on traded goods. In (Adam, 2005) it is viewed that
developing countries have reaped little benefits from international trade compared to gains
that have accrued to industrialized nations from trade. In the theory of international trade, the
static gains from trade and losses from trade restrictions have been examined thoroughly. Yet,
trade theory provides little guideline as to the effects of international trade on growth and
technical progress. On the contrary, endogenous growth theory makes it clear that the gains
from trade can arise from several fundamental sources: differences in comparative advantage
and economy-wide increasing returns.
2.2.5 Endogenous Growth Theory
Endogenous growth theory was popularized by King and Robelo (1990). Economists
believed that investment in human capital, innovations and knowledge are significant
contributors to economic growth. It focuses on positive externalities and spillover effects of
knowledge based economy which will lead to development of economies and also holds that
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policy measures can have an impact on the long-run growth rate of an economy. For example,
subsidies on research and development or education increase the growth rate in some
endogenous growth models by increasing the incentive to innovation.
There is also a central role for the accumulation of knowledge as a determinant of
growth. Supporters of endogenous growth theory believed that there are positive externalities
to be exploited from the development of a high value-added knowledge economy which is
able to develop and maintain a competitive advantage in fast-growth industries within the
globe and maintain a competitive advantage in fast-growth industries within the global
economy. The main points of the endogenous growth theory are as follows: The rate of
technological progress should not be taken as a constant in growth model-government
policies can permanently raise a country’s growth rate if they lead to more intense
competition in markets and help to stimulate product and process innovation. There are
increasing returns to scale from new capital investment. The assumption of the law of
diminishing returns is questionable. Endogenous growth theorists are strong believers in the
potential of economies of scale (or increasing returns to scale) to be experienced in nearly
every industry and market. Private sector investment in research and development is a key
source of technical progress.
The theory drops two central assumptions of the Solow model, (i) that technological
change is exogenous, and (ii) that the same technological opportunities are available in all
countries. In addition, the assumption of decreasing returns to a narrow concept of capital
(including only physical capital) is replaced by the assumption of constant returns to a broad
measure of capital (including also human capital and infrastructure). It treats technology and
knowledge as economic goods in an attempt to understand the determinants of long term
growth based on learning-by-doing or investment in human capital and new technologies.
Contrary to the standard neoclassical models and that by Arrow (1962), there are invention
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costs in the creation of new technology, and there are adoption costs associated in particular
with creating the human capital required to use a new technology.
The growth model differs as to what mechanism is employed to endogenize the
impact of technical progress on growth. The mechanisms in early models (Romer, 1986;
Lucas, 1988) are dynamic externalities at the aggregate level, that is, technology is
endogenously provided as a side-effect of private investment decisions. Romer (1986)
assumes that the stock of knowledge of a firm increases in proportion to the firm's
expenditure on research and development, while spillovers from these private investments
increase public knowledge. In the absence of an effective patent market, the stock of
knowledge is like a public good. Even though Romer's model is similar to Arrow's,
technological change is endogenized, since in his model long-term growth is driven primarily
by the creation of new knowledge by forward looking, profit-maximizing, private agents. The
investment creates new knowledge which displays diminishing returns. But, given the
knowledge spillovers due, for example, to the inadequacy of patent protection, the production
of goods from new knowledge exhibits increasing returns. Since new knowledge is produced
from investment with diminishing returns, each profit-maximizing private agent who invests
in knowledge creation, and hence incurs invention costs, faces an optimal upper limit to his
investment. Thus, technical change should be responsive, endogenously, to policy, such as
tax and fiscal incentives.
2.2.6 Globalization Theory
Globalization is not a new phenomenon as it has progressed throughout the course of
history. The history was somehow disrupted and the speed slowed down until the new era of
global integration, which facilitated the removal of barriers to trade and capital flows as well
as the advancement in communications and computer technologies, which have made easy
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the collection and processing of data needed for decision making. Consequently, the world
exports of goods and services have more than tripled since 1983. These changes have also
stimulated demand for cross border trade and against the background of financial
liberalization in many countries, promoted a pool of global capital and liquidity to meet such
demand.
The economists of the Orthodox School see globalization and liberalization from the
point of solving a global problem and that capital mobility adds new resources, technology,
management and competition to capital deficit economies in a way that improves efficiency
and stimulates change in a positive direction. The Asian Tigers’ case drove home the growth
driven force of capital mobility when FDI flows were encouraged with the liberalization of
capital account transactions. In the suggestion of the New classical theorists, they maintain
that free flows of external capital should equilibrate and smoothen a country’s consumption
or production paths. It is confirmed that capital account liberalization is a necessary strategy
to attract private capital flows to substitute declining aids in developing countries. Grossman
and Helpman (1991) concluded that countries that have adopted an outward-oriented
development strategy have grown faster and achieved higher levels of standard of living than
their counterparts who engaged in protectionist trade policies. They argue further that the less
developed countries stand to gain more from international trade since they do not have capital,
both human and physical, to bring about new products by way of research and development
(R&D). Balassa (1966) argues that export-oriented policies provide incentive to sales in both
domestic and foreign markets, and concluded that “trade orientation has been an important
factor contributing to inter-country differences in the growth of output.
Obaseki (2000) concludes that Nigeria has not benefitted enough from globalization
due to over dependence on crude oil exports, low manufacturing exports and the under-
development of the domestic, financial markets. The opportunities pointed are increased
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specialization and efficiency, economies of scale in production and increased global welfare,
while the challenges are the design of appropriate .framework to ensure that domestic
monetary management is not impaired, and that the domestic economy is not unduly
destabilized owing to adverse developments in other parts of the world. To Okpokpo,
Ifelunini and Osuyah (2014) globalization has the tendency to integrate countries into the
world economy as well as create contacts for enterprises, institutions and peoples across
national boundaries. All the countries in the world today are faced with the realities of
increased integration of the world trades facilitated by the rapid growth of information
technology. and the opening up of the hitherto closed societies and economies. The world is
witnessing ever stronger links within the global market caused by a combination of powerful
cost-reducing technological change, induced policy change and political development”
(Kwanashie (1999). This same process according to Ogbonna, Uwajumogu, Chijioke and
Agu (2013) encourages rising inequality among and within nations. The liberalization of the
world economy in their view has proceeded in such a way that growth prospects of
developing countries are being undermined. Globalization produces winners and losers, both
between and within countries (World Bank, 2002). Hence, while economies of seven East
Asian countries are among the fastest growing economies in the last decade due largely to
policies of liberalization and openness, most countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) have not
been so lucky as they have witnessed decline in their economic fortune after increased
openness of their economies. Both the prosperous and retrogressive countries are products of
economic globalization.
2.2.7 The Theory of Second Best
The general theorem of the second best states that if a constraint is introduced into a
general equilibrium setting which prevents the attainment of one of the Pareto conditions,
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other Pareto conditions, although still attainable are in general, no longer desirable (Lipsey
and Lancaster, 1957). Smith and Ricardo view free trade and the unimpeded movement of
factors as the first best policy in a world which does not have any distortions. Attainment of
the Pareto optimum requires the simultaneous fulfillment of all optimum conditions. An
allocation of resources is said to be Pareto optimal if there does not exist another feasible
allocation in which some agents would be better off (in a welfare sense) and no agents worse
off. Pareto optimality is achieved exclusively under free trade such that other cases where
there are distortions – for example, tariffs, subsidies, taxes, monopolies are sub-optimal.
Before the theory of second best, trade blocs were considered to be a move closer to free
trade and therefore welfare increasing.
The theorem of second best addresses this by stating that, in the presence of
distortions, if all the conditions for Pareto optimality cannot be satisfied, then the removal of
some of the distortions does not necessarily increase welfare, nor does the addition of other
distortions necessarily decrease it. One sub-optimal situation is therefore replaced by another
sub-optimal situation. Welfare may remain unaffected, increased or decreased. In a system
with several distortions, the removal of any single distortion cannot be presumed to be
welfare improving. In other words, if an economy is prevented from attaining all the
conditions for maximum welfare simultaneously, the fulfillment of one of these conditions
will not necessarily make the economy better off. This is the general theorem of second best.
From this theorem, welfare comparisons between economic states are ambiguous when some
Pareto optimum conditions are met while others are not. Welfare comparisons need to be
done so that no one is left worse off.
2.2.8 Economic Theory of Corruption
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Apart from the chief proponent of this theory, Rose-Ackerman (1978), other
propagators include Kauffmann, Aart and Pablo (1999) and Chetwynd, Chetwynd and
Spector (2003). The African Centre for Economic Growth (2000) used the theory extensively
in their works. Lambsdorff (2007) referred to the theory as economic transmission theory or
economic theory of corruption. This theory postulates that corruption affects the macro-
economy by first impacting economic growth factors, which in turn, impact macroeconomic
development. The theory posits that corruption may impede economic growth in such ways
like discouraging foreign and domestic investment, in increasing public debt, and in
dampening entrepreneurship; in lowering the quality of public infrastructure, decreasing tax
revenues; diverting public talent into rent-seeking, and distorting the composition of public
expenditure. When corruption impedes growth through these avenues, macroeconomic goals
like poverty reduction and employment generation become unattainable.
In addition to limiting economic growth, there is evidence that corruption also
exacerbates income inequality. Black and Lynch (1994) and Goudie and David (1997), using
regression analysis has shown a positive correlation between corruption and income
inequality. Explanations for this link are that corruption distorts the economy (and the legal
and policy frameworks) allowing some to benefit more than others. Not only this, corruption
leads to unfair distribution of government resources and services, reduces the progressivity of
the tax system, increases the inequality of factor ownership and lowers households’ income.
Businesses and firms pay a higher proportion of their incomes in bribes (than do middle or
upper-income households) which discourages further reinvestment (De-Long and Summers,
1991).
2.2.9 Governance Theory of Corruption
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This Rose-Ackerman (1978) theory is the counterpart of the economic transmission
theory; it is sometimes referred to as the governance transmission theory. The scholars that
handled the economic theory like Kaufmann, Aart and Pablo (1999) and Chetwynd,
Chetwynd and Spector (2003), and others like Lambsdorff (2007), including The African
Centre for Economic Growth (2000) all directly or indirectly did researches using the theory.
This theory identifies political institutions and governance factors as critical to corruption –
macroeconomic association. According to Ackerman (1978), “Corruption affects poverty by
influencing governance factors, which in turn, impact macroeconomic performance”.
Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector (2003) assert that corruption reduces governance capacity
by weakening institutions and citizen participation. This leads to lower quantity and quality
of public sector services and infrastructure. When health and basic education expenditures are
given lower priority, (for example, in favor of capital intensive programs that offer more
opportunities for high-level rent taking), lower income groups lose services on which they
depend and the poor become poorer (Gupta and Tareeq, 2008). From the above reasoning, it
is not surprising that higher levels of corruption are consistently correlated with higher school
dropout rates, unemployment and underemployment, and high levels of infant mortality thus
lowering macroeconomic performance.
Lambsdorff (1999) and Knacks (1999) in separate studies chronicled two more
mechanisms through which corruption lowers macroeconomic performances. They note that
corruption weakens government institutions and afterward impairs governance. Impaired
governance on the other hand increases poverty by restricting economic growth and coming
full circle, the weak institutions become permissive and breed corruption by its inability to
control the corruption. Secondly, corruption that reduces governance capacity also may inflict
critical collateral damage: reduced public trust in government institutions. The incentive to
engage in productive economic activities declines. Rose-Ackerman (2001) concluded
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therefore that, corruption leads to public distrust of government which leads to crime which
frustrates macroeconomic development (particularly by either creating poverty or increasing
poverty).
Summarily, the Governance Theory postulates that corruption disrupts governance
practices, weakens institutions of public services, reduces the respect for the rule of law and
reduces public trust. This impaired governance leads to reduced social trust which reduces
cooperation of citizens and reduces tax revenue and funds available to support economic
growth developmental programs. This undermines socio-political and macroeconomic setting
which are frustrated.
2.2.10 Theoretical Linkage
Historically economic integration has been associated with the theory of customs
union as developed by Viner (1950). He built on the neo-classical free trade theory which
insisted on unhindered free trade without barriers throughout the world, arguing that the
exchange of goods and services would increase and be beneficial to all the parties within a
customs union as long as trade was created. This will lead to advantages of economies of
scale and greater revenues. At the United Nations Public Financing for Development Summit
in Monterrey in 2002, public finance experts gave their assertion on the revenue productivity
theory, pointing out that an effective tax system will encourage an efficient economy by
providing an environment conducive for business and co-operation. Smith (1776) also argued
that it made little sense to institute a tax system in which the cost of collecting the tax was
higher than the realized tax revenue, hence, revenue productivity theory agreed that the tax
base must be large enough and that the cost of operating the tax system must be low. They
emphasized the aspects of having a large enough tax base to cover at minimum cost and
stressed an efficient tax administration so as to enforce compliance. This is agreed to by the
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developmental model of government revenue and expenditure developed by Musgrave (1989)
and Rostow (1971) in their early stages of economic growth and development of a developing
economy.
Following the neoclassical model, the essence of economic integration would consist
of the freeing of group trade, a common external tariff no greater than the average existing
formerly at the national level, the prevalence of market forces with any new allocation of
production factors based on comparative advantage, and limitation of industrial specialization
agreements that could create monopolistic situations, trade distortions and a loss of welfare.
For an economy with an already established industrial base and with developed industries
these recommendations may improve the allocation of resources and contribute to a higher
rate of growth, but for an underdeveloped economy the result may be damaging to growth
and overall development. (Mackay, 1984), it is not necessarily sufficient to reject the
assumptions of the orthodox theory based on the observations that they do not hold in a
particular situation. Relaxation of some of the assumptions to accommodate other factors
may not substantially change the implications of a theory and to an extent this has been the
case when static economies of scale and public goods were included in the standard
integration theory. When compared with the studies of free trade related growth, employment,
or trade creation and diversion, there have been a relatively small number of both theoretical
and empirical studies on the revenue impact of trade integration. This is an equally important
area of inquiry, because if trade integration leads to a reduction in tax revenues, this can have
serious implications for fiscal reform of countries that have a budget constraint.
2.3 Empirical Literature
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To examine the effect of economic integration on trade tax in Nigeria the study
reviewed existing literature and chronologically presented them according to region,
international and local and the date of study.
Gudissa and Mishra (2014) in their study on Ethiopian tax structure using descriptive
analysis on the variables of tax revenues and gross domestic product, found that effective
tariff rate is much lower than the average tariff rates since integration and the contribution of
tariff to both the total tax revenue and total government revenue have also declined. They
recommended the identification of factors responsible for the slow performance of the tariff
revenue. The study was important because similar variables like customs duties, trade tax and
total tax revenue was used, but the narrative descriptive methodology is rather weak to get
good estimates especially since the stationarity properties of the data was not taken care of,
and this may lead to spurious results.
Aytac and Kilic (2014) examined the short and long term effects of trade taxes on
verticial specialization in Turkey. They adopted an Auto-Regressive Distribution Lag (ARDL)
method on Balassa’s measure of relative export – import as the measure of vertical
specialization and used variables like customs duties and export duties and discovered that
there is no statistically significant relationship between the variables in the short term, but
that there is a positive and statistical significance in the long term. Hence, they concluded that
tax on international trade in Turkey has limited, but positive effect on vertical specialization
in the long term, even if not in the short term and recommended that higher tariff can be
applied on goods. The study provides information on the behavior of some variables both in
the short term and long term that is of interest to this study which is to evaluate the effect of
economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria, using some of the
variables stated in this study.
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Mawia and Nzomio (2013) investigated tax buoyancy in Kenya adopting the
analytical method of buoyancy criteria to a gross domestic product based tax forecasting
model using taxes data found that tax bases responded well to economic changes except
excise duty, they recommended a constant review of the tax system as the economic structure
changes, stating that reasons for tax evasion should also be analyzed to help minimize non
compliance. In dealing with the buoyancy of tax, the study provided information on method
to determine the contribution of trade tax to total tax revenue which this study intends to
address.
Afesorgbor (2013) examined the effectiveness of Africa economic integration using a
meta-analytical review and comparative estimation method. He analyzes previous empirical
studies and compared their estimation method to Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood using
panel data on trade flows from 1980-2006 for 47 African countries. He found that although
there is a general positive impact of Africa RTA’s in Africa, they are highly sensitive to
different estimation methods and tend to be over-estimated when zero flows are not properly
dealt with. Sharma (2013) in a paper on the perspective of economic integration in Africa
evaluates the efficiency of economic integration initiatives in Africa, the paper argues that a
linear model of economic integration that is, FTA and custom union is inadequate to address
Africa’s needs and an alternative, inclusive and holistic model is required to do this.
Bourdon and Viji (2013) in the relationship between trade openness and economic
growth gave some new insights on the measurement issue, adopting Ordinary Least Squares
regression on the New Growth theoretical framework. They used various variables to
determine openness, they found out that countries exporting higher quality products and more
diversified products grow more rapidly. The impact of trade dependency is non-linear and are
lower it was even negative for countries whose exports are slightly diversified or of low
quality. The study is reviewed to obtain information on the methods of measurement of
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openness, and drawing policy recommendations as regards the quality of Nigeria’s export and
mono-product economy.
Cage and Gardenne (2012) in their work on the fiscal cost of trade liberalization using
panel data from the period 1945 to 2006 identified a number of episodes of decreases in tariff
revenue and investigated whether countries are able to recover lost revenue due to the
introduction of low tariff in accordance with integration policy through other tax sources.
This study is relevant in that it examined the possibility of openness and its implications for
tax revenue losses and it gave insight into the possibility of Nigeria recovering lost tariff
revenue from other sources of revenue.
Morgan and Kanchanahataki (2012) on trade liberalization and economic growth in
forty eight countries, adopted various theories of trade using difference in difference
application stated while in aggregate there appears to be a positive but small impact of trade
liberalization on economic growth, this masks a huge range of responses as a one size-fit-all
policy is not necessarily the most effective. They suggested that a base-by-base approach is
more appropriate. The study is important because it suits the view that LDCs need not apply
wholesome policies that have worked in other realms, but apply them with consideration to
particular environmental factors.
Ghani (2012) studied the impact of trade liberalization on the economic performance
of OIC member countries, using panel data on balance of payment constrained growth model.
He found that liberalization effect differ from one country to the next. However, on average
the process has improved some Countries GDP per capita in the medium term, unlike these
ones, the effect on the GDP ratio of export, import and trade did not improve after trade
liberalization, with this, he recommended that if the liberalization process fails to improve
trade, it will not be successful in improving OIC members GDP per capita. This study is
important to this research because Nigeria is a member of the Organisation of Islamic
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Countries (OIC). So it will provide good background information on the Nigeria situation and
the result obtained from this study will also collaborate or state otherwise.
Markevicius (2011) in his study optimizing the degree of economic integration
between Lithuania and Belarus defined economic integration as the first step in any form of
integration which involves the liberalization of trade regulations and rules, removal of
barriers, reduction of tariffs and/or harmonization of common external tariffs amongst
members against non-members. He stated that economic integration should not be
constrained to 'negative' integration nor should it be viewed as an alternative to other
development policies, rather it should be approached as a catalyst that creates conditions
conducive to development. The criteria by which integration is judged will depend on the
factors considered important within the theory, and by the objectives and the definition of
integration. As such 'there is probably no single measure that is adequate to portray all the
facets of a broad concept like economic integration. It is important to be explicit about what
aspects of the concept one's measures are designed to tap. However, all of the approaches he
stated are partial in nature; this limitation on evaluating integration has to be accepted as
inevitable in any empirical work. It is admitted though, that to attempt the full cost benefit
analysis would be a very large task and it is not attempted here, rather concentration is on the
aspect of it associated with trade.
Hartzenberg (2011) studied regional integration in Africa using the narrative
descriptive approach. He revealed that economic integration makes sense to Africa because
of its character of small countries, small economies and small markets but recommended the
development of infrastructure and the commitment to trade policies and agreements. This
work is important as it seems to capture the Nigeria situation in terms of the development of
markets, and commitment to policies and political will, hence it holds relevant information
required for the study
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Enrico (2009) in trade liberalization and trade tax revenues in African countries used
panel data of 53 African countries for the period 1970-2000. He used the General Moments
Method (GMM) for his estimation and concluded that there is a large trade-off between a
greater degree of openness to international trade and the revenue collected from export and
import taxation. He demonstrated the existence of the Laffer effect between trade openness
and trade tax revenue and stresses the importance of exchange rate policies along a macro-
economic stability. They study provided a platform for the determination of the degree of
openness of an economy and its implications for the economy especially as it concerns this
trade-off. It also provided information on how to ascertain the Laffer-effect on tax revenue
which is important for this study. It will build on this information to provide the Nigeria
situation given the government resort to always increase tax rates without recourse to
economic theory and legislation.
David (2007) provided a guide to measures of trade openness and policy by
evaluating various methods of trade openness, he concluded that there is no consensus yet, as
to what is (are) the ‘best’ measures of trade openness as many existing ones are poorly
specified and are simply ad-hoc measures driven by data availability. He advised continued
search for the best method. The study is reviewed to have a guide to the various methods of
measuring trade openness, and which to apply for the study. It can be concluded that the
question should not be whether a particular method produces perfect measures of openness,
since none will. The real question is which method seems likely to produce the best measures.
Babatunde (2009) in his work on how trade liberalization can stimulate export
performance in sub-Saharan Africa used a variant of the imperfect substitution model and
adopting the method of panel least squares estimation technique, he found that trade
liberalization can stimulate export performance albeit marginally and indirectly through
increased access to import inputs. He recommended that trade liberalization must be
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coordinated with effective exchange rate management. The study touch directly on economic
liberalization using trade liberalization (trade openness) which this study also adopted and
then concern itself with other explanatory variables which are of concern to the study.
Andersen and Babula (2008) in the link between openness and long run economic
growth applying various theories, concluded that there is likely to be a positive relationship
between international trade and economic growth and that there is likely to be problems of
errors of measurement. He recommended continuous analysis on methodology and
investment on education, ensuring of property rights and building up of institutions. The
study provides basic information on international trade and the limitations posed by error of
measurement but agree on continued analysis based on existing methods.
Hereden (2007) studied South Africa’s experience of the trade, development and co-
operation agreement with the European union from 1995 to the present using the cooperation
theory of international political economy. He found that the Republic of South Africa (RSA)
could be judged to have made progress but could still have done better. The short comings
are that RSA did not consult much with trading partners before negotiating with European
Union (EU). She allowed individual EU nations get involved so valuable time was lost. Some
form of power-play was also exerted by EU, hence, often times, RSA was caught off guard
by EU tough negotiating strategy. He advocated that LDCs should employ “pooled
resources” approach in WTO negotiating process, diversify their economy and take bold
stand on political and economic sovereignty. They study is important for the information it
would yield with respect to trade policy negotiations and the provision of a useful
background to the recommendations that would be made by this study.
Gupta (2007) in the determinants of tax revenue efforts in developing countries used a
broad data base of LDCs, Gross Domestic Product, Per Capita Income, agricultural Gross
Domestic Product, Openness and foreign trade. He adopted the theory of revenue
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performance index and found out structural factors such as GDP per capita, agricultural share
of GDP, trade openness have significant effect on revenue performance. Other factors are
share of taxes, corruption and political stability. He recommended increased aids to LDCs,
reduction in corruption, increase in overall political stability, and improved incentive
structure for tax officials. The study provided information on measure of trade openness, the
behavior of some variables of interest including corruption, and policy measures to improve
tax revenue performance.
Mehrara, Maki, and Tavakolian (2007) examined empirically the relationship between
oil revenue and economic growth and estimated the existence of threshold effect on output
growth in 13 Oil exporting counties including Nigeria for the period 1965-2005 applying
panel regression. The empirical result strongly suggests the existence of a threshold beyond
which oil revenue growth exerts a negative effect on output. The result indicated that
threshold affect the growth rate of oil revenue above which oil revenue significantly show
growth and it is around 18%-19% for Oil exporting countries. In contrast, a linear estimation
without any allowance for threshold effects would misleadingly have us behave that an
increase in the Oil revenue increases the growth rate.
Sindzingre (2007) in financing the developmental state; tax and revenue issues used
the endogenous growth model to find out that the key features of developmental states are the
capacity of the state to creditably commit and intervene with policies that are directed more
towards growth than taxation policies. She recommended that the state develop capacities to
coordinate policies, arrange coalition between the state, private firms and community service
organizations. On the whole, policies should be made credible and result from endogenous
processes. This study is helpful in that economic integration is a policy matter and targeted at
whole gamut of growth and development, not just tax issues, so information provided was
useful to this study.
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Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) in Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization state
with the public finances of many developing and emerging market countries still heavily
dependent on trade tax revenues, further trade liberalization may be hindered unless they are
able to develop alternative sources of revenue. While there is now a well-established body of
theory and policy advice on how this might be done in principle, the paper used panel data for
111 countries over a 25 years period and cleaned them for a variety of problems in standard
data sources—to ask what has happened in practice: whether countries have recovered from
other sources the revenues they have lost from past episodes of trade liberalization? High-
income countries clearly did recover. For middle-income countries, recovery has been in the
order of 45–60 cents for each dollar of lost trade tax revenue, with signs of close to full
recovery when separately identifying episodes in which trade tax revenues fell. Troublingly,
however, revenue recovery has been extremely weak in low-income countries (which are
those most dependent on trade tax revenues): there is no much evidence that the presence of
value-added tax has made it easier to cope with the revenue effects of trade integration.
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) in their paper “Trade Liberalization and Growth: New
Evidences” did correct some of the problems with the Sachs-Warner variable while retaining
their basic approach. The authors revised the Sachs-Warner criteria in order to correct for the
biases pointed out by Rodrik and Rodriguez and others on the effect of economic integration
and extended their data to cover the 1990s. They summarized their results by revisiting the
evidence on the cross-country effects of Sachs and Warner’s simple dichotomous indicator of
outward orientation on economic growth confirming the pitfalls of this indicator as first
underlined by Rodrik and Rodriguez Additionally, they showed that the partitioning of
countries according to the Sachs and Warner dichotomous indicator, while it effectively
separates fast growing countries from slow growing ones in the 1980s and to a lesser extent
in the 1970s, fails to do so in the 1990s. They did not stop there, they went on to build a
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time-dependent index of liberalization based on a country’s date of trade liberalization. This
exercise uses as its starting point Sachs and Warner’s liberalization dates, a somewhat
different exercise that did not play such a central role in their original analysis.
Lopez (2003) on the impact of trade liberation on trade balance, the balance of
payment and economic growth in Mexico used variables of export, import, Gross Domestic
Product in an OLS model applying the traditional trade theory found that the effect of trade
liberalization on balance of payment (BOP) is not significant. The increase in the income
elasticity of demand for imports has not been compensated by a higher rate of growth of
exports and this has contributed to the slow growth of Mexico’s long run equilibrium growth
rate. This has great implications for its credit worthiness and sustainable economic growth.
The review was done to obtain information on the behavior of variables of interest used for
the study, and the fact that elasticity of imports did not induce higher exports as enthused by
theory, so interested getting information as it will apply to Nigeria.
Yanikkaya (2003) studied trade openness and economic growth in a cross country
analysis using empirical investigation. Employing panel data for 100 countries, he adopted
several econometric models, like the OLS multiple regression, 3 Stage least squares, and the
Seemingly Unrelated Regression. He observed that contrary to conventional views on the
growth effect of trade barriers, his results showed that this is positive and mostly in
specifications significantly associated with growth in least developing countries. The interest
in this study concerns the various econometric method used including that of trade openness
information on its use, strength, weakness and acceptance.
At a UN (2002) International Conference on Financing for Development held in
Monterrey, France from 18-22, March, 2002, Public Finance experts came out with a
document titled the “Monterrey Consensus” which spelt out, the revenue productivity
principle built on Adam’s Smith economy principle of a tax. They stated that for a tax to
57
yield adequate revenue, it’s base must be large enough to cover the cost of collection, even as
it increases compliance.
Dollar and Kraay (2004) in their paper Trade, Growth and Poverty, examined some of
the measurement and robustness issues that had been raised in the discussion on openness, by
looking at differences in openness over time and its correlation with changes in growth rates.
They argued that many of the reasons for which we could be skeptical of cross-sectional
results on openness and growth have to do with omitted variables and simultaneity problems
that can be significantly diminished in a first-difference analysis. The main problem with a
first-difference approach would be that it throws away valuable information and may increase
measurement error first-differences. Whether this correlation is spurious or not is an open
question: their solution to the identification problem which is to instrument the first
differences with lagged levels is far from perfect. If shocks are persistent over time, this will
not be an appropriate solution to simultaneity problems; it also leaves open the problem of
omitted variables such as institutions.
Dollar and Kraay’s findings can be summarized in two key facts. First, they found
that countries that have increased their exposure to international trade – which they label
“globalizers” - have increased their growth rates from 2.9% in the 1970s to 5.0% in the 1980s,
while those that have seen their growth rate decline from 3.3% to 1.4% over the same period.
Secondly, they found that trade shares have a significant effect on growth in a first-
differences instrumental variables regression that is presumed to reduce simultaneity and
omitted variable biases.
Khattry and Rao (2002) examined the impact of trade liberalization on the level
and structure of government expenditures across countries, with particular emphasis
on low income countries. They develop the argument that policies employed during
trade liberalization have resulted in a fiscal squeeze as a result of declining tax revenues
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and rising interest expenditures. To surmount this fiscal hurdle, expenditures on
physical capital, which have negligible political ramifications have been reduced. Other
more politically sensitive expenditures, such as spending on social capital, have been
financed by incurring additional debt. However, additional debt has exerted upward
pressure on interest payments and further exacerbating the fiscal situation. The
statistical analysis carried out to examine the evidence uses panel data for eighty
developing and industrialized countries over the period 1970–98 and employs a fixed–
effects regression framework to account for country–specific characteristics. The results
indicate that trade liberalization has indeed resulted in declining revenues and higher
interest expenditures and that these factors have contributed to the observed decline in
infrastructure spending.
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) took the writings of the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariff /World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO) agreements, using vigorous economic
theory from the frontiers of international trade, political economy, industrial organisation and
game theory to form their models. The result showed that the GATT/WTO’s core underlying
principles are efficiency enhancing, illustrating that the GATT/WTO does have an economic
foundation.
. Ademoyehu, Geda and Gabret (2002) studied regional economic integration in Africa
reviewing the problems and prospects in theories with COMESA as case study. They used
panel data and various traditional trade theories which revealed that regional groupings have
had an insignificant effect on the flow of bilateral trade. This performance is mainly
constrained by problems of variation in initial condition, compensation issues, real political
commitment, over-lapping membership and policy harmonization and poor private sector
participation. They further recommended that integration should not be seen as a lingering
pan-African ideology, but more importantly as an economic survival strategy aimed at
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combating marginalization from the global economy. This literature is important as it seems
to address issues which the study considered as hindrances to an effective economic
integration in Africa, and which can be applied to the case of Nigeria.
Gunnning (2001) researched the relevance of trade blocs in Africa. In a narrative
descriptive method he found that Africa trade blocs are largely pursued for political reasons,
hence the economic effects are dubious and may reduce the welfare of its members,
particularly if the rest of the world is the marginal supplier. He concludes that if a bloc is set
up for political reasons, then it is desirable that it unilaterally lowers external tariffs so as to
reduce trade diversion and income convergence.
Mwaba (2000), studied Policy Options for African Countries in a Global Economy in
terms of trade liberalization and Growth. He found out that African countries have not
embraced trade liberalization in the manner that other developing regions have. Protectionist
measures which have taken various forms, including tariffs, quantitative restrictions,
exchange controls and downright import bans have been implemented with poor result on the
economy. In fact, the New growth theorists contend that traditional analysis tended to
consistently underestimate the welfare costs of protectionism, because they ignored the
effects of the introduction of new goods on technological progress, domestic production and
growth associated with free trade. In this paper we conclude that while opening an economy
to trade may not provide the desired quick fix, the removal or relaxation of quantitative
import and export restrictions and lowering of tariffs may result in increased exports and
growth, hence the dawn of a global economy ushered in by universal trade liberalization,
therefore, need not spell catastrophe for African economies as is widely feared.
Thirwall (2000) in his study stated since 1950 there has been a massive liberalization
of world trade taking various forms including the formation of free trade areas, customs
unions, unilateral reductions in tariff barriers, and reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade. To
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what extent has this liberalization contributed to the growth performance of countries, and
what are the mechanisms through which faster export growth may impact favourably on
economic growth? His paper first surveys the empirical literature which seems to show that
countries that participate in regional trading agreements (RTAs) fare worse than countries
which reduce tariffs unilaterally, and secondly, he went further to comment on theoretical
literature related to the mechanisms through which exports affect growth. It is argued that the
orthodox neoclassical supply-side argument is only half the story, and much more emphasis
needs to be placed on the effect of export performance in relaxing a balance of payments
constraint on demand.
Kusi (1998), evaluated the revenue productivity of Ghana’s overall tax system and of
individual taxes on the basis of estimates of tax buoyancies and elasticities. He also looked at
the links between the tax reform of 1983-1993 and revenue performance, as well as looked at
ways of mobilizing additional revenue. The analysis showed that tax reform has had
significant impact on the productivity of both the individual taxes and the overall tax system.
All the individual taxes, except for cocoa export tax and excise duties showed buoyancies and
elasticities of more than unity during the reform period, thereby causing the overall tax
system to have a buoyancy and elasticity of more than unity each. Various revenue
enhancement options were found to be available for use by the tax authorities. These options
include the introduction of VAT to replace the existing sales tax, and further improvement in
the tax administration to increase tax collection and to combat evasion and fraud.
Sachs and Warner (1997) did a study on sources of slow growth on African
economies applied the Barro approach using the variables of Real Gross Domestic Product,
indices of openness, inflation and life expectancy. He revealed that slow growth can be
explained in terms of poor economic policies most especially lack of openness to
international markets. So they recommended African economies should open their economies,
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close infrastructural gap and treat health deficiencies through special policies. This is useful
to this study because it seeks to find factors hindering sustainable growth and seeks to know
if openness is a factor that would help to fasten growth.
Krueger (1997) in her work on trade policy and the economy, a historical overview of
trade policy concepts concluded that trade policies play a crucial role in economic
development. Adopting the comparative analysis theory of international trade, she
recommended that a well considered trade policy provides a blue-print that should be
embraced by government, and that policies often times are not bad but its interpretation may
be due mainly to the application of non economic principles by practitioners. The study is
important to this study because economic integration is a trade policy and this would help
bring to the fore the problems that affects policy implementations.
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) pointed out that conventional trade creation and
trade diversion are not the entire story in deciding on the welfare outcome for an individual
member of a trade bloc. Even if trade creation is larger than trade diversion so that the bloc as
a whole benefits, an individual member could lose on account of adverse income distribution
effects arising from tariff revenue redistribution. This implies that, when an economy with a
high degree of protection forms a trade bloc with an economy with relatively open markets,
the former may well be faced with a net welfare loss.
Scully and Fellow (1991) in investigating tax rates, tax revenue and economic growth
used the Laffer Curve theory to reveal the optional rates for various forms of taxes, but that
many countries attempt to impose marginal tax rates much higher than the rates which
maximizes government revenue. These countries damage their economies and often collect
very little revenue in return. They recommended that government that limit the size of public
sector have the best chance of enjoying high rates of economic growth, and more over, the
promotion of economic growth results in more revenue for the government than trying to
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collect the most possible taxes each and every year. This study is important to this research
work because of the concept of Laffer curve for the policy of the Nigerian government which
always resorts to tariff increases without recourse to theoretical economic analysis. Hence
this will provide information that will lead to examining the Laffer effect on trade revenue in
Nigeria.
Grossman and Helpman (1991), studying innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy indicated that trade openness would affect growth positively provided that the
decrease in tariffs increase the resources allocated to research and development (R&D). If the
reduction in tariffs reduces the resources allocated to R&D, then a decrease in growth will be
observed. They suggested there may be few political incentives for further global integration.
Thus, integration is viewed as establishing a long-term dynamic towards more complete
global integration, and hence it is likely to be beneficial in the long run.
Harrison (1996), in Openness and Growth using a time series cross-country analysis
for Developing Countries makes a synthesis of previous empirical studies between openness
and the rate of GDP growth, comparing the results from cross-section and panel estimations
while controlling for country effects. Harrison concluded that on the whole, correlations
across openness measures seem to be positively associated with GDP growth - the more open
the economy, the higher the growth rate, or the more protected the local economy, the slower
the growth in income. On the other hand, trade restrictions or barriers are associated with
reduced growth rates and social welfare and countries with higher degrees of protectionism
on average tend to grow at a much slower pace than countries with fewer trade restrictions.
This is because tariffs reflect additional direct costs that producers have to absorb which
could reduce output and growth.
Mackay (1984) in studying the effects of economic integration on lesser developed
countries developed the use of trade flow model in the evaluation of economic integration in
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the third world. He concentrated on three related issues (a) as a state of affairs (b) evaluation
of the desired objectives and (c) what is the cost of achieving these objectives. He developed
the trade flow model as one of the aspects of the evaluation framework, and used it to
estimate the effects of integration on trade flows in the Caribbean Community (Caricom)
over the period 1967 to 1976. He extended the use of the trade flow model from the
aggregated form of the equation to estimates of intra and extra regional trade flows, total
imports and exports of the region and to the trade flows of the individual member countries.
Based on these results and the evaluation of Caricom he was able to determine the extent to
which the model isolates the effects of economic integration on trade flows.
According to Viner (1950) penetrating analysis on the customs union issue, both free
traders and protectionists argued in favour of trade blocs. The former saw only the benefits of
free intra bloc trade while the latter emphasized the benefits of protection from non-members
goods. Viner’s introduction of the key concepts of trade creation and trade diversion however,
demonstrated that trade blocs were not necessarily welfare improving, whether for member
states or globally, such that trade blocs might harm welfare where the trade creating force is
predominant, one of the members at least must benefit, both may benefit, the two combined
must have a net benefit, and the world at large benefits. Secondly, there would be those goods
that prior to integration were imported from a third (non-union) country, but with the removal
of the tariffs on intra-union trade will be imported from other union members. From the free
trade point of view where the trade diverting effect is predominant, one at least of the
member countries is bound to be injured, both may be injured, the two combined will suffer a
net injury, and there would be injury to the outside world. The welfare effects of the customs
union was evaluated in terms of the resource cost of the new supplier, trade creation being a
reduction in resource costs and therefore a benefit and trade diversion an increase in resource
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costs and considered a cost. The relative magnitude of these two effects determines the net
welfare change of the customs union.
Oluwaseyi and Maku (2013) studied trade openness, foreign direct investment and
economic growth in Nigeria. Using a regression growth model on globalization theory, they
found estimates indicating that trade openness and foreign direct investment exert positive
and negative effect on economic growth respectively even as they have a long run
relationship. Also fiscal deficits and inflation were found to be growth increasing. They
suggested the adoption of structural trade oriented policies to enhance economic growth in
Nigeria via higher export flows in order to accumulate more foreign proceeds to boost output
growth rate in Nigeria. The study was reviewed to obtain information of the calculation on
trade openness, and to observe the behavior of some variables of interest used in the study. It
provided information on the export policy review.
Akeem (2013) in performance evaluation of foreign trade and economic growth in
Nigeria agreed that foreign trade plays a vital role in restructuring economic and social
attributes of countries around the world. The workings of an economy in terms of growth rate
and per capita income have been based on domestic production, consumption activities and in
conjunction with foreign transaction of goods and services. Foreign trade has not helped in
promoting economic growth because the Nigeria economy still experiences some element of
economic instability and this has also turned the country into an import dependent economy.
The study focuses on the workings of trade on Nigeria’s economic growth and, the Ordinary
least square (OLS) Multiple regression techniques was used on data extracted from CBN
statistical bulletin golden jubilee edition. From the study, it was observed that export, import,
and exchanged rate are all negatively related to real output of Nigeria with 19%, 8.7% and
52% respectively for the period 1970 to 2005. With this, it could be said that, foreign trade
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policies should be reexamined and competitive products should be produced by local
industries.
Oriakhi and Osemwegie (2013) studied tax incentives and revenue productivity in the
Nigerian tax system. They adopted the theory of tax structure using taxes revenue for the
period 1981-2009, upon which they applied the OLS methodology. They found
unsatisfactory the level of total tax revenue productivity in Nigeria, stating that this is due to
institutional failures, non-compliance and negligence prevailing in the oil and non oil sectors,
including a poor tax effort. The study is important to obtain information on the reasons for
low tax performance in Nigeria, how institutional failures contributed to poor tax efforts. It
will also provide information on the behaviour of some variables that are of interest. They
recommended a policy that would reduce or eliminate corruption and inefficiency in the
system.
Nwosa, Saibu and Fakunle, (2012) did a study on the effect of trade liberalization on
trade tax revenue in Nigeria. The study adopted the Wald Test applied to time series data for
the period of 1970-2009. They found that trade liberalization, public debt, trade openness,
GDP and labour force exerted positive influence on total revenue while exchange rate has a
negative effect. They recommended an appropriate macroeconomic policy to enhance the
success of trade liberalization policy in Nigeria. Their study provided relevant information to
this study which improved on it by (i) providing a contemporary analysis in terms of the data
used 1970-2014, so it is a time update. This study include important variables; corruption,
foreign direct investment and exchange rate which are also relevant to the determination of
the effect of economic integration on trade tax performance in Nigeria. In theory, this study
adopts a different theory in relation to economic integration and linked same to revenue
productivity theory and in methodology, this study used the method of OLS multiple
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regression analysis which has optimal properties, as against the Wald Test used. Also,
relevant diagnostic and tests were conducted to ensure an adequate result is obtained.
Kumolu (2012) reports on the shocking revelation about how Nigeria lost N37.2
billion as a result of import waivers that were granted to importers. Laboya and Mgbame
(2012) in their work on indirect tax and economic growth used the endogenous growth theory
and adopted the co-integration and error correction model revealed a negative and
insignificant relationship between indirect tax and economic growth in Nigeria. They
recommended that emphasis should be shifted from indirect tax as a growth driver in Nigeria
and advice a diversification of the mono-product economy. The study was important given
that an insignificant effect of indirect tax on economic growth is in contrast to economic a
priori, especially as this study is seeks to find the relationship between an indirect tax (trade
tax) and its effect on economic integration in Nigeria.
Igberase and Diania (2012) looked at trade openness (globalization) and economic
growth questions in Nigeria an empirical evaluation. Using globalization theory and adopting
Analytical statistical method, used OLS co-integration they found that there is a long run
relationship between economic integration and globalization. They recommended that
Nigeria should embrace global integration without looking for short run gains, but with
readiness to allow a gestation period. The study defined economic openness like that done by
this study, and also adopted the co-integration method to determine the long run relationship
between the variables.
Worlu, Christian and Nkoro (2012) examined tax revenue and economic development
in Nigeria using a macro-econometric approach. The study used data covering the period
from 1980-2007, and adopted the 3 stages least square estimation technique, they found that
tax revenue stimulates economic growth through infrastructural development and foreign
direct investment (FDI). They recommended that tax revenue can materialize its full potential
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in the economy through fiscal laws and legislation and the strengthening of existing ones in
line with macroeconomic objectives and check mating officers to minimize corruption, tax
evasion and avoidance. The study provides information addressing the ultimate aim of trade
tax collection, which is economic development, and ways of addressing factors that affect it,
hence the information is relevant to this study.
Okwori and Ochinyabo (2014) doing an assessment of Value Added Tax and its effect
on revenue generation in Nigeria 1986-2012 used secondary data of Personal Income Tax,
Customs and Excise Duties, Company Income Tax, Value Added Tax (VAT) concluded from
the estimates obtained through the buoyancy method that there is a positive relationship
between Total federally collectible revenue and Value added tax. They observed from the
coefficient of custom duties obtained that a huge revenue earning potential exists in the tax
and it should be examined more, especially as it it was the highest revenue earner before the
present day dependency on volatile oil revenue.
Ozulumba (2011) in his study on trade and economic growth in Nigeria applied the
endogenous growth model through the OLS model estimation technique, he found out that
trade, FDI and exchange rate have positive and insignificant relationship with economic
growth while inflation rate is positive. He suggested the adoption of deeper and significant
policy frameworks and also practical measures taken to improve the contribution of trade tax
to make it more significant to the people’s well-being. This study provided information on
Nigeria’s trade policy, and the result obtained is quite interesting for this study which used
some of the variables used in the study.
Akah (2011) researching on the need for parliamentary intervention on Nigeria’s trade
policy used descriptive statistics to state that law makers must work towards legislations that
keeps off the track of commerce and towards policies and programmes that build and strongly
establish the productive base. Placing emphasis on infrastructure, technology and agriculture,
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he recommended that trade legislation should be based on economic competitiveness, support
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and be consistent. The study review was important to
obtain information on trade policies in Nigeria, especially since this study is expected to
make policy recommendations.
Emeka (2010) in trade openness and output growth in Nigeria did an econometric
analysis using the non-monotonic econometric model method of Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) for the period 1970 – 2007, he found that there is an inverted u-shaped (non-
monotonic) relationship between trade openness and output growth in Nigeria. He concluded
that an optional control of trade is necessary to curb smuggling and other vices at the borders,
but encourage proper regulation of tariff to stem smuggling. This study was important to
align the calculation of the degree of openness and try to address a proper and adequate tariff
rate to stem smuggling. Ekeocha (2010) did a study on modeling the potential economic
effect of tax policy reform in Nigeria, using a computable general equilibrium analysis, his
study revealed that the policy of increasing the rate of taxes in Nigeria will improve
government revenue and normal GDP, but at the expense of real GDP and worsening level of
unemployment. He therefore calls for a careful tax transformative structure that will boost
production and improve the real GDP and the level of employment.
Kargbo and Egwarkhide (2009) examined the effect of tax reforms and discretionary
tax measures on revenue productivity in Sierra-Leone. Using a simultaneous equation model
for the period between 1977-2009 estimation result showed that even though discretionary
tax measures were largely effective in mobilizing additional tax revenues the tax system were
largely inelastic. So the tax system is unproductive and the portmanteau of tax reforms
implemented in Sierra-leone did not achieve the primary objective of raising revenue and
they recommended a general consumption tax such as VAT to raise the productivity of
Sierra- leone tax system.
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Nwafor, Adenikinju, and Ogujuiba (2007) in evaluating the effects of the ECOWAS
trade liberalization scheme on poverty found out that it favoured capital intensive sectors
such that rural poverty increased in the short and long run even though urban poverty
decreased in both periods. It had negative implications for rural households due to the
dependence of the latter on land and labour income. Ajayi (2005) in his work regional
financial and economic integration in West Africa adopted the traditional trade theory using
the gravity model for his analysis. He found out that participation in the CFA monetary union
and the ECOWAS PTA appear to have improved inter-regional trade but for political
instability, fiscal misbehavior. He recommended addressing the difficulties of fiscal
restructuring to harness the advantages of external support and confront political instability.
The study brought into focus the analysis of political instability and its effect on fiscal
misbehavior and addressed issues of colonial interference of political and socio-economic
policies in West Africa.
Manson, Ogujuiba, and Adeola (2005) studied the impact of trade liberation on
poverty in Nigeria. They used a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) in
all cases, the result suggested greater rural household vulnerability to poverty especially at
20% tariff regime as poverty increased in all its ramifications. They said there is a need to
pay special attention to rural areas development as general poverty level is driven by the
extent of rural poverty. Trade liberalization is a path to economic integration the subject
matter of this study and poverty in Nigeria is an issue of concern for policies of taxation. The
study also used variables that are of interest to this study, so it was important to review this
study.
Ogujiuba, Oji and Adenuga (2004) used co-integration approach to find out if trade
openness is valid for Nigeria found out that Nigeria witnessed tariff reduction following its
multilateral and regional trade arrangements especially in the textile and manufacturing
70
sector. The study was useful because it concerns fears about the loss of revenue that this
study also raised, hence providing some level of guide to the work. Okoh (2004) in Global
integration and the growth of Nigeria’s non oil exports employed the vector error correction
model to delineate the long run relationship between growth in non oil, growth in capital
inputs and global integration. Her findings showed that while Nigeria is unable to gain from
greater integration and trade, her trading partners (exporters of capital inputs) gained from
greater access into the Nigeria market. She concluded by stating though Nigeria needs to look
inward for solutions to the declining trade, there is a need to renegotiate her commitments
with a view to increasing tariffs, even though this is contrary to WTO assertions, insisting
that the WTO tariffication is hurting the Nigerian economy.
Gbayesola and Uga (1999) studied the average responsiveness and inter-temporal
stability of government revenue in Nigeria from 1970-1995 using regression analysis and
other test statistics to determine inter temporal stability. They found out that total federally
collectible revenue was more responsive to change in income. It was also found out that the
magnitude of parameter estimate measuring responsiveness to change in tax revenue to
change in tax rate and tax reform diminished significantly as the economy move away from
1980. Uwatt (1999) examined the performance of major revenue and their productivity based
on buoyancy measures from 1970-1996. Using OLS estimation techniques he found out that
the productivity of revenue in Nigeria over the sample period was generally low, the overall
productivity varies between 1.14 and 1.33 while the corresponding figures of tax revenue are
between 0.63 and 1.14. This low productivity has also been found partly to reflect
ineffectiveness on tax administration which has a far reaching implication for income
mobilization. He suggested options that are opened to government; (i) determine optimal tax
rate to agreed level of expenditure (ii) determine optimal level of expenditure and tax rate. He
concluded that the various categories of revenue could however be enhanced with appropriate
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tax reforms in tax administration machinery as well as improvement in the revenue act and
the general level of economic activity. He recommended customs duties for further studies
because of its antecedent and inherent potential.
Ariyo (1997) studied the productivity of the Nigerian tax system: 1970-1990 did an
evaluation based on the OLS estimation method using secondary data for analysis. The
findings found the Nigeria revenue sustainable for the period under study, but suggested
customs duties for further studies as a tax that has huge potentials given that the oil revenue
source is volatile. Obiozor, Olukoshi and Obi (1996) in examining West Africa regional
economic integration from Nigeria’s policy perspective for the 1990’s in a narrative
descriptive approach identified lack of commitment, political will and division along colonial
ties as the limitations of economic integration in the region. They recommended a review of
Structural Adjustment Programme in favour of some state interventions to mitigate the harsh
effects of SAP and rapid economic integration even in the face of economic crisis. The study
was important to obtain information on problems of economic integration and how this can
be mitigated in this study.
2.3.1 Gap in Literature
It is evident from the above review that there is no consensus among empirical studies
on the impact of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue. In the light of this,
this study carried out a country specific analysis for the period 1970 to 2015 to examine the
direction of the effect on Nigeria. Some studies (Uwatt, 1999; Ariyo, 1997) on the revenue
performance of taxation in Nigeria are no longer contemporary so this study for the period
1970 – 2015, is of a longer period and is more current. This study also takes cognizance of
the fact of the contemporary challenges of diversifying the revenue base and the opportunities
integration provides for export led economic growth strategy. To be in a position to track
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Nigeria’s performance in trade tax revenue there is a need to ascertain past performance, on
the basis of which to project the prospect of improved trade- trade tax revenue in the future.
The study improved on a study on Nigeria by Nwosa, Saibu, and Fakunle (2012) by
including only very important variables; Foreign direct investment (FDI), Exchange rate
(EXR), Lending interest rate (LIR) and Corruption (CPI) to determine the productive
capacity of the policy implementing environment. The existing literature looked at trade
integration and economic growth, ignoring a significant link between them, trade tax, this
perhaps is one of the reasons for ineffective macro-economic policy decisions. Also, results
obtained from previous empirical researches did not go in the same direction hence, this
study also contributes to this pool of empirical studies.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
3.1 Theoretical Model
Traditional trade theories have argued in favour of trade generating economic gains,
but not until Viner’s Customs. Union Theory (1950) penetrating analysis of trade creation
and trade diversion that it became known that trade blocs are not necessarily growth
improving, as it could also result in economic loss. He stated economic integration policy will
generate gains from exchange, specialization and economies of scale which would yield
growth in trade and consequently trade tax. Hence the relationship between trade tax and
trade can be explained by the equation; TRT = f (TOT), where trade tax is the summation of
tariff revenue from the export and import of goods by a country, as captured in the Central
Bank Statistical Bulletin in Nigeria. While INT reflects economic integration policies of
liberalizing trade rules and regulations, removal of trade barriers and the
lowering/harmonizing of common external tariff against non-members of the Union by the
members of the Union, for which data can hardly be obtained. Hence, it is measured by the
widely accepted and used trade openness ratio (David, 2007). Greenway, Morgan and Wright
(2002) agreed that most measures of openness have problems. Winters, McCulloch and
Mackay (2004) also buttressed this assertion.
The major weakness of this simple elucidation by Viner (1950) was the static nature
of its analysis, but this was overcome by subsequent developments made by Meade (1955) in
“trade expansion’ effect and Lipsey (1957, 1960) in “production and consumption” effects.
Their analysis added a dynamic dimension to the Customs Union theory, which Balassa’s
(1978) dynamic theory of economic integration further proved. Grossman and Helpman
(1991) suggest that a conducive environment must be created for implementing economic
integration policy for it to create economic gains or else economic loss will ensue. Winters
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(1999) pointed out that economic integration does not have a direct impact on trade tax.
Rather, it could only impact on it by influencing its direct determinants. Similarly, Obokoh
(2008) and Meier (1995) agreed with this assertion. This consequently allowed the
introduction of other explanatory variables to examine the impact of economic integration on
growth variables. This study in line with Kareem (2010), Ibrahim et al (2013), Ogbeidi
(2012), Nwosa, Saibu and Fakunle (2012), Enrico, (2009), Obadan (2006), Ajayi (2003),
Kebede, Fekadu and Arady (2011) introduced FDI, EXR, LIR, CPI to this analysis, not only
to examine the effect of economic integration on trade tax in Nigeria, but also to examine the
ability of the productive capacity of the economy to grow trade tax using the stated variables
as important determinants of growth in the economy.
3.2 Model Specification
Using a simplified regression estimate, the empirical relationship between trade tax
revenue, trade and economic integration can be expressed as follows;
TRT = f (INT, TOT) - - - eqn. 1
Given these the relationship can be expressed as;
TRT =    t
    th  hth  - - - eqn. 2
Taking note of the assertions made by Harrison (1996), Obokoh (2008), Grossman and
Helpman (1991) on implementing environment, and the view of Winters (1991) on
influencing determinants of trade tax, other explanatory variables were added to equation 2.
These are FDI, EXR, LIR, in line with Nwosa, Saibu and Fakunle (2012), and Suparerk
(2009).
Hence, the equation can be restated as;
TRT =    t
    th  hth   t    th    h  - - - eqn. 3
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Finally, motivated by the assertion of Ogbeidi (2012) and Ibrahim et al (2013) on corruption
evidenced by the Transparency international (TI, 2014) computation on Nigeria, this study
includes corruption as an important explanatory variable such that the equation becomes;
TRT =    t
    th  hth   t    th    h   t   - - - eqn. 4
To this end therefore, the specified model for this study is provided in the following
equation;
hhh         t th     hth      t       th       h      t  - - - eqn. 5
Introducing the stochastic function yields;
hhh         t th     hth      t       th       h      t  + Ut - - - eqn. 6
Taking the natural logarithm function, the equation becomes
 H hhh    H       t H  th      H hth      H  t       H  th 
   H   h      H  t       --- eqn. 7
The logarithm transformation of data was done as a means of removing growth overtime in
the variance of data, and to give absolute values to variable data.
Where, bo is the intercept and b1, to b6, are coefficients of the parameters.
The a priori expectation is stated as: b1, b2, b3 > 0, and b4, b5, b6 < 0.
Buoyancy of Trade Tax
The aim of this study is not only to analyze economic integration and the growth of
trade tax revenue but also to estimate the buoyancy of trade tax revenue to total tax revenue
in Nigeria from 1970 to 2015. Estimate of tax elasticities are traceable to the works of Sahota
(1961), Prest (1962), Osoro (1993), Kusi (1998) and Ariyo (1997), Murithii and Moyi (2003).
In the assessment of tax revenue performance, two measures are normally utilized. These are
buoyancy of tax revenue and income-elasticity of tax (Osoro, 1993).The former could be
defined as the positive response of tax revenue to the combined effects of automatic growth,
(growth emanating from economic activities) and the growth resulting from discretionary
changes in tax rates and rules. The latter refers to changes in tax revenue due to changes not
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only in income but also other discretionary changes in tax revenue due to changes in tax
policy.
In examining the contribution of trade tax to total tax in Nigeria this study utilized the
regression equation below;
TRT = a GDPb _________________________________eqn 8
In logarithm form;
 Ro  o     Ro     h  Ro  th __________________________________eqn 9
Where the coefficient ‘a’ denotes the level of the `tax yield on trade tax (TRT) when
the explanatory variable Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is zero, and the coefficient ‘b’ gives
the performance. The log transform of this equation allowed the derivation of buoyancy
coefficient β, this is often done in time series analysis as a means of removing growth
overtime in the variance of data, it also removes skewness, elements of heteroscedasticity and
gives absolute values to variable data, and even to take care of outliers.
The performance model adopted in this study is akin to that employed by Kusi (1998)
for the estimation of the Ghanaian tax system. The point of departure of the present study is
the replacement of elasticity for buoyancy in the decomposition process of tax to base and
base to income thereby eliminating the elasticity approaches which require the isolation of
the impact of discretionary tax measures. This approach was preferable, partly for the
peculiar reasons advanced above and mostly because discretionary tax change is a pervasive
phenomenon in Nigeria’s trade and taxation policies.
To consider further trends in revenue from the trade tax revenue (TRT), we
decompose tax buoyancy to obtain the buoyancy of trade tax (TRT) revenue with respect to
its tax base, total foreign trade (TOT) and the buoyancy of the tax base with respect to
income Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This can be expressed as follows:
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  t  
  th
 th
 t  
___________________eqn 10
Where
TRTi is tax revenue from Trade tax
TOTi is the Base of the Trade tax revenue (Total foreign trade)
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the Base of Total foreign trade for the period.
This decomposition of buoyancy into Tax to Base and Base to Income is very useful
for policy analysis. Since it tells us which component of growth that is amenable to policy
manipulation and to obtain estimates in order to investigate the responsiveness of tax base
and tax administration.
To compare the performance of the tax system, we regress buoyancy over the stated
period on the platform of E-views 8.0. β (eqn.9) provides the estimate of tax buoyancy. That
is, it measures the change in trade tax revenue due to a change in GDP, and the effect of
discretionary changes in tax policy in percentage terms. On a priori ground, it is expected to
be positive.
Explanation, Measurement and Justification of Variables
(i) Trade Tax (TRT): Trade tax is taxes on international trade which is the sum of import
and export duties as stated in CBN annual statistical bulletin. It is a component of total tax
revenue in Nigeria. It is a major source of revenue, measured in N’Billions in this study with
implications for the entire macro-economy of Nigeria. It is an endogenous variable in this
study, and the main variable affected by economic integration and consequently, affect the
revenue of the country.
(ii) Economic Integration (INT)
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The degree of openness was used as proxy for economic integration in this study. It was
measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. Since revenue of the Nigeria economy
especially from the perspective of trade revenue, tend to have high dependency on
international trade, an increase in the degree of openness is expected to bring about higher
trade revenue. It measures the international competitiveness of the Nigerian economy in the
global market. Theory advocates that with increasing integration a positive relationship is
expected between economic integration and trade tax.
(iii) Total Trade (TOT)
This is the summation of the total value of imports into Nigeria and export from
Nigeria. It is the total value of merchandize trade of Nigeria with the rest of the world. It is
measured in N’Billions and is important as the base of Trade tax, and form part of the
components used in the measurement of economic integration. It is expected to have a
positive effect on trade tax.
(iv) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Foreign Direct Investment is a measure of the inflow of foreign investment into the
country. It is measured in N’billions computed in monetary terms by the CBN from which
this study obtained figure for the period of the study from its annual statistical bulletin for the
various years. It is prominent as a major incentive for economic integration given its link with
two major economic variables of export and economic growth in the productive capacity of
an economy. It is expected to be positive with trade tax as it is a basis for mutual trade and
increases the degree of economic integration.
(v) Exchange Rate (EXR)
This is the nominal exchange rate at which the domestic currency is being exchanged
for foreign currency. it is an external shock to the economy. Currency
appreciation/depreciation could potentially lead to a lower/higher volume of imports and
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lower/higher trade revenue. Hence, a positive/negative relationship is expected between
exchange rate and trade tax revenue. Generally, for developing African countries the
relationship between exchange rate and the performance of the economy is important. It is
also used to determine whether domestic industries are competitive in international trade
given their productive capacity and the level of the availability of foreign exchange.
Lending Interest Rate (LIR)
This is the cost of borrowing, the rate which determines the demand for and supply of
loan-able fund in the economy. A low interest rate stimulates businesses to borrow exerting
positively on exports by boosting productive capacity and consequently boosting tax revenue.
This variable is important in this study to show and determine the impact of fiscal deficit and
public debt on the economy in terms of examining the “crowding out” effect of government
financing its deficit as a result of inadequate revenue probably occasioned by economic
integration. It is expected to have a negative relationship with trade tax.
(vii) Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Corruption is reputed to be a major determinant of taxation in Nigeria. It is reportedly
embedded in every facet of the Nigerian economy (TI, 2014), more so in trade tax as
enshrined in the externalities in trade tax collection. It is proxy by Corruption perception
index (CPI), an internationally accepted measure developed by Transparency international
(TI). It leads to substantial loss of tax revenue hence it is expected to have a negative effect
on trade tax.
(viii) Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the growth of economic activity within an
economy. Ultimately, the study aims to impact on the economy through the transmission
mechanism of trade, trade tax through to economic growth (proxy by GDP). It is measured in
N’Billions and it is also important as base to total tax and to determine the buoyancy of tax.
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It is believed that the higher the growth rate experienced within an economy, the higher
should be the buoyancy of tax. Hence, it is expected to have a positive effect on trade tax.
(ix) Total tax revenue (TAX)
This is the summation of all taxes collected in the economy. It is measured in N’
Billions and it is important as the bench mark to measure the contribution of trade tax and
also, to determine the response of GDP that impacts taxes. It is expected to have a positive
effect on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and trade tax is expected to be buoyant to it.
3.3 Sources and Kinds of Data
The study drew data mainly from secondary sources. These sources include the
Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Statistical Bulletin, the National Bureau of Statistics,
Annual Abstract of Statistics, Nigeria Customs Service publications, Transparency
International, relevant text books, journals, the internet and other relevant media. This was to
obtain the quantitative and qualitative data that provide adequate information for the study.
Given the secondary sources of data, the specific kinds of data required for the study
include the following;
(i) Trade tax revenue (TRT)
(ii) Total value of import trade (IMP)
(iii) Total value of export trade (EXP)
(iv) Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(v) Economic integration (INT)
(vi) Value of Total trade (TOT)
(vii) Foreign Direct investment (FDI)
(viii) Exchange Rate (EXR)
(ix) Lending interest rate (LIR)
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(x) Corruption perception index (CPI)
(xi) Total tax revenue (TAX)
3.4 Method of Data Analysis
The data were collected for the period from 1970 to 2015 and analyzed using
descriptive and analytical statistics. Descriptive statistics improved the presentation and
analysis of the data in terms of trend, percentages, graphs, charts, ratios, frequencies and
tables enabling a clear picture of the variables in use and their trend over the period of the
study, showing their individual behaviour and relevance to the study.
The analytical method involved the use of parametric test; paired means / repeated
measures test; econometric model Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression to obtain the
1st order statistical criteria of the coefficient of determination (R2), and the standard error (δ)
to obtain the appropriate estimates for the parameters, in terms of their signs and magnitude
to ensure that the estimates are both statistically significant and economically meaningful.
The second order test (econometric test) was conducted on the variable series to ensure that
the data collected are stationary. Other diagnostic and tests of unit root, autocorrelation,
multicollinearity, co-integration, and error correction model was conducted. These were done
so that in all the cases, the results obtained do not suffer from problems of non-normality,
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and mis-specification.
3.4.1 Stationarity test
The test of stationarity is important because time series data may not be stationary, in
that case the classical t-student value and the f-statistic will be inappropriate, and the problem
of spurious regression will arise (Granger and Newbold 1974). The study employed the
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test on the variables in the study.
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The Dickey-Fuller (DF) unit root test is based on the regression equation given as;
         tt              t         = 0
Which can be written as:
            t       ___________________________ eqn 11
Where ∆Yt is the first difference in the dependent variable
Ut is the error term
    (O,δ) are the notations for the basic assumptions concerning the error term (Ut) denoting
randomness, normally distributed, zero mean and constant variance.
The null hypothesis is Ho : β = 0, implying non stationarity of series
The alternative hypothesis is H1 : β ≠ 0, implying stationarity of the series.
The explicit form of the model would be:
i.   Ro o          t    Ro o  t       _______________eqn 12
These tests involve testing the negativity of (β) in the OLS regressions. The rejection of the
null hypothesis (Ho) implies that INT and TRT are integrated of order zero. That is, series are
stationary. In other words, there could be long-run equilibrium effect between INTt and TRTt
If this is not satisfied, then one can proceed with the ADF test which is of the form:
         t       h
      t       ________________eqn 13
Where the lag k is set so as to ensure that any autocorrelation in ∆Yt is absorbed and that a
reasonable degree of freedom is preserved, and also the error term is white noised. It assumes
that the Y series follows an AR(P) process and adding P lagged difference terms of the
dependent Y to the right hand side of the test regression. The test reported is a t-ratio which is
used to test the null hypotheses (Ho): The variable has unit-roots. The 95% critical values are
-2.93 (case without trend).
3.4.2 Other Tests Applicable
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Lag Selection Criteria
This is used to know the actual number of lag to be introduced so as to avoid too
much lag or too few lags. Too much lag will consume degrees of freedom causing multi-
collinearity to set in, while too few lags will lead to specification error. Based on the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Information criteria (SIC), the study chose the lag
length that has the minimum information criteria, in line with Lutkepohl (1991).
Test of Johansen Co-integration
After determining the optimal lag structure the co-integration test was carried out
using Johansen co-integration test which is a superior test that relies on asymptotic property,
though it is also robust to many departures from normality as it gives room for the
normalization with respect to any variable in the model that
automatically becomes a dependent variable. The Johansen (1998) co-
integration is analyzed via the Trace statistic and Maximum Eigen value. The decision rule is
that if either is greater than the 5% critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of no co-
integration among the variables. That is, using a group object and given an equation of order
p:
Yt = A1Yt-1 + …+ ApYt-p + Bxt + Et ------------------------ eqn 14
Where; Yt is a k-vector of non stationary series 1(1) variables
Xt is a d-vector of deterministic variables
Et is a vector of innovations
Error Correction Model
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If the series are further co-integrated, then they are most efficiently represented by an
error correction method which is used to tie short run behaviour of the variables to its long-
run values. Engel and Granger (1987) stipulated that the ECM will correct disequilibrium
error and is of the form;
  o      h       t        t       _____________________eqn 15
Where ∆ denotes the first difference,
Ut is the one period lag value of the residual from the regression equation
α the empirical estimate of the equilibrium term
Et is the error term.
Heteroscedasticity test
One important assumption of the Classical Linear Regression Model is that the error
terms are homoscedastic in variance. The heteroscedasticity test is carried out in order to
verify whether the disturbances μi actually exhibit the equal variance (homoscedasticity)
assumption. The white’s heteroscedasticity test with (no cross term) is used to carry out this
task. This test makes use of the residuals generated from the original regression. It then runs
each of the regressors and their squared terms against the generated residuals.
The auxiliary model can be stated as:
      h      o       o 
        t 
         t 
       t 
       t   
   t 
       to      to
      h  o       o
     h     h       ______eqn 16
Where Vi = pure white noise error
This model is run and auxiliary R2 from it is obtained. The hypothesis tested is
Ho: 1 = 2 = 3= --------- 6 = 0 (Homoscedasticity)
Hi: 1≠ 2 ≠ 3 ≠ --------- 6 ≠ 0 (Heteroscedastic)
Under this hypothesis, the sample size (n) times the R2 obtained from the auxiliary regression
asymptotically follow the chi-square distribution with degree of freedom equal to the number
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of regressors (excluding constant term) in the auxiliary regression. That is: n.R2 ~ X2 df. The
decision rule is Reject Ho if  2 cal >  2 tab at 5% level of significance; otherwise, do not
reject Ho.
Autocorrelation (or Serial Correlation) Test
The Classical Linear Regression Model also assumes that autocorrelation does not
exist in the disturbances. That is to say, the disturbance term relating to any observation is not
influenced by the disturbance term relating to any other observation. Symbolically;
E(μi μ;) = 0 i ≠ j
The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test (Breusch-Pagan, 1979, and Godfrey, 1978) general
test of autocorrelation also known as LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test is used to verify this
assumption. This test is better than the conventional Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation in
the sense that it allows for non-stochastic regressors such as the lagged values of the
regressors and, higher-order autoregressive schemes, and simple or higher order moving
averages of the error terms. The test assumes that the error term generated from the original
regression follows the pth-order autoregressive, AR(P) scheme. Then, the AR (P) scheme
alongside the original regressors is run against the generated residual. For our model, we
generated AR (2) for the residual. The auxiliary model to be tested is;
      h      o       o 
       t       t       t       to     o 
 h         t        t      ___________________________________________ eqn 17
The hypothesis to be tested is
Ho: p1 = p2 = o (No autocorrelation)
H1: p1 ≠p2 ≠0 (autocorrelation)
The test statistic is given as; (n-p) R2 ~ x2 (p)df
Where n = number of observation, p = the order of the autoregressive scheme of μt
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R2 = R2 from auxiliary regression. The decision rule is Reject Ho if 2 and > 2(2) critical at
5% level of significance; otherwise do not reject Ho.
Multicollinearity Test
Another assumption of the Classical Least Squares Regression Model is that there is
no multiconlliearity among the explanatory variables included in the regression model.
Multicollinearity refers to the existence of more than one exact (or inexact) linear relationship.
The test is carried in order to verify the possibility of this assumption. The test is carried out
using the Pairwise correlation matrix:
   
      t    
     
 
  t             
  t       
___________________________________ eqn 18
Where n = no of years, x = explanatory variables 1 to 6, y = dependent variable (TRT),
∑= sum. It has been suggested that if the pair-wise correlation coefficient between two
regressions is in excess of 0.8, then multicollinearity is present and may pose serious
estimation problem (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2009)
Normality Test
One of the assumptions of the CLRM is that the error terms are normally distributed
with zero mean and constant variance that is;
μt~N (0,б2)
The normality test is conducted to verify whether the error terms are normally
distributed. The Jacque – Bera (JB) test of normality is used to verify this assumption. This
test is based on the residuals generated from OLS. Under the null hypothesis that the
residuals are normally distributed, the JB statistic asymptotically follows the chi-square
distribution with two (2) degrees of freedom. The test statistic given as:
 s  
  
 
 
  t   
  
t       㤮 _____________________________________eqn
19
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Decision Rule: Reject the null hypothesis of normality if JB –statistic exceeds critical
JB (i.e.x2(2)df) at 5% level of significance; otherwise, do not reject the null hypothesis of
normality.
The CUSUM test
The stability of the parameters in the model is examined using the plots of the
cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM).
    
     
 
  
 
 
_____________________ eqn 20
The expected value is:
          t r a h t r 
Instability of the parameters arises due to structural changes and the institution of
different policy regimes over the sample period. Whilst the CUSUM test is particularly useful
for detecting systematic changes in the regression coefficients. If any of the straight lines in
the graph is crossed, the null hypothesis that the regression equation is correctly specified is
rejected at the 5% level of significance.
Test of Specification Errors
Another assumption that is fundamental to the Classical Linear Regression Model is
that the model must be correctly specified. A general test proposed by Ramsey called RESET
(Regression specification Error Test) is used to verify this assumption. This test follows the
F-distribution.
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    t
   
 
    
_______________________ eqn 21
Where: y = Trade Tax, β1-6= Explanatory Variables
Under the null hypothesis that the model is well-specified, our decision rule is to
reject the null hypothesis if the calculated F exceeds the critical value F at a given level of
significances.
Chow's Breakpoint Test
The Chow breakpoint test tests whether there is a structural change in all of the
equation parameters. However if the equation is linear it allows you to test whether there has
been a structural change in a subset of the parameters. To carry out the test, we partition the
data into two or more subsamples. Each subsample must contain more observations than the
number of coefficients in the equation so that the equation can be estimated. The Chow
breakpoint test compares the sum of squared residuals obtained by fitting a single equation to
the entire sample with the sum of squared residuals obtained when separate equations are fit
to each subsample of the data.
Three test statistics are reported for the Chow breakpoint test. The F-statistic is based
on the comparison of the restricted and unrestricted sum of squared residuals and in our case,
we assume that the TRT and INT relation may have changed after the structural adjustment
programme (SAP) in 1986, and after Nigeria joined the World trade organization (WTO) in
1995 we divided our sample into three periods: 1970–1986, 1987– 2014, 1970–2014, and
carry out the Chow test computed in three possible regressions:
Time period 1970–1986: Yt = λ1 + λ2Xt + u1t n1 = 17 ___________________eqn. 22
Time period 1987–2014: Yt = γ1 + γ2Xt + u2t n2 = 28 ___________________eqn. 23
Time period 1970–2014: Yt = α1 + α2Xt + ut n=(n1+ n2) = 45 ____________eqn. 24
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The Chow test indicates whether the analysis should be restricted to different time
periods within the study period or pooled for the whole period of the study under the null
hypothesis the regressions are (statistically) the same (that is, no structural change or break)
and the F ratio given follows the F distribution with k and (n1 + n2 − 2k) df in the numerator
and denominator, respectively.
The decision rule is that we do not reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability
(that is, no structural change) if the computed F value in an application does not exceed the
critical F value obtained from the F table at the chosen level of significance (or the p value).
In such a case we may be justified in using the pooled (restricted) regression. Contrarily, if
the computed F value exceeds the critical F value, we reject the hypothesis of parameter
stability and conclude that the regressions are different, in which case the pooled regression
may be of spurious value.
The Paired Means / Repeated Measures test
The model supposes that there exists a population of paired observations (through
matching or repeated measures), and that samples when selected from this population can
hypothetically be tested in a pre-test and post-test analysis (Emaikwu, 2010). That is, it
compares paired data before and after treatment, such that in this study, the trend of
trade tax (TRT) data before Nigeria joined the WTO (1975 – 1994) when pursuing a
protectionist trade policy and after Nigeria joined the WTO (1995 - 2014) and pursued a
more outward oriented trade policy with the global economy, on the whole a period of forty
years paired over a twenty year period each. With a population of 20 pairs of measurements
forming a sample from a population, the mean of the difference (d) is tested using the
following implementation of t- statistic;
t statistics.
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Where;
t =   t    
εd  t
 εd  
n
n n t t 
d =224.04,    = 4480.94,     = 1402,738, t-student statistic = 6.92
Given, df = 19 at 0.05 significance level
t = student t statistic
d = sample mean differences
    = sum of differences squared
     = summation of differences
n = number of sample differences
  = hypothesized mean difference
Decision Rule: Reject H0, if t statistic > critical t at 0.05 significance level with (n-1) degrees
of freedom.
3.4.3 Estimation Technique
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is used as the estimation technique. The choice of
the method is necessitated by the nature of the study which hinges on test of theoretical
relationships of variables. This is best examined from both the short-run and long run
perspective, so OLS and Co-integration test were used to capture both the static and long run
economic analysis as these permits a more flexible approach to modeling. Granger and
Newbold (1974) demonstrated that Error Correction Method is important too, this is derived
from its usefulness in explaining long run equilibrium effect through the process of short-run
dynamics of economic data. These were estimated using E-views software.
The researcher in testing the trend of trade tax revenue in Nigeria for the period of the
study utilized the Paired means / Repeated measures test. The model supposes that there
exists a population of paired observations (through matching or repeated measures), and that
samples when selected from this population can hypothetically be tested in a pre-test and
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post-test analysis (Emaikwu, 2010). That is, it compares paired data before and after
treatment, such that in this study, the trend of trade tax (TRT) revenue data before Nigeria
joined the WTO (1975 – 1994) when pursuing a protectionist trade policy and after Nigeria
joined the WTO (1995 - 2014) and pursued a more outward oriented trade policy with the
global economy, on the whole a period of forty years paired over a twenty year period each.
The performance model adopted in this study is akin to that employed by Kusi (1998)
for the estimation of the Ghanaian tax system. The point of departure of the present study is
the replacement of elasticity for buoyancy in the decomposition process of tax to base and
base to income thereby eliminating the elasticity approaches which require the isolation of
the impact of discretionary tax measures. This approach was preferable, partly for the
peculiar reasons advanced above and mostly because discretionary tax change is a pervasive
phenomenon in Nigeria’s trade and taxation policies. To consider further trends in income
from the individual tax source (TRT), we decompose tax buoyancy to obtain the buoyancy of
tax (TRT) revenue with respect to its tax base (TOT) and the buoyancy of tax base with
respect to income (GDP).
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
4.1 Data Presentation
This section highlights all the data used in the analysis of this thesis. The data
presented showed the trend of trade tax revenue in Nigeria, highlighting in details important
dates and changes, stating the reasons for such and the implications of such on the economy,
and from this contribute to knowledge. It was also used to identify variables used to evaluate
the effect of economic integration on the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria, this involved
both analytical and descriptive statistical analysis. This is followed by the estimation of
buoyancy of trade tax revenue to total tax revenue in Nigeria for the same period from 1970
to 2014.
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
The time series annual data for the study is presented in full detail in Appendix I, with
its natural logarithm transformation in appendix II, and the percentage changes in Appendix
III. The Descriptive Statistics of the variables of the data is presented in Table 4.1
Given that the measure of central tendency is not adequate to analyze the data series,
the measure of dispersion is also used. The mean as a very important measure is chosen for
the measure of central tendency, while standard deviation, the most important measure of
dispersion is also chosen. Also, the measure of skewness (the symmetry of the distribution of
the series around its mean), kurtosis (the peakness or flatness of the distribution of the series),
the Jarque-bera test (measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with
those from the normal distribution) and probabilities of the series are examined.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of variables
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI TAX GDP
Mean 104.2670 37.74044 4650.365 240.6967 51.66067 18.36533 1.491778 1136.324 11764.49
Median 15.50000 38.66000 348.8000 14.46000 17.30000 19.49000 1.210000 77.20000 875.3000
Maximum 540.7000 68.77000 25057.80 1360.400 158.5000 36.09000 2.700000 9787.700 89043.60
Minimum 0.370000 11.06000 1.640000 -0.400000 0.590000 6.000000 1.000000 0.510000 5.200000
Std. Dev. 150.1090 13.82431 7690.490 394.1157 62.71159 7.296616 0.543132 2151.560 22763.64
Skewness 1.436021 0.085785 1.639792 1.557708 0.674430 0.225837 1.176839 2.502410 2.278340
Kurtosis 4.006142 2.535669 4.300806 4.046285 1.631716 2.257533 2.920316 9.108422 7.002852
Jarque-Bera 17.36428 0.459449 23.33957 20.25098 6.921794 1.416127 10.39904 116.9269 68.97403
Probability 0.000170 0.794752 0.000009 0.000040 0.031402 0.492597 0.005519 0.000000 0.000000
Sum 4692.017 1698.320 209266.4 10831.35 2324.730 826.4400 67.13000 51134.57 529402.0
Sum Sq. Dev. 991439.2 8408.908 2.60E+09 6834396. 173040.7 2342.587 12.97966 2.04E+08 2.28E+10
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Source: Author’s Computation, (August, 2016)
Note: TRT, TOT, FDI, TAX and GDP are expressed in N’billion
INT, LIR are expressed in rate.
EXR is the average official exchange rate ($1/N)
CPI is expressed as an Index
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The summary of the data in Table 4.1 from Appendix I showed the mean values of the
variables: the mean value for TRT was N104.26 billion, hence for most period of the
study1970 to 2000 (that is, a period of 31 years trade tax revenue collection was below
average depicting low tax effort and inefficiency in tax administration, for while in the early
years 1970 to 1974 there was low trade, latter years saw higher volume of trade which were
not commensurate with trade tax revenue collection. It was only in 2001 that trade tax
revenue collection was above average even then there were still challenges of tax avoidance
and evasion, excessive waivers, frivolous exemptions and outright corruption and smuggling
adversely affecting TRT collection. The average for INT (index of integration) was 37.74%,
which falls far below the 100%, threshold for a complete economic union. It was only in the
period 1974 to 1976 and in 1978 (39.8%), and also in 1990 to 1992 (47%) and 1995 (58%),
before it peaked at 68% in 2005. So the country was above 50% only for the period since
2003, if not, only intermittently at the periods of 1995 when it joined the WTO. This is
attributed to lack of political will to apply economic integration policies and the frequent
policy instability as a result of overlapping agreements and the ensuing violation and
confusion.
The mean value for Total Foreign Trade (TOT) was N4650.36, this average figure
was surpassed only after 2003, and more so in 2010 due to the re-basement of the country’s
gross domestic product which indicated some level of increase in non oil trade and growth in
the services sector not captured. The indication is that out of the forty five years period of the
study, only twelve years saw total foreign trade perform above average, a clear indication of
the dominance of a mono product oil sector, and the reliance of primary product that is
reputed to be of low quality and command low prices in the international market. So the are
not competitive thereby undermining the availability of foreign exchange and limiting the
productive capacity of the domestic economy. The mean of foreign direct investment (FDI)
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inflow into Nigeria for the period of the study was N240.69billion. The early periods did not
witness any deliberate policy to attract foreign direct investment into the country, so it was
only from the period 2003 (N259.4billion) that this average was met, probably due to
democratic consolidation in the country, and the government desire to deliver democracy
dividend to the populace resorting to augment the savings and investment gap. This growth in
FDI continued until 2011when it peaked at N1360 billion, and the country became the
highest destination for FDI in Africa, even though the argument remains that it was all about
“hot money”, and investment in the Oil sector with little linkage with the general economy.
The political tension, the general global depression, including heighten pressure of
insurgency and terrorism has witnessed it declining since 2013. This has implication for
investment and productive capacity of the domestic economy.
The mean value of the nominal exchange rate (EXR) was N51.72 to a Dollar (N51.72:
$1), it was observed that against this mean the naira depreciated continually throughout the
review period. A depreciating real may imply that the Naira is gaining strength against other
currencies of other trading partners in real terms, this is not the case in nominal terms as the
Naira may actually be depreciating due to high domestic inflation. The implication is that an
appreciation as seen in the early periods of the study may typify an over-valued Naira,
especially if it does not stem from market fundamentals but rather, bear the marks of
concerted collusion by operators with a plan to congregate around a particular market rate. So
the country’s exports dearer than imports, creating an import dependent country with adverse
implication for domestic productive capacity. Worse still, given these, the mono-product
export and the pervasive corruption in the system, revenue inflow in TRT is undermined.
The mean Lending interest rate (LIR) was 18.36% in the period of this study, and this was
surpassed since 1987. Considering the fact that the economic investment profile have been
operating above this figure, there is an indication of a high cost of doing business in Nigeria,
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and this has implication of undermining the productive capacity of the economy. A maximum
level of 36% was attained in 1993 at the height of the pariah status of the country. This high
cost of fund is attributed to government activity in the financial market as with inadequate
revenue to fund projects it engages in fiscal deficit financing thereby crowding out private
investment and consumption with adverse effect on the productive capacity of the economy,
consequently competitiveness of domestic production in international trade.
The mean value for Nigeria’s corruption perception index (CPI) was 1.44. This
indicates a high level of corruption given that an index closer to zero indicates a low level of
corruption. Even then, from 1997 the figure for the country has been above this average and
this calls for concern. Infact, since the democratic dispensation it has been about 2.0, a study
of the trend of TRT indicated a correlation between electioneering and trade tax. The value
even maximized at 2.8 in 2011and Nigeria was named the most corrupt country in the world.
Various studies Ogbeidi (2012) and Ume and Kyarem (2014) alluded to this, reporting that
the menace has permeated every facet of society. This is manifested in tax avoidance and
evasion, generous waivers, excess exemptions, and wanton concessions granted by
presidential fiat, including outright corruption and stealing with the collusion of tax officials.
The mean value of total tax (TAX) revenue was N1136.3, this average figure was not
achieved until 2002, an indication of poor tax effort and administration, and the new
emphasis on dependence on oil tax alone to the neglect of other taxes. Even after 2002, the
significant change in tax revenue was in 2010 (N54,204.8), this is attributed to the
reinvigoration of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Nigeria Customs
Service in 2007, including the total review of the country’s tax laws in that same year. The
setting up of Anti-corruption agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) and the independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) may have also played a
part.
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The mean value for GDP was N11,764.4, this average was only surpassed in 2005
when the country joined the WTO and has since then been above this average figure. An
indication that since she joined the WTO trade between Nigeria and her trading partners has
greatly benefitted the general economy. In 2010, with the rebasement of the GDP, the country
witnessed an unprecedented adjustment in GDP that saw it emerged as the largest economy in
Africa. Before the period of 2005, as a result of protectionism in the earlier period of this
study, the figure for GDP was below this average figure, accounting for the country’s low
standard of living.
The estimated standard deviation of TRT is 150.1, that is a divergence from the
mean of 69% which is high, indicating that for the period of the study the series is not close
together, an indication of poor tax effort and administration including leakages as mentioned
above. The mean divergence of INT is 13.82 which is 2.84% from the mean of 37%, an
indication that from the early part of the study the country practiced protectionism until in
1986 with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), she became more
outward oriented and capped this with membership of the WTO and other international trade
organization, including signing and adopting the ECOWAS CET agreement. This is not to
mention the long years of military dictatorship and the pariah state status this gave the nation,
including the fact that it is a mono product economy trading mainly on primary products that
are of less competitiveness in international trade. The Standard deviation of TOT is 7690.49,
which is 60% of the deviation from the mean value. This is an indication of the growth in
trade within the period of the study. This is attributed to the discovery of crude oil (the
country’s main export commodity) in commercial quantity in the early period of this study.
The rebasement of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) also added to this divergence as other
products which were not captured in the previous re-basement were captured and the values
of all the products were revalued. This does not take away the fact that Crude oil still
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remains the major export (66%) of the country (NBS, 2015), this has implication for foreign
exchange inflow, but the limited linkage with the economy is a case of concern in terms of
improving domestic productive capacity. The mean deviation for Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) is 394.1 this is another high divergence of 60% from the mean as the country in the
early period of the study did not have any deliberate policy in place to attract FDI. She was
having a feeling of self sufficiency until the global depressions of early 70s, 80s and 2007 hit
her, and she experienced spirals of inadequate revenue hence resorted to deficit financing,
and the push for FDI to drive development plans. This can also be seen in the light of the
limited use the inflow has had on the economy as estimates obtained indicated that the inflow
are mainly in the stock exchange and the oil and gas industries with limited linkage on the
economy.
The standard deviation of exchange rate (EXR) from its mean is 62.7 which is 81%
level of deviation. This deviation stems mainly from policy inconsistency in the exchange
rate market where market fundamentals were not used to drive the market, but rather political
and corrupt tendencies were used. Severally, the country engaged in experimenting with
different trade models, with adverse effect on the value of the Naira, encouraging arbitrage
even within government circles and market operators including the banks. This is not to
mention the mono product oil economy that is always subjected to the vagaries of
international political economy and low prices with adverse effect on foreign exchange
inflow, foreign direct investment, domestic investment and consumption. These has effect on
the divergence from the mean. There are also issues of weak and poor macroeconomic
management of the Naira, as witnessed almost through the period of this study where the
naira in nominal terms may be depreciating, due to high domestic inflation. The implication
is that the EXR may typify an over-valued currency. Hence making exports dearer and import
cheaper, creating an import dependent nation in Nigeria with implication for limited
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competitiveness in international trade as it also undermines domestic productive capacity.
The mean deviation of lending interest rate (LIR) is 7.29 which is just 2.46% from the
mean of 18%, this indicates a closeness in the series, hence the fact that at 18%, Nigeria is a
high cost productive environment is not in doubt. This is attributed to government’s activities
in the financial market to finance continuous unsustainable deficits and this crowds out
private investment and consumption in the economy, with adverse effect on the productive
capacity, more so that the investment funds taken by government is not used in the provision
of investment goods, but filtered away in wanton corruption of political leaders and their
cronies. The Standard deviation for Corruption perception index (CPI) for Nigeria is 0.58
for the period of the study. This indicates 2.4% closeness to the mean of 1.4, meaning that
trade tax in Nigeria is bedeviled by corruption. This is expressed in terms of the handling and
execution of tax avoidance and evasion, waivers, exemptions and concessions, including
outright stealing.
Also, the mean divergence of TAX revenue was 2151.5, a divergence of 52%
indicating that the series are not close together, and as mentioned earlier this derived from the
intervention of government in 2007 and 2010 to improve tax administration and enforcement
in the country. Finally, the standard deviation of GDP from its mean is 22,763.6, a deviation
that is fourfold, an indication of the latter values of the period of the study as a result of the
re-basement of the GDP in 2010 to capture activities not earlier captured, therefore making
the country the largest economy in Africa.
The maximum and minimum values of the variables for the period 1970 to 2014 are
also shown in table 4.1. The maximum for trade tax revenue was in 2014 (N540.7billion),
obtained in the period after the reinvigoration of the Federal inland revenue service and the
Nigeria customs service in 2007, and the total review of the National tax policy in 2010,
including the rebasement of the GDP in 2010, while the minimum (N0.37billion) was
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obtained at the commencement of the study in 1970, this is due to the protectionism being
practiced then by the country, and most of its exports were primary agricultural products
which command low prices and were less competitive in international trade. The maximum
value of INT (68.77%) was achieved in 2005, twenty years after SAP and ten years after
joining the WTO. It was also the period of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. And its
minimum value (11.06%) was witnessed in 1986, this threw to the front burner the need to be
more outward oriented with trade and economy necessitating SAP implementation. TOT has
its maximum value to be N25057.8 recorded in 2011, after the rebasement of the GDP, and
signing of numerous trade agreements like MINT, AGOA in the wake of democratic
consolidation in the country and its minimum value to be 1.64 recorded in 1970, a period of
protectionism and low trade regime. The highest FDI value (N1360.4billion) was in 2011, the
period in which the United Nations Council of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported
the country as the highest destination for FDI in Africa, while its lowest value (N-0.40 billion)
was in 1980, attributed to the need and pressure from the international community to
democratize. 2014 recorded the highest figure (N158.5:$1) for EXR, this is due to low
primary product export, high cost of business environment, high domestic inflation and
underhand dealings in the foreign exchange market, while its lowest value (N0.59:$1) was
seen in 1979, given the hindsight of low import demand due to over-valued Naira and low
level of economic integration with the international community due to nascent unstable
democratic leadership. LIR had its maximum value (36.09%) in 1993, this due to the high
level of political tension in the country as a result of the truncated 1993 general elections,
which stifled FDI and other foreign financial assistance leading the government to source
development financing from the financial market generating this high interest rate and
crowding out private investment and consumption in the economy, while 6.0% was its
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minimum value achieved in 1977, a period in which the country discovered crude oil in
commercial quantity and commenced export of the product.
CPI had its maximum value (2.8) in 201, a period in which Transparency international
rated the country as the most corrupt country in the world, reporting that it was exhibited in
every facet of the society. 1.0 was its minimum value achieved in 1997. The maximum value
for TAX was N9,787 billion also achieved in 2014, this is due to the consolidation of reforms
conducted in the sector to enhance revenue collection, but there are indication that this figure
is conservative given the high level of tax avoidance and evasion including waivers,
exemptions and concessions arbitrarily given and outright corruption. GDP is maximum
(N89,043 billion) in 2014, due to continuous growth experienced since the democratic
consolidation in1999 that averaged 7.5% for the period of the study. While the minimum
value (N5.20billion) was in 1970 when the country was practicing protectionism which
witnessed low trade.
Skewness which measured the symmetry of our variables indicated the following for
each variable; TRT (1.43), INT (0.08), TOT (1.64), FDI (1.55), EXR (0.67), LIR (0.22), CPI
(1.29), GDP (2.27) and TAX (2.50). Given that all the variables exhibited positive inclination,
it means the distributions all have a long right tail meaning that they are all skewed to the
right. It is only INT (0.08) and LIR (0.22) that follows the normal distribution. Kurtosis (the
measure of peakness or flatness of the distribution) indicated the following; TRT (4.00), INT
(2.53), TOT (4.30), FDI (4.04), EXR (1.62), LIR (2.25), CPI (3.06), GDP (7.0), and TAX
(9.10). Given that Kurtosis ranges between (0 and 3), TRT, TOT, FDI have values greater
than 3 so their distribution is Leptokurtic indicating they are peaked relative to the normal
distribution, while INT, EXR, and LIR are Platykurtic indicating the distribution is flat
relative to the normal distribution. It is only CPI (3.06) that is Mesokurtic (followed the
normal distribution).
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The Jarque–Bera (JB) test of normality is an asymptotic or large-sample test based on
OLS residuals. The test as shown in Table 4.1 have critical value of 5.99, while the series
have the following; TRT(17.3), INT (0.45), TOT (23.3), FDI (20.25), EXR (6.92), LIR (1.41)
CPI (12.5), GDP (68.97), and TAX (116.9) from these, it can be seen that only the series INT
and LIR follow the normal distribution, given that their values is above the JB statistic. Also,
their computed p values are quite low and significant, as against that of INT and LIR which
are high and insignificant. Therefore, most of the error term in our sample did not follow the
normal distribution at the 5% level of significance, but keeping in mind that the JB test is a
large-sample test, our sample of 45 observations may not be necessarily large. Also, the test
of normality does not preclude the conduct of other tests, which may invariably correct this
result (Gonzalo, 1994). Normality is not necessary to obtain many of the results we use in
multiple regression analysis as it is possible to relax this assumption and still retain most of
the statistical results obtained. This necessitated further use of empirical analysis.
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4.1 Graphical Analysis
Figure 4.1: Trend of TRT, INT, TOT, FDI, EXR, LIR, CPI, TAX And GDP
Source: Author’s Compilation from Excel 2007 print out (November, 2015)
104
TRT from 1970, when it was N0.37billion continued to increase till 1982 when it
became N2.33billion, subsequently in 1983 it decreased to N1.98 billion and further to
N1.61billion in 1984, before it increased again N2.18billion from then on it was in an upward
trend, only decreasing in 2006 when it was N177.7billion, and peaked at N540.7billion in
2014.
INT in 1970 was at 31.5% with marginal increases till 1977 when it fell from 43.59%
to 36.5%, and further kept decreasing up till to 1989 when it became 23.22%, then moved on
to 47.35% before deepening again till 1995 when it became 58.67% before spiraling, and
peaked at 68.77% in 2005 and has since then been declining to 33.46%, 29.48% and 26.39%
for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively.
TOT in 1970 was N11.64 billion, and kept increasing till in 1981 when it was N23.8
billion and started declining till 1986 when it was N4.9 billion and jumped to N48.2 billion in
1987. In 1988, it increased to N42.6 billion and continued on this upward trend, increasing
six fold to N1705.8 billion in 1995 from N368.8 billion in 1994.
In 1970, FDI inflow into Nigeria was N0.13 billion, and the trend afterwards was
haphazard, even negative in 1980 at N0.4 billion and picking up immediately in 1981 at
N0.33 billion and continued on the growth path gradually until in 1995 when it amount
N75.94 billion from N22.23 billion in 1994. The increase continued in 1996 and 1997, but
decreased in 1999 to N92.8 billion. But there was a noticeable change in 2005 at N654.2
billion from N248.2 billion in 2004. This upward trend continued and peaked at N1360.4
billion in 2011 and it being on the downward trend in 2013 and 2014 at N875.1 billion and
N738.2 billion respectively.
EXR indicated that in 1970, N0.71 was exchanged for $1 and the naira kept
appreciating against the dollar hovering at between N0.60 and N0.80 for the period up to
1985. In 1986, the depreciation of the naira was at N1.02:$1 and this depreciation continued
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up to 1994 when it stabilized at N21.89:$1 up to 1998. In 1999, the Naira took a deep crash
exchanging at N92.69:$1, since then naira has continued to depreciate continuously against
the dollar with its highest depreciation been N158.5:$1 in 2014, having been N153.86,
N157.5 to a dollar in 2011, 2012, and 2013 respectively.
In 1970, LIR was at 8%, the minimum throughout the period of the study. It hovered
around 10% and 13% between 1971 and 1984. In 1990, it hit 27.7% reaching 36.09% in 1993,
but declined to 20.79% and 20.86% in 1995 and 1996, and subsequently followed a
downward path after then up to 2008 when it was 18.7%. But since then, in 2009, it has been
on the increase hovering around 22% between 2009 and 2011, then becoming 24.94% and
30% in 2013 and 2014 respectively.
CPI in 1970 is extrapolated at 1.2 reputed to be a high rate of corruption in Nigeria.
The figure kept getting worse up to 1977 when it was 1.7, then declined in 1978 to 1.09. But
ever since then it has been worst case situations each passing year and was worse still in 2006
when it hit 2.2 in 2006 and has never gotten better, such that in 2014 the country’s rating
peaked at 2.7, as it was in 2008 and 2012 respectively.
Tax in 1970, was N0.51 billion increasing to N10.9 billion in 1980, and afterwards, it
declined to N9.3 billion in 1981 and lower still to N8.2 billion in 1986. In 1987, it rose about
twice to N17.3 billion. This is same with the increase from N80.6 billion to N157.8 billion in
1994 and 1995 respectively. The marginal increase continued until 2000 when it took a
quantum leap from N368.9 billion in 1999 to N801.5 billion in 2000. There was a decline in
2003 to N1130.1 billion from N1489.8 billion in 2002. The same fluctuation continued to be
witnessed in tax revenue but followed an upward trend to N4628.7 billion, N5767.6 billion,
N7910.6 billion and N9787.7 billion in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively.
In 1970, GDP was N5.2 billion, and the country’s growth has continued to increase
year in year out from that period up to 1989 when it stood at N382.3 billion . In 1990 it
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declined marginally to N328.3 billion but continued on the upward trend to N1399.7 billion
in 1994. After which there was a remarkable increase to N2907.4 billion in 1995, and also in
1996 it almost doubled at N4032.3 billion and continued on this growth path up to 2009 when
it was N124,794.2 billion. And was subsequently rebased in 2010 when it was valued at
N54204.8 billion, and hitting N80,222.1 billion and N89,043.6 billion in 2013 and 2014
respectively.
4.2 Results And Data Analysis
Unit Root Test
The unit root is used to examine the stationarity of the data series since the data is
time series, the ADF test is employed given that the model is linear. It is important because it
enhances validity of results and is also a prerequisite for further analytical tools. At levels the
time series data were not stationary as shown in the table below, hence the need to difference.
The full result of the stationarity test is presented in table 4.2
Table 4.2: Stationarity Test
Variables ADF Test
Levels
5% Critical
Value
Order of
integration
ADF test 1st
Difference
Order of
Integration
TRT -0.48 -2.93 NS -7.41 I(1)
INT -2.13 -2.93 NS -8.81 I(1)
TOT -0.91 -2.93 NS -7.22 I(1)
FDI -0.75 -2.93 NS -9.46 I(1)
EXR -0.30 -2.93 NS -5.30 I(1)
LIR -1.17 -2.93 NS -6.99 I(1)
CPI
TAX
GDP
-0.44
-0.66
-0.73
-2.93
-2.93
-2.93
NS
NS
NS
-9.93
-7.40
-7.30
I(1)
1(1)
1(1)
Source: Author’s Compilation from Appendix (IV) (August, 2016)
NS ; Not stationary
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The result reveals that all the variables are stationary only at 1st difference 1(1). This
is substantiated by the ADF test statistic in comparison to the critical values – with the former
greater than the latter (taking absolute values) at 5% significant level.
4.2.1 The effect of Economic integration on the growth of Trade tax in Nigeria.
Table 4.3: Regression Results
TRT = 0.23 – 0.29INT + 0.71TOT – 0.11FDI + 0.37EXR – 0.33LIR – 0.37CPI
t- student (-3.39) (13.80) (-1.95) (4.67 ) (-2.20) (-2.52)
t critical 1.68 from the theoretical table
R2 = 0.99 Adjusted R2 =0.99 F0.05-statistic = 1148.84 D-W statistic = 1.81
Source: Author’s Compilation (August, 2016)
Note: t values are in parenthesis, with the full details of the result in Appendix VI
The results show the effect of INT, TOT, FDI, EXR. LIR and CPI on TRT. The signs
and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients indicate the following:
Firstly, Economic Integration indicates a negative effect on TRT revenue (against
economic criteria) and it is also statistically significant. According to Viner (1950), there
exists a positive relationship between economic integration and the growth of trade tax
revenue. This result is not in line with that postulation as it shows an inverse relationship
indicating that a unit increase/decrease in INT will lead to a 0.29 decrease/increase of that
unit in TRT revenue. This shows that the policy of economic integration that removes
barriers and lowers tariff reduce government revenue significantly especially for a country
like Nigeria that depends heavily on revenue from this source and has a high marginal
propensity to import, an under developed and inefficient domestic tax system, with low
export commodity value and funds a major proportion of its budget from trade tax revenue.
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This result obtained is in line with that obtained by Gudissa and Mishra (2014), Ogujuiba et
al (2014) and Ghani (2011) in their studies.
Secondly, total foreign trade shows a positive effect on TRT revenue (This is in
agreement with economic criteria). The same result was obtained in the study done by
Bourdon and Viji (2013), and Ghani (2011). The result indicates that a unit increase in TOT
will lead to 0.79 increase of that unit in TRT and vice versa. This resulted from the
government export promotion programme that encourages the development of Micro Small
and Medium enterprises, expanded market for domestic products under various international
trade agreements like the African Growth and Opportunities Act of the United States of
America (AGOA), ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme, and the growth of the Oil and Gas
industry in the country. An interesting part of this result is the fact that total foreign trade has
grown significantly over time, probably due to trade agreements, but not much have been
translated into growth in trade tax for which it is a base. This adverse impact may be
attributed to corruption embedded in smuggling, tax avoidance and evasion, frivolous and
unwarranted waivers, exemptions, and concessions dubiously granted.
It is of concern that imports constitutes the bulk of total trade in Nigeria, as economic
integration does not mean export growth and Nigeria goods are mainly of primary nature that
commands low prices in the international market, and are reputed to be of poor quality
especially in an environment of volatile exchange rate.
Thirdly, Foreign Direct Investment has a negative effect on TRT revenue (this is
against economic criteria). The result indicate that a unit decrease in FDI will lead to 0.12 of
that unit increase in TRT revenue, and a unit increase in FDI will lead to a 0.12 decrease in
TRT of that unit. This is in agreement with Oluwaseyi and Maku (2013). This negative effect
stems from bloated policy of attracting FDI which have not been properly implemented
possibly due to overlapping trade agreements, it can also be the effect of capital flight that
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plaques the country including repatriation of profits and illegal dealings rampant with
Multinational Corporations in Nigeria due to corrupt tendencies that has weakened
institutions in the country. There is also high level of tax avoidance and evasion, including
excessive tax exemptions and tax holidays granted them such that they have not contributed
to energizing the productive base of the economy. FDI inflow into Nigeria is mainly in
portfolio investment to take advantage of the high stock prices such that at the slighted sign
of risk, the are withdrawn as hot money and capital flight ensues.
Fourthly, Exchange rate shows a positive effect on TRT revenue (not in agreement
with economic criteria). The result indicates that if Naira appreciates by a unit, TRT will also
increase by 0.37 of that unit and, if Naira depreciates by a unit, TRT revenue will decrease by
0.37 of that unit. The same result was obtained in the study by Igberi et al (2012) and Okoh
(2004). It should be noted that over the years Nigeria has been involved not just in trade
agreements, but also in many debt agreements with international finance institutions (World
Bank and International Monetary Fund) that requires tampering with its currency, so the
value of its currency has not been stable. Also, apart from crude oil, the country’s exports are
primary agricultural products that command low price in the international market, and are
reputed to be of low quality. So, the growth witnessed in TOT may be in the direction of
imports with implication for indigenous firms. The result indicate that the Naira may be over-
valued and this makes domestic products dearer than imported products thereby encouraging
net imports such that the domestic tax bases that should offset the loss from implementing
economic integration policy is not productive.
Fifthly, Lending interest rate has a negative effect on TRT revenue (agreeing with
economic criteria), It indicates that for a unit decrease in LIR, TRT revenue will increase by
0.33 of that unit. Also, a unit increase in LIR will decrease TRT revenue by 0.33 of that unit.
Khattry and Rao (2000) obtained same result in their study, also, Hinrichs (1966) attests to
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the fact that there is a negative relationship between TRT revenue and LIR. This inverse
relationship may be the high cost of securing investment capital in Nigeria, due to
government quest to borrow due to increasing deficit especially in a deregulated economy
thereby crowding out private investment and consumption that spur domestic tax base, this
have kept LIR at double digits for a long time now in Nigeria affecting the productivity,
profitability and competitiveness of indigenous firms.
Lastly, Corruption Perception Index exerts a negative effect on TRT revenue as
stipulated by economic criteria. A unit decrease in CPI will lead to a 0.37 unit increase of that
unit in TRT revenue, and a unit increase in CPI will lead to a 0.37 unit decrease of that unit in
TRT revenue. It is in line with Ume and Kyarem (2014) and Gupta (2007). The result
indicated that corruption has an effect on trade tax revenue, and the coefficient of this is
relatively significant at 37%. Corruption is reputed to have permeated every segment of the
society in Nigeria, such that Transparency International has over the years placed the country
amongst the most corrupt nations in the world. Corruption is evident in the area of tax
avoidance and evasion, and even much more in the waivers, exemptions and concessions
granted by official fiat such that tax revenue is greatly hampered.
Evidence from this study has shown that economic integration (INT) has a negative
effect on trade tax (TRT) revenue, this results in revenue loss to the economy from this
potentially large source, consequently government is faced with inadequate revenue and
resorts to deficit financing to finance economic development. This action of government will
crowd out private investment and consumption which will hamper the growth of the domestic
productivity and tax base. This is further worsened by the upward pressure on lending interest
rate that weakens the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy to compete favourably
with cheaper imports because of the over -valued domestic currency, creating avenue for
dumping and sealing the possibility of a viable domestic tax base that can off set the revenue
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loss from implementing economic integration policy. In an environment of continuous
economic integration in the face of an over-valued domestic exchange rate (EXR) and high
lending interest rate, coupled with pervasive corruption, this will not curtail fiscal deficit but
instead exacerbate it resulting in a pervasive fiscal imbalances and poor economic under-
development.
The summary statistics in table 4.3 showed that the model's estimates are generally
robust. The computed R2 of 0.99 implies that about 99% of the total variation in TRT is
explained by the regressors with the remaining 1% accorded factors exogenous to the model
but covered by the error term. It remained high at 99% even after adjustment was made for
degree of freedom. Also, the overall model is statistically significant at 5% significant level
as shown by the F statistics calculated at 1148.8. The Durbin Watson value computed at 1.8
is very close to 2, hence, depicting the presence of minimal positive serial autocorrelation.
These observations necessitate the test for long-run relationship.
Lag Length Selection Criteria
The stationarity of the residuals is potent evidence that there is evidence of
convergence to long-run equilibrium among the integrated variables. To be able to ascertain
whether there is cointegration among variable of interest, it is important to first determine the
optimal lag length of variables to be used.
Table4.4: Lag Length Selection Criteria
Lag
0
1
2
LogL
-164.0
69.8*
107.5
LR
NA
380.7*
49.01
FPE
6.72
1.28*
2.60
AIC
7.95
-0.64*
-0.11
SIC
8.24
1.64*
4.18
HQ
8.06
0.20*
1.46
Source: computed by author (August, 2016)
*Indicates lag order selected by the criterion
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From the data in table 4.4 above, it can be seen that all the selection criteria indicate
that 1 lag length is selected for application in the study.
Johansen Cointegration
Having determined the optimal lag structure, the cointegration test was carried out
using Johansen cointegration test which is a superior test that relies on asymptotic property. It
is also robust to many departures from normality as it gives room for the normalization with
respect to any variable in the model that automatically becomes a dependent variable. It is
analyzed via the Trace statistic and Maximum Eigen value. The decision rule is that if either
is greater than the 5% critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration among
the variables. Their respective results are displayed in Table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5: Cointegration Test
Null
Hypothesis
Trace
Statistic
0.05 Critical
Value
Null
Hypothesis
Max-Eigen
Statistic
0.05 Critical
Value
r = 0* 177.14 125.62 r = 0* 60.39 46.23
r ≤ 1* 116.75 95.75 r ≤ 1* 50.11 40.08
r ≤ 2 66.64 69.82 r ≤ 2 26.63 33.88
r ≤ 3 40.00 47.86 r ≤ 3 18.27 27.58
r ≤ 4 21.73 29.80 r ≤ 4 11.47 21.13
r ≤ 5 10.26 15.49 r ≤ 5 9.53 14.26
r ≤ 6 0.73 3.84 r ≤ 6 0.73 3.84
Source: Author’s Compilation (August, 2016)
Note: r represents number of cointegrating vectors. Trace statistic indicates 2 cointegrating
equations while Max-Eigen statistic also indicates 2 cointegrating equations. * denotes
rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
The Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equations, Max-Eigen value test also indicates
2 cointegrating equations. The trace statistic and the Max-Eigen statistic are greater than their
respective critical values for the cointegrating equations at these points. Thus, the null
hypothesis of no cointegrating equation is rejected. This implies that even though the series
of the variables are stationary at 1st difference, their linear combinations are cointegrated.
This further means that there exists a long run relationship among the variables at 5%
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significance level. This long run relationship existing between the variables is shown in the
model below:
Table 4.6: Estimated Long Run Results
TRT = - 0.29INT + 1.12TOT - 0.39FDI + 0.35EXR - 0.78LIR - 0.78CPI
t (3.98) (-17.62) (5.38) (-4.82) (5.32) (5.74)
Source: Author’s Compilation (August, 2016)
Note: t values are in parenthesis.
The coefficient of INT, TOT, and FDI are expected to be positive while that of EXR,
LIR and CPI are expected to be negative. From the long run model, the coefficient of TOT,
LIR and CPI are correctly signed, thereby agreeing with the economic criteria. The
coefficients of INT, FDI, and EXR do not agree with a priori expectation. Despite the signs
of the parameter estimates, they are all statistically significant given t test values.
The result further reveals that in the long run a unit change in INT, FDI, LIR and CPI
will cause TRT revenue to change by 0.30, 0.78 and 0.78 of that unit change respectively.
Similarly a unit change in TOT and EXR will cause TRT revenue to change by 1.12 (more
than proportionate), 0.39 and 0.35 respectively in the long run. An interesting part of this
result is the fact that the signs of the coefficients of the variables are the same both in the
short run and the long run, indicating that the analysis may not be much different, but the
magnitude of the coefficient changed, only that on the effect of integration (INT) on trade tax
(TRT) revenue remains at 0.29, indicating that policies need be gotten right and be driven by
the right political will and expertise to ensure that the desired effect is effectively activated.
TOT witnessed a significant more than proportionate effect of 1.12 on TRT revenue as
against the 0.71 it had in the short run, an indication that trade policies on ground is achieving
desired effect in the long run, and also justify that there are leakages in the system that must
be corrected for more revenue to be generated to make trade tax buoyant. The coefficient of
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FDI increased marginally from 0.11 in the short run to 0.38 in the long run, unfortunately,
still on the inverse indicating conscious effort needs to be engineered to ensure that FDI
inflow is monitored to ensure they are put into domestic productive ventures that would
impact positively on businesses that will expand the base of trade tax and spur other domestic
taxes through blocking the holes of unnecessary tax holidays, tax avoidance and evasion,
including curbing quickly the excesses that is involved in waivers, exemptions and
concessions being granted to undeserving firms and political cronies. Exchange rate had a
marginal decline in coefficient from 0.37 to 0.34, but this can be driven more by policies
targeted at curtailing inflation to arrive at a priori economic criteria as this scenario may have
to do with an over-valued currency (the Naira) inhibiting export, making domestic companies
less competitive in the international trade arena and encouraging importation thereby
propagating the nation as an import dependent nation. Worse still, is the fact that revenue that
would have accrued to the nation are drastically stifled by underhand dealings, smuggling and
outright corruption.
Corruption and Lending interest rate have the highest increment (more than a 100%)
in coefficients, from 0.33 and 0.37 to 0.78 and 0.78 respectively. This is worrisome because
both are major variables in an economy. Corruption has permeated every aspect of the
Nigerian economy (Ogbeidi, 2012), and its consequence seems to be growing in line with this
result. This may be the reason for the poor performance of other variables like INT, EXR and
FDI, so serious attention to curb its adverse effect must be put in place, and this calls to
question the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies like Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and the
Nigeria Police Force (NPF). For LIR, this increasing inverse relationship with trade tax may
be attributed to the effect of public debt arising from the need to fund government fiscal
deficit generating “crowding out” private investment and consumption that invariably puts
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pressure on lending interest rate, such that investment funds don’t yield adequate returns that
generates taxable income because of the “fiscal squeeze” resulting from government activity
in the financial market, most especially as a huge part of fiscal deficit is funded by the banks
in Nigeria. This has multiple effects on the economy, so should be promptly and adequately
addressed through measures that would generate not just more revenue, but also expand
domestic tax base, and promote an effective system that would develop and tap into
alternative sources of revenue, but also, make investment fund available for economic growth
and development.
Error Correction Method
An error correction (ECM) model is designed for use with non-stationary series that
are known to be cointegrated. The ECM has cointegration relations built into the specification
so that it restricts the long run behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their
cointegrating relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. The
cointegration term is known as the error correction term since the deviation from long-run
equilibrium is corrected gradually through a series of partial short-run adjustments.
The summary result of the error correction model is given as follows:
Table 4.7: Error Correction Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t statistics
ECM -0.96 0.24 -3.84
D(TRT(-1)) 0.61 0.29 2.08
D(INT(-1)) 0.05 0.20 0.27
D(TOT(-1)) -0.01 -0.00 -3.42
D(FDI(-1)) 0.12 0.07 1.72
D(EXR(-1)) 0.07 0.24 0.30
D(LIR(-1)) -0.36 0.69 -7.2
D(CPI(-1)) 3.56 10.09 0.35
C -7.11 2.99 -2.39
R2 = 0.96, Adjusted R2 = 0.91, F statistics = 20.87
Source: Author’s Compilation (August, 2016)
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Table 4.7 shows the coefficients of TRT, INT, FDI, and LIR display signs conforming
to a priori expectation while the coefficients of TOT, EXR and CPI do not. The model shows
five significant variables, only the parameter estimate of EXR, CPI and INT are statistically
insignificant in this model. The R2 (0.96*100= 96%) shows a strong and positive relationship
between the variables, revealing that 96% of the variations in TRT are accounted for by INT,
TOT, FDI, EXR, LIR and CPI, and the adjusted R2 is at 91% due to the adjustment for
degrees of freedom. This reveals that the explanatory variables have theoretical relevance to
the data series. The F calculated (20.87) is greater than the F tabulated (2.34) – we conclude
that the independent variables (INT, TOT, FDI, EXR, LIR, and CPI) have strong influence on
TRT in terms of forecasting.
In consonance with the error correction model, the coefficient of the error correction
term is with the expected negative sign and statistically significant, an indication of a move
back towards equilibrium with a magnitude of -0.96. This magnitude indicates that if there is
any deviation, the long run equilibrium is adjusted speedily where about 96% of the
disequilibrium may be removed in each period. This shows that the speed of adjustment to
where TRT will equilibrate even when there is initial disequilibrium is at the rate of 96%, this
fast rate indicate that in a little over a year, any disequilibrium will be automatically adjusted
back to equilibrium.
4.2.2 Trend of Trade Tax Revenue in Nigeria
The time series percentage growth data in Appendix III, indicated that in 1970 trade
tax revenue in Nigeria was N0.37billion, it increased to N0.49billion in 1971, a growth rate
of 32%. But in 1972, it declined by 1.8% from N0.48billion then increased to 7.2% in 1972,
before declining again by 3.4% in 1974, sliding from N0.51billion to N0.49billion. This is
attributed to the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity and marked the shift from
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dependence on trade tax to crude oil revenue which has continued till date with adverse
consequence for economic development, when there are price shocks resulting either from
global depression or political issues in global matters, development is thwarted.
In 1975, there was a visible increment in TRT from the 1974 figure of N0.49billion
(that declined by 3.4% from the previous year) to N0.76billion, this is an unprecedented
increase of 52% not seen before this time. This apparently was due to massive importation of
goods and services by the country given its new status of an oil economy. imported goods
and services became a fag and the country started having preference for foreign goods, these
has continued till date, as the marginal propensity to import is high and this has the
implication of creating unemployment, capital flight and creating ostentatious consumption
that Nigeria is today known for and a reason for the dumping that has continued unabated,
this is even worse now with cheap imitation products from China, Turkey and other countries.
However the growth rate of TRT increased to 16%, 30%, and 47% even though the
nominal figure was N0.88billion, N1.15billion, and N1.7 billion in 1976 to 1978 respectively.
More so, in 1979 it crashed to a negative figure of -32% (that is from N1.7billion in 1978 to
N1.14billion). This is the period of the return to democracy and the third Republic in Nigeria.
The military regime with their penchant for frivolous expenditure may attribute this to
election and security expense. But it is an evidence of leakages (corruption) which have
persisted in the economy today. Such was witnessed again, in the elections of 1983 to 1984,
where there was no growth in trade tax, but a decline of N1.61billion in 1984 (18%) from
N2.3billion in 1981, the trend has continued whenever the government in power use
government resources to finance electioneering process resulting in massive leakages
(corruption in the system).
By 1986, the decline has peaked attaining an all time low of 22%, as trade tax revenue
plunged from N2.18billion in 1985 to N1.7billion. This necessitated the austerity measures
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later in the name of SAP, as the persistent decline in revenue caused fiscal dislocation in the
economy and adversely affected economic growth and development. The result quickly
showed in 1987 as trade tax revenue returned more than proportionately, with a value of
N3.5billion, a growth rate of 105%. This growth quickly declined by 60% (N5.6billion) in
1988 and a minimal 3% in 1989, which is attributed to frequent government policy instability
consistent with military regimes. It was even negative (-3.7%) (N15.5bn), as a result of the
pariah nation status of the country during the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida and the
subsequent cancellation of the June 1993 general elections against the global outcry that
followed it.
In 1995, when Nigeria joined the World Trade Organisation, TRT once again returned
more than proportionate from N18.2billion to N37.4billion (105%). This cannot be attributed
entirely to trade liberalization as pursued by the WTO, but also government effort to re-
invigorate the general tax system as a result of the decline in 1993, the need of the
government to do some necessary infrastructure so as to gain legitimacy. Once again, this
growth was short lived as TRT declined by 47%, 14% and -8% in 1996, 1997 and 1998
respectively. The trend that prior to any regime change there is always a massive decline in
TRT clearly suggested that government effort at revenue generation declines grossly due to
leakages in the system. This was the case in 1979, 1983 and 1999 when there was a return to
democracy in the fourth republic. This results in the handing over of empty treasures to
succeeding administration in the country.
In 1999, with the return to democracy, Nigeria’s Pariah status was removed, and it
made effort to improve in trade relationships in the global economy, hence TRT grew from
N57.billion to N87billion (52%). This growth was sustained up to 2001 where it returned
N170.6billion (68%), and prior to another election period in 2003, it declined to a mere 6%
and 7% in 2002 and 2002 respectively, once again buttressing the fact that election leads to
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massive leakages in revenue in Nigeria. it continued its minimal growth of N17.2billion,
(11%), N232billion (7%) in 2004 and 2005.
In 2006, the tendency to neglect and pilfer from TRT for election purpose showed as
TRT revenue declined from N232.8billion (7%) in 2005 to N177.7billion (23%) in 2006. In
2007, election, it once again declined to N241.4billion (35%), but the growth remained
marginal N264billion (9%), N297billion (12%) in 2008 and 2009. By 2010, it was low
growth at N309billion (3%) despite the comprehensive restructuring of the entire tax system
that involves re-invigoration of the Federal Inland Revenue Service, the concession of the
ports. Perhaps, the re-basement of the GDP resulted in the growth of N435.3billion (41%)
witnessed in 2011, which subsequently declined to N451.5billion and N464.9billion that is
3% and 2% in 2012 and 2013. And in 2014, it marginally grew to N540.7billion (16%).
The data have suggested that TRT revenue in Nigeria is greatly affected by massive
leakages (corruption). Despite the nominal growth witnessed over the period of the study, in
real terms this has been marginal and even at times negative. This is seen mostly at
electioneering periods. It also means that such effort at generating revenue is implemented for
only a short period and afterwards discarded. Hence there is a need for a sustained drive at
policy implementation and the enforcement and prosecution of offenders who engage in the
massive leakages observed. This can be done by empowering law enforcement institutions
and by closely monitoring election funds for proper effectiveness in revenue generation
including reinvigorating the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2004.
Table 4 in Appendix 11 showed the paired measures for the dependent test variable
trade tax (TRT) revenue collected for the period of the study. This was paired for a twenty
year period each as stated in section 3.5.1. the result indicated that at 0.05% significant level
with 19 degrees of freedom, t statistic (6.92) is not less than the critical t value of 2.09, hence
the null hypothesis (H0) is not rejected, meaning that Economic integration (INT) is not
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effective in the trend of TRT revenue at the 0.05% level of significance during the period of
the study. This is, even though the d (sample difference) for each pair of data resulted in
positive values, indicating that INT resulted in more trade tax revenue. However, to know
how effective this is and to conclude at the 95% confidence level stated otherwise, indicating
that INT is not effective in trend of trade tax in Nigeria for the period of the study.
This is due to the early period of protective trade policy that hindered the expansion
of trade with the global economy. And from the trend analysis above, it was only in 1986 that
the country initiated the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that the country started an
outward trade oriented policy, and eventually she joined the WTO in 1995. In 1999, she
commenced her fourth republic and was more involved in trade agreements with the global
community, some of which have overlapping agreements that are in conflict with others
hindering effective implementation. In early 2000s, it signed the MINT and ECOWAS CET
agreements and commenced phased implementations before commencing full
implementations recently. This has generated ineffective results over the period of the study
because experts were not fully involved in the signing and implementation of these
agreements, and considerations was not given to the implementing environment which also
undermines the productive capacity of the economy. From the percentages trend data in
Appendix III, it was observed that with the implementation of the policy, the percentage trend
of TRT is truly on the downward slide in 2010, 2012, and 2013 where its growth rate was
only 3% respectively.
The study has shown in the trend data presentation that trade tax revenue has a major
challenge in electoral process in Nigeria, as prior to any general elections this revenue source
is greatly undermined through leakages in frivolous waivers, generous exemptions and
unwarranted concessions granted by presidential fiats to finance elections. This is besides the
very high incidence of tax avoidance and evasion prevalent in the system encouraging the
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various shades of corruption that adversely affect financing in a developmental state. In
analytical terms, as shown in the repeated measures test (Appendix xi), there is significant
difference in the trend of trade tax revenue between the period pre- WTO and post WTO
revenue in Nigeria for the period of the study and this is in the negative direction as shown by
the regression result. Hence, it can be concluded that economic integration is not effective in
the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria for the period of the study. This has the potential
of exacerbating fiscal imbalances and under-development.
Diagnostic and Tests
Cumulative Sum of the Recursive Residuals (CUSUM)
There are several diagnostic tests that examine whether the parameters of the model
are stable across various sub-samples of given data. The CUSUM test adopted is based on the
cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. This option plots the cumulative sum together with
the 5% critical lines. The test finds parameter instability if the cumulative sum goes outside
the area between the two critical lines. The significance of any departure from the zero line is
assessed by reference to a pair of 5% significance lines, the distance between which increases
with increases in (subsamples). Movement of recursive residuals outside the critical lines is
suggestive of coefficient instability. The CUSUM graph is given below:
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Figure 4.2: Cusum graph for Parameter Stability
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Source: Author’s Computation (August, 2016)
Table 4.8: Ramsey Reset Specification of Error test
Test
t Statistic
F-Statistic
Loglikelihood Ratio
Value
1.666
2.776
3.435
Degree of freedom
35
1,35
1
Probability.
0.1046
0.1046
0.0638
Source: Author’s Computation (August 2016)
This test follows the F-distribution under the null hypothesis that the model is well-
specified, our decision rule is not to reject the null hypothesis if the F0.05 exceeds the F
calculated value at the 5% given level of significance. From the Ramsey RESET result;
F-statistic = 2.77
While, critical F0.05 (1,35) ≈ 4.08
Conclusion: Since F-statistic ≈ 2.77 is less than the critical F ≈ 4.08, we do not reject
the null hypothesis of model is well-specified, we therefore conclude that the estimated
model is correctly specified at the 5% significant level given the 0.10 level obtained; that is,
there is no specification error.
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Chow's Breakpoint Test
The Chow breakpoint test tests whether there is a structural change in all of the
equation parameters. The study chose a date that is significant to this study; 1995, the year
Nigeria formally joined the World trade organisation.
Table 4.9: Chow's Breakpoint test result
Test
F-Statistic
Loglikelihood Ratio
Wald test
Value
1.3012
16.213
11.711
Degree of freedom
9, 27
9
9
Probability.
0.2817
0.0626
0.2301
Source: Author’s Computation (August 2016)
From table 4.9, we found that for 9 and 27 degree of freedom, the 5 percent critical F
value is 2.09, while the F statistic is 1.30. Therefore, the probability of obtaining an F value
of as much as or greater than 1.30 is much greater than the 5 percent significant level; the
Chow test therefore seems to support that the parameters for TRT, INT, TOT, FDI, EXR, LIR
and CPI has not undergone any structural change in Nigeria over the period 1970–2014. This
justified the use of pooled regression for the period of the study.
Heteroscedasticity Test
The presence of heteroskedasticity does not alter the bias or consistency properties of
ordinary least squares estimates, but OLS estimation is no longer efficient and conventional
estimates of the coefficient standard errors are not valid, so the heteroscedasticity test is
carried out in order to verify whether the disturbances actually exhibit the equal variance
(homoscedasticity) assumption. The white’s heteroscedasticity test is used to carry out this
task. It makes use of the residuals generated from the original regression and runs each of the
regressors and their squared terms against the generated residuals. We will reject Ho if F cal
> F tab at 5% level of significance; otherwise, we will not reject Ho.
From the result obtained;
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Calculated F = 0.398
While, critical F 0.05 (36, 8) = 2.18
Conclusion: Since calculated F = 0.398 is less than critical F0.05 (36, 8) df = 2.18, we
therefore do not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity and conclude that the error
terms have a constant variance.
Table 4.10: White Heteroskedasticity Test Result
Test Statistic
F-Statistic
Obs R-Squared
Scaled Explained SS
Value
0.398
36.07
24.82
Degree of freedom
36,8
36
36
Probability.
0.622
0.465
0.919
Source: Author’s Computation (August 2016)
Autocorrelation Test
The Breusch-Godfrey (BG) general test of autocorrelation also known as LM-test is
used to verify this assumption. This test is better than the conventional Durbin-Watson test of
autocorrelation in the sense that it allows for non-stochastic repressors such as the lagged
values of the regress and, higher-order autoregressive schemes, and simple or higher order
moving averages of the error terms. We reject the null hypothesis (Ho) if F statistics > F
critical at 5% level of significance; otherwise we will not reject Ho.
From the result obtained,
Calculated F = 0.267
While, critical F = 4.08
Conclusion: Since calculated F is less than critical F = 4.08, we do not reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation and therefore conclude that the error terms in the model are
not serially correlated.
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Table 4.11: Breuseh Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test Result
Test Statistic
F-Statistic
Obs R-Squared
Value
0.267
0.34
Degree of freedom
1,35
1
Probability.
0.608
0.55
Source: Author’s Computation (August, 2016)
Multicollinearity Test
An assumption of the CLNRM is that there is no multiconlliearity among the
explanatory variables induced in the regression model. It refers to the existence of more than
one exact (or inexact) linear relationship. Multicollinearity test is carried out in order to
verify the possibility of this assumption using the correlation matrix. It has been suggested
that if the pair-wise correlation coefficient is in excess of 0.8, then multicollinearity is present
and may pose serious estimation problem (Gujarati and Porter, 2006). The result of the
correlation matrix is presented below:
Table 4.12: The Result of the Correlation Matrix
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
TRT 1.000000 0.385829 0.523523 -0.185431 0.111549 0.047961 -0.102357
INT 0.385829 1.000000 0.704031 -0.149601 -0.102228 0.183062 -0.191323
TOT 0.523523 0.704031 1.000000 0.046755 -0.135450 -0.033144 -0.155980
FDI -0.185431 -0.149601 0.046755 1.000000 0.247302 -0.026508 -0.123748
EXR 0.111549 -0.102228 -0.135450 0.247302 1.000000 0.360996 0.280860
LIR 0.047961 0.183062 -0.033144 -0.026508 0.360996 1.000000 -0.004610
CPI -0.102357 -0.191323 -0.155980 -0.123748 0.280860 -0.004610 1.000000
Source: Author’s Compilation from E-views 8.0 print out (August, 2016)
From the correlation matrix in Table 4.11 above, we can confirm that there is no pair-
wise correlation coefficient that is in excess of 0.80 (Gujarati and Porter, 2006). Hence, the
variables cannot be said to be collinear. INT is 0.38, TOT is 0.52, with FDI, EXR, LIR and
CPI having -0.18, 0.11, 0.04, and -0.10 respectively. Therefore we conclude that there is no
multicollinearity among the repressors
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4.2.3 Buoyancy of Trade tax
Table 4.13: Result of the Buoyancy of Tax and Analysis
Tax To Base Base to Income
Tax Revenue Buoyanc
y
Estimate
s
t-statistics Adjusted
R2
Buoyancy
Estimates
t-statistics Adjusted
R2
TRT 0.77 64.56 98% 1.05 52.13 98%
TAX 0.95 43.4 98%
Source: Author’s Compilation (August, 2016)
The results presented above indicated that the buoyancy for Nigeria’s overall tax
system is 0.95. On this basis, it can be stated that a 1 percentage point growth in GDP spurred
a less than proportionate growth in tax revenue (that is, it is inelastic). Thus, a decreasing
proportion of income was transferred to the government in the form of tax revenues, meaning
that the tax structure in Nigeria is not buoyant. Buoyancy for trade tax revenue is also at 0.77
(inelastic) which indicates loss of revenue. This can be attributed to the implementation of
economic integration and the challenges posed by the high level of corruption, frivolous and
arbitrary waivers, exemptions, concessions and tax evasion. This is evident given that the
overall buoyancy of trade tax base (TOT) to GDP buoyancy is high (1.05), which is more
than proportionate. The low trade tax to total tax base buoyancy is an indication of leakages
in the efforts to improve tax imposition and implementation, an indication of inefficiency in
tax administration, low tax compliance. Unfortunately, the growth in tax revenue lagged
behind the growth in GDP and this further dampens the responsiveness of tax revenue to
changes in Nigeria’s GDP.
As the economy changes, there should be constant review of the tax structure to
improve on shortcomings in the administration of tax system, the development of alternative
revenue sources. We recommend that tax evasion magnitude, composition, growth and
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determinants be estimated and handled to help minimize noncompliance as this effectively
defrauds the government of legally due tax revenues, thereby reducing the government’s
ability to provide public services, while increasing the nation’s fiscal and debt burden.
Although the tax base seemed to respond well to changes in national income, trade tax did
not respond positively to changes in its base, an indication of leakages in the tax system. It is
possible that trade tax revenue was affected negatively by other government policies that
influence foreign trade such as economic integration, exchange rate volatility and corruption.
This clearly showed that Nigeria has not been able to off- set the loss in revenue that is lost
due to the implementation of economic integration policy, with the government in the face of
inadequate revenue resorting to financing fiscal deficit from the domestic economy thereby
putting upward pressure on Exchange rate (EXR) and Lending Interest rate (LIR) which
lowers the productive capacity of the domestic industry to compete at international level and
spur productivity and export that will improve domestic tax base and off set loss from
reduction in tariff and other barriers, in the face of prevailing corruption this will exacerbate
the fiscal squeeze and lead the country to prolong problems of fiscal imbalances and under
development.
4.3.1 Test of Hypothesis 1:
Ho1: Economic integration does not significantly affect the growth of trade tax revenue in
Nigeria.
H11: Economic integration significantly affects the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria.
The condition for significance is that taking absolute value t statistics should be
greater than t critical, and in the estimated OLS result in table (4.3), the t statistic value -3.39
is greater than the t critical value -1.68 taking absolute values for a two tail test at 5%
significant level. Also, in the long run model, INT has a coefficient of 3.98 which is
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statistically significant. Hence, it is right to conclude that economic integration has significant
effect on the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria for the period of the study. We therefore
reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative.
4.3.2 Test of Hypothesis 2:
Ho2: There is no significant difference in the trend of trade tax in Nigeria before and after
joining WTO.
H12: There is significant difference in the trend of trade tax in Nigeria before and after
joining WTO.
The condition for significance is that taking absolute value reject H0, if t statistic is
less than critical t at 0.05 significance level. The t statistic value 6.92 is greater than the t
critical value 2.09 taking absolute values for a two tail test at 5% significant level. Therefore,
there is significant difference in the trend of trade tax revenue in Nigeria. Hence we reject the
null hypothesis and accept the alternative. And we can conclude that economic integration
has significant effect on the trend of trade tax revenue in Nigeria for the period of the study
4.3.3 Test of Hypothesis 3:
Ho3: There is no significant buoyancy of Trade tax revenue in Nigeria.
H13: There is significant buoyancy of Trade tax revenue in Nigeria
Empirical evidence from table 4.12 showed that total tax (TAX) revenue is inelastic
with a buoyancy value of 0.95 to its base, GDP, same with TRT revenue which is inelastic at
0.77 to its base TOT. TOT in table 4.12 was found to respond well to economic changes with
buoyancy values greater than unity (1.05). But, on the whole, the study revealed that TRT
revenue does not contribute significantly to TAX revenue in Nigeria for the period of the
study.
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4.4 Discussion of Findings
This research work was conducted to evaluate the effect of Economic integration on
the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria in the face of dwindling revenue performance that
has resulted in fiscal squeeze and has escalated non sustainable fiscal deficit and public debts
with dire consequences on foreign direct investment, exchange rate and lending interest rate
in the face of pervasive corruption for the period from 1970 to 2015.
In the first analysis conducted, it was observed that Economic integration has
statistically significant effect on the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria, within the period
of the study, but it exerts a negative effect on TRT revenue. This is evidenced by the result
obtained from both the short and long run estimates. This result implies that economic
integration policy of removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs, rules and regulations have
resulted in loss in trade tax revenue in Nigeria, and the country has not been able to recover
this loss in revenue due to poor policy implementing environment leading to fiscal squeeze,
as this has far reaching implication for foreign direct investment, exchange rate and interest
rate which experience upward pressure, as this condition does not stop the government from
seeking more deficit financing thereby crowding out private investment and consumption that
is suppose to spur the base of trade tax, expand existing domestic taxes and develop
alternative sources of revenue. It also lowers the competitiveness of domestic industries
against imported goods. There is therefore a strong need to further focus on policies that will
encourage greater economic integration with appropriate environmental condition.
In the second analysis utilizing the paired means / repeated measures test, there is an
indication that Economic integration is not effective in contributing to the trend of trade tax
revenue in Nigeria for the period of the study. This is due to protectionism being practiced in
the early period of this study, the adverse effect that led to the introduction of Structural
Adjustment Programme in 1986, and consequently an outward oriented trade policy that led
to the joining of WTO in 1995, and the membership of many trade arrangements like MINT,
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ECOWAS CET agreements. But, these were all agreed and implemented without expert
opinion including considerations for the implementing environment coupled with other
challenges associated with Trade tax revenue.
In the third analysis, the study found that the buoyancy of trade tax (TRT) revenue to
total tax (TAX) revenue is inelastic, consequently total tax revenue is also inelastic to
changes in its base Gross Domestic Product (GDP) suggesting leakages in the system.
Confirming this view is the fact that the base to income buoyancy posted a more than
proportionate return indicating that leakages in the form of corruption, tax avoidance and
evasion, generous waivers, frivolous exemptions and unwarranted concessions, including
other inefficiencies that exist in the system.
The summary of these findings is captured in the test of the three hypotheses which
showed that Economic integration is not effective in contributing to the trend of trade tax
revenue in Nigeria, and there exists a significant inverse relationship between TRT revenue
and INT, it thus implies that Nigeria has been losing tariff revenue from implementing
economic integration policy and the country has not been able to off- set this loss in revenue
due to the application of this policy in an environment of limited productive capacity. This is
confirmed in hypothesis three which indicated TRT revenue is inelastic and has been
contributing less than proportionately to TAX revenue, which in turn is income inelastic to
changes in GDP. The fact that TOT (base of TRT) to GDP buoyancy is more than
proportionate provided evidence of leakages in the system attributed to corruption and other
challenges identified in the study.
It should be noted from results obtained that FDI, EXR LIR and CPI is significant in
explaining the effect of fiscal squeeze in Nigeria. This is shown in the OLS and long run
results. This results from government’s need to finance deficit financing through public debt
occasioned by inadequate revenue generation that puts an upward pressure on lending interest
131
rate and in the process inevitably crowd out private investment and consumption that should
spur domestic productive activity that should impact positively on trade tax base, expand
other domestic taxes and harness alternative sources of revenue that should off- set the loss in
revenue from trade tax.
Exchange rate also showed significance in the study, both in the OLS and the long run
results it exerted positive effect on TRT revenue as against a priori expectation. This may be
an indication of over- valuation of the domestic currency (the Naira) against other currencies
with adverse effect on the economy in general. It makes the country import dependent as
imports becomes cheaper compared to domestic goods, even as it generates import duties.
The worry here is the adequacy of such revenue given the high level of underhand dealings
and corruption prevalent in the economy and the impact of import dependency, especially as
the domestic productivity is hampered and export is curtailed.
The adverse effect of Corruption is also observed from the OLS and the long run
results where it showed inverse effect on TRT revenue in the short run, and exhibited a
higher coefficient in the long run. It is exhibited in trade tax avoidance and evasion, generous
waivers, frivolous exemptions and unwarranted concessions granted to undeserving
individuals and firms by official fiat.
These findings are in line with Okoh (2004), Ghani (2011), which have found that
economic integration (INT) has adverse effect on various growth variables like exports and
output in developing countries like Nigeria for which it is a development issue. Thus
economic integration policy facilitates loss of trade tax revenue, even more so, that FDI, EXR,
LIR and CPI undermines domestic productive capacity. This has implication for the base of
TRT revenue, the expansion of existing taxes and the development of alternative sources of
revenue. Therefore compromising the possibility of off-setting the loss in TRT revenue, and
exacerbating fiscal squeeze leading the country into profound problem of fiscal instability
and under development.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary
Nigeria is a country in dire need of alternative sources of revenue and improvement in
the existing ones given her dwindling revenue profile. The country has for sometime been
involved in economic integration agreements whose policy demands have implication for the
economy. This study examined economic integration as it affects the growth of trade tax
revenue in Nigeria, given the policy of liberalizing rules and regulations, removing barriers
and lowering / harmonizing common external tariffs of members against non-members. It is a
fall out of an assessment of Nigeria’s revenue profile from various studies Ariyo (1997),
Ghani (2011) and Nwosa et al (2012), including official government documents indicating
continuous fiscal deficits, volatile exchange rate and double digit lending interest rate over
various years revealing among others an unsustainable level of fiscal deficit, increasing
public debt with implications for foreign direct investment, and consequently on the
productive capacity of the domestic economy- its competitiveness in international trade.
This backdrop spurred the interest of the researcher to evaluate “economic integration
and the growth of trade tax revenue in Nigeria.” It specifically sought to examine the trend
of trade tax revenue in Nigeria and estimate the buoyancy of trade tax revenue to total tax
revenue in Nigeria. Three hypotheses were formulated to guide and achieve these objectives.
Descriptive and analytical tools were adopted to achieve these objectives. Several variables
were used; TRT, INT, TOT, FDI, EXR, LIR, CPI, TAX and GDP and data was collected for
the period from 1970 to 2014.
The formulations of the models were hinged on two theories: Customs union and
revenue productivity theory, which in turn were consequent upon the various literature and
empirical studies reviewed. The findings of the study revealed that economic integration has
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negative effect on trade tax revenue in Nigeria for the period of the study. Furthermore, the
explanatory variables, foreign direct investment exhibited a positive effect on trade tax
revenue. This is an indication that it is mostly “hot money” that flows into the country to take
advantage of high returns on portfolio investment, hence the resort to capital flight at the
slightest risk. This was the case both in the short and long run, so it does not spur productive
capacity in the economy. Exchange rate both in the short run and long run was positive which
may be attributed to an over –valuation of the Naira, especially in the past decade of trade
liberalization that made high cost domestic products more expensive than imported goods,
and the reliance on a mono product for foreign exchange to strengthen the Naira in the face of
high propensity to import. Hence, import duty showing prominence with implication for local
production and the competitiveness of local firm in international trade. In the short run, LIR
was negative, and in the long run it also exhibited an upward pressure due to the crowding
out effect of the governments activities in the financial market to fund fiscal deficits which
also undermines domestic productive capacity that is supposed to be a veritable source of
expanding the base of trade tax, expanding domestic taxes and harnessing alternative sources
thereby increasing public debt, this will exacerbate the fiscal squeeze.
Also, the study revealed that TRT contributes less than proportionately to total tax
revenue, which also is inelastic to GDP changes. This is an indication of leakages, more so,
that the base to income buoyancy of trade tax is elastic. This can be attributed to poor tax
efforts, frivolous waivers, generous exemptions, fraudulent concessions, tax evasion and
outright corruption, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in
Nigeria to combat the menace.
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5.2 Conclusion
Following the findings of this research, it is concluded that Nigeria is engaging in
economic integration in the face of ensuing revenue loss given the poor policy environment
in the country. This has affected foreign direct investment and has put pressure on exchange
rate and lending interest rate which has adversely affected the productive capacity of the
domestic economy, hence diminishing its capacity to grow trade tax revenue, expand
domestic tax bases and develop alternative revenue sources to off- set tariff loss from
implementing economic integration policies. This has the capacity to exacerbate the fiscal
squeeze if not quickly curtailed.
It is also clear from the analysis that economic integration policy measures have
remained ineffective in driving trade tax growth in Nigeria due to the behaviour of FDI, EXR
and LIR as shown in the study. This weakness is caused by the inability of the authorities to
effectively harness alternative sources of revenue, properly administer existing sources and
outright corruption. Finally, the study concluded that economic integration has not benefited
Nigeria in terms of the growth of trade tax revenue for the period of the study. This has
impacted on the economy in terms of fiscal squeeze generated by continuous unsustainable
fiscal deficit in an environment of limited productive capacity and corruption, so if this is not
quickly curtailed it will lead the country to a profound case of fiscal squeeze that will result
to fiscal imbalances and under development.
5.3 Policy Recommendations
This study which evaluated economic integration and the growth of trade tax revenue
in Nigeria for the period 1970 to 2015 concluded that Nigeria is losing tariff revenue from
implementing economic integration policy because she has not effectively developed and
managed its domestic tax sources to adequately off-set this loss of revenue as a result of
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limited productive capacity in the economy and other challenges affecting trade tax revenue.
In view of this, this research makes the following recommendations:
1. There is need to fully understand foreign trade agreements, create conducive
environment for them and properly implement them with the right political will and
appropriate infrastructure and investment to ensure expected benefits that will grow
the economy to impact positively on trade tax revenue which will in turn finance
economic development. This can be achieved by engaging experts in the process of
negotiation up to the implementation stages of economic integration policies, and
allowance can be sought for phased implementation and reversals as the case may be
in the face of adverse effects.
2. The development of alternative sources of revenue and the effective broadening and
administration of existing domestic tax sources to generate adequate revenue that will
off-set the loss in revenue from implementing economic integration policy in Nigeria
should be pursued. This will involve invigorating all the stakeholders in the scheme
such as the Federal Inland Revenue Service, Nigeria Customs Service to be more
effective in their service responsibility and delivery, through constant capacity
training, application of global standards in their duties, including creating awareness
in the citizenry about the need to pay taxes and the usefulness of tax revenue to the
country.
3. Corruption has become a huge menace in Nigeria, and unless it is curtailed the effort
at raising finance for economic development will be futile, and even the application of
tax revenue to encourage citizen faith in compliance is thwarted, as it also diverts
resources meant for public goods and services to private pockets hampering economic
development and limiting the expansion of domestic tax bases as it affects investment
and consumption in the economy. This can be controlled through the enactment of
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laws and legislation that will strengthen the Anti-corruption agencies to adequately
enforce the laws by arresting and prosecuting offenders to act as deterrent to other
criminal minds in the society.
4. Macroeconomic policies that will positively impact on the productive capacity of the
economy should be enacted; there should be incentives for export promotion to
encourage domestic production and create jobs. This will strengthen the naira and
make domestic goods competitive in the integrated area. Also, develop and design
effective policies that will attract viable foreign direct investment, stabilize exchange
rate and interest rate to the desired threshold to drive investment and economic
development.
5.4 Limitations of the Study
1. The various data collected even from the same source exhibited some level of
inconsistency. The researcher ensured that the most appropriate was used to avoid
spurious results.
2. The depth of analysis of this research would have been more encompassing if a more
comprehensive data on some indicators were available.
3. Corruption perception index was used as proxy for corruption as this is the universal
measure that is most accepted and adequate for measuring it for now.
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APPENDIX I
TABLE 1: TIME SERIES DATA (NOMINAL, PERCENTAGE AND INDEX
OF DATA)
YEAR TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI TAX GDP
1970 0.37 31.5 1.64 0.13 0.71 8 1.2 0.51 5.2
1971 0.49 35.9 2.37 0.14 0.69 11 1 0.94 6.6
1972 0.481 33.33 2.4 0.3 0.66 10 1.3 1.1 7.2
1973 0.516 32.11 3.5 0.19 0.66 10 1.4 1.37 10.9
1974 0.498 40.98 7.5 0.18 0.63 10 1.3 3.53 18.3
1975 0.76 40 8.6 0.25 0.61 9 1.6 3.75 21.5
1976 0.882 43.59 11.9 0.21 0.62 10 1.4 4.73 27.3
1977 1.15 36.5 14.7 0.25 0.65 6 1.7 5.98 32.6
1978 1.7 39.83 14.3 0.13 0.61 11 1.09 5.66 35.9
1979 1.14 27.71 14.3 0.18 0.59 11 1.06 6.9 51.6
1980 1.81 36.1 18.31 -0.4 0.6 9.5 1.08 10.9 50.6
1981 2.32 25.23 23.8 0.33 0.61 10 1.06 9.3 94.3
1982 2.33 18.81 19 0.3 0.67 11.75 1.07 8.1 101
1983 1.98 14.9 16.4 0.3 0.72 11.5 1.09 6.3 110.1
1984 1.61 14.01 16.3 0.4 0.76 13 1.08 7.2 116.3
1985 2.18 13.97 18.8 0.4 0.89 11.75 1.09 9.9 134.6
1986 1.7 11.06 14.9 0.7 2.02 12 1.1 8.2 134.6
1987 3.5 24.96 48.2 2.5 4.02 19.2 1.12 17.3 193.1
1988 5.6 19.98 52.6 1.72 4.54 17.6 1.1 18.3 263.3
1989 5.8 23.22 88.8 13.8 7.4 24.6 1.13 32.1 382.3
1990 8.6 47.35 155.6 4.73 8.04 27.7 1.15 52.4 328.6
1991 11.5 38.66 211 6.92 9.91 20.88 1.16 56.2 545.7
1992 16.1 39.85 348.8 14.46 17.3 31.2 1.18 77.2 875.3
1993 15.5 35.28 384.4 29.66 22.1 36.09 1.19 89.6 1089.7
1994 18.2 26.35 368.8 22.23 21.89 21 1.21 80.6 1399.7
1995 37.4 58.67 1705.8 75.94 21.89 20.79 1.23 157.8 2907.4
1996 55 46.43 1872.2 111.3 21.89 20.86 1.25 188.1 4032.3
1997 63 49.83 2087.4 110.4 21.89 23.32 1 224.6 4189.2
1998 57.7 39.84 1589.3 80.7 21.9 21.34 1.19 195.9 3989.5
1999 87.9 43.84 2051.5 92.8 92.69 27.19 1.6 368.9 4679.2
2000 101.5 43.65 2930.7 116.4 102.1 21.55 1.2 801.5 6713.6
2001 170.6 46.79 3226.1 133.2 111.94 21.34 1 1118.8 6895.2
2002 181.4 41.78 3256.9 226.7 120.97 30.19 1.6 1489.8 7795.8
2003 195.5 52.13 5168.1 259.4 139.35 22.88 1.4 1130.1 9913.5
2004 217.2 57.75 6589.8 248.2 133.5 20.82 1.6 1711.7 11411.1
2005 232.8 68.77 10047.4 654.2 129.3 19.49 1.9 2637.6 14610.9
2006 177.7 56.2 10433.2 624.5 128.65 18.7 2.2 2847.8 18564.6
2007 241.4 59.16 12221.7 759.3 125.83 18.36 2.2 3051.1 20657.3
2008 264.1 63.19 15352.9 971.8 118.57 18.7 2.7 1336.3 24296.3
2009 297.5 54.52 13518.6 1273.6 148.9 22.62 2.5 2426.4 24794.2
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2010 309.2 35.65 19321.4 905.7 150.3 22.51 2.4 2835.5 54204.8
2011 438.3 39.61 25057.8 1360.4 153.86 22.42 2.4 4628.7 63258.6
2012 451.5 33.46 23820.6 1113.5 157.5 24.65 2.7 5767.6 71186.5
2013 464.9 29.48 23648.8 875.1 157.3 24.94 2.5 7910.6 80222.1
2014 540.7 26.39 23499.3 738.2 158.5 30 2.7 9787.7 89043.6
Source: CBN (various years), NBS (various years), TI (various years)
Note: TRT, TOT, FDI, TAX and GDP are expressed in N’billion
INT, LIR are expressed in rate.
EXR is the average official exchange rate ($1/N)
CPI is expressed as an Index
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APPENDIX II
TABLE 2: TIME SERIES DATA (LOG DATA)
YEAR TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI TAX GDP
1970 -0.99425 3.449988 0.494696 -2.04022 -0.34249 2.079442 0.182322 -0.67334 1.648659
1971 -0.71335 3.580737 0.86289 -1.96611 -0.37106 2.397895 0 -0.06188 1.88707
1972 -0.73189 3.506458 0.875469 -1.66073 -0.41552 2.302585 0.262364 0.09531 1.974081
1973 -0.66165 3.469168 1.252763 -1.7148 -0.41552 2.302585 0.336472 0.314811 2.388763
1974 -0.69716 3.713084 2.014903 -1.38629 -0.46204 2.302585 0.262364 1.261298 2.906901
1975 -0.27444 3.688879 2.151762 -1.56065 -0.4943 2.197225 0.470004 1.321756 3.068053
1976 -0.12556 3.774828 2.476538 -1.38629 -0.47804 2.302585 0.336472 1.553925 3.306887
1977 0.139762 3.597312 2.687847 -2.04022 -0.43078 1.791759 0.530628 1.788421 3.484312
1978 0.530628 3.68462 2.66026 -1.7148 -0.4943 2.397895 0.086178 1.733424 3.580737
1979 0.131028 3.321793 2.66026 0 -0.52763 2.397895 0.058269 1.931521 3.943522
1980 0.593327 3.586293 2.907447 -1.10866 -0.51083 2.251292 0.076961 2.388763 3.923952
1981 0.841567 3.228034 3.169686 -1.20397 -0.4943 2.302585 0.058269 2.230014 4.546481
1982 0.845868 2.934389 2.944439 -1.20397 -0.40048 2.463853 0.067659 2.091864 4.615121
1983 0.683097 2.701361 2.797281 -0.91629 -0.3285 2.442347 0.086178 1.84055 4.701389
1984 0.476234 2.639771 2.791165 -0.91629 -0.27444 2.564949 0.076961 1.974081 4.756173
1985 0.779325 2.636912 2.933857 -0.35667 -0.11653 2.463853 0.086178 2.292535 4.902307
1986 0.530628 2.403335 2.701361 0.916291 0.703098 2.484907 0.09531 2.104134 4.902307
1987 1.252763 3.217275 3.875359 0.542324 1.391282 2.95491 0.113329 2.850707 5.263208
1988 1.722767 2.994732 3.962716 2.624669 1.512927 2.867899 0.09531 2.906901 5.573294
1989 1.757858 3.145014 4.486387 1.553925 2.00148 3.202746 0.122218 3.468856 5.946206
1990 2.151762 3.857567 5.047289 1.934416 2.084429 3.321432 0.139762 3.958907 5.794841
1991 2.442347 3.654805 5.351858 2.671386 2.293544 3.038792 0.14842 4.028917 6.302069
1992 2.778819 3.685122 5.854499 3.389799 2.850707 3.440418 0.165514 4.346399 6.774567
1993 2.74084 3.563316 5.951684 3.101443 3.095578 3.586016 0.173953 4.495355 6.993658
1994 2.901422 3.271468 5.910254 4.329944 3.08603 3.044522 0.19062 4.389499 7.244013
1995 3.621671 4.071929 7.441789 4.712229 3.08603 3.034472 0.207014 5.061328 7.975014
1996 4.007333 3.837946 7.534869 4.70411 3.08603 3.037833 0.223144 5.236974 8.302092
1997 4.143135 3.908617 7.643675 4.390739 3.08603 3.149311 0 5.414321 8.340265
1998 4.055257 3.684871 7.371049 4.530447 3.086487 3.060583 0.173953 5.277604 8.291421
1999 4.4762 3.780547 7.626327 4.757033 4.529261 3.302849 0.470004 5.910526 8.450882
2000 4.620059 3.776203 7.982997 4.891852 4.625953 3.070376 0.182322 6.686485 8.811891
2001 5.139322 3.84567 8.079029 5.423628 4.717963 3.060583 0 7.020012 8.838581
2002 5.200705 3.732418 8.088531 5.558371 4.795543 3.407511 0.470004 7.306397 8.96134
2003 5.27556 3.953741 8.55026 5.514235 4.936989 3.130263 0.336472 7.030061 9.201653
2004 5.380819 4.056123 8.793278 6.483413 4.894101 3.035914 0.470004 7.445242 9.342342
2005 5.45018 4.230768 9.215069 6.436951 4.862135 2.969902 0.641854 7.877625 9.589523
2006 5.180097 4.028917 9.252748 6.632397 4.857096 2.928524 0.788457 7.954302 9.829012
2007 5.486455 4.080246 9.410968 6.87915 4.834932 2.910174 0.788457 8.023257 9.935824
2008 5.576328 4.146146 9.63906 7.149603 4.775504 2.928524 0.993252 7.19766 10.09808
2009 5.695414 3.998568 9.511822 6.808708 5.003275 3.118834 0.916291 7.794164 10.11837
2010 5.733988 3.573749 9.868969 7.215534 5.012633 3.11396 0.875469 7.949974 10.90052
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Source: Author’s computation (August, 2016)
2011 6.082904 3.679082 10.12894 7.015263 5.036043 3.109953 0.875469 8.440031 11.05499
2012 6.112575 3.510351 10.07831 6.774338 5.059425 3.204777 0.993252 8.660011 11.17306
2013 6.141822 3.383712 10.07107 6.604215 5.058155 3.216473 0.916291 8.975959 11.29255
2014 6.292865 3.272985 10.06473 6.604215 5.065755 3.401197 0.993252 9.188882 11.39688
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APPENDIX III
TABLE 3: PERCENTAGES OF TRT, INT, TOT, FDI, EXR, LIR AND CPI
YEAR % TRT % INT % TOT % FDI % EXR % LIR % CPI
1970
1971 32.4 4.4 44.5 7.6 -2.8 37.5 -16.6
1972 -1.8 -2.57 1.2 114.2 -4.3 -9 30
1973 7.2 -1.22 45.8 -36.7 0 0 7.6
1974 -3.4 8.87 114.2 -5.2 -4.5 0 -7.1
1975 52.6 -0.98 14.6 38.8 -3.2 -10 23
1976 16 3.59 38.3 -16 1.64 11.1 -12.5
1977 30.3 -7.09 23.5 19 4.8 -40 21.4
1978 47.8 3.33 -2.7 -48 -6.1 83.3 -35.8
1979 -32.9 -12.12 0 38.4 -3.3 0 -2.7
1980 58.7 8.39 28 -322.2 1.6 -13.6 1.8
1981 28.1 -10.87 29.9 -182.5 1.6 5.3 -1.8
1982 0.4 -6.42 -20.1 -9 9.8 17.5 0.9
1983 -15 -3.91 -13.6 0 7.4 -2.1 1.8
1984 -18 -0.89 -0.6 33.3 5.5 13 -0.9
1985 35.4 -0.04 15.3 0 17.1 -9.6 0.9
1986 -22 -2.91 -20.7 75 126.9 2.1 0.9
1987 105.8 13.9 223.5 257.1 99 60 1.8
1988 60 -4.98 9.1 -31.2 12.9 -8.3 -1.7
1989 3.5 3.24 68.8 702.3 63 39.7 2.7
1990 48.2 24.13 75.2 -65.7 8.6 12.6 1.7
1991 33.7 -8.69 35.6 46.3 23.2 -24.6 0.8
1992 40 1.19 65.3 108.9 74.5 49.4 1.7
1993 -3.7 -4.57 10.2 105.1 27.7 15.6 0.8
1994 17.4 -8.93 -4 -25 -0.9 -41.8 1.6
1995 105.5 32.32 362.5 241.6 0 -1 1.6
1996 47 -12.24 9.7 46.5 0 0.3 1.6
1997 14.5 3.4 11.5 -0.8 0 11.7 -20
1998 -8.4 -9.99 -23.8 -26 0 -8.5 19
1999 52.3 4 29 14.9 323.4 27.4 34.4
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2000 15.4 -0.19 42.8 25.4 10.1 -20.7 -25
2001 68 3.14 10 14.4 9.6 -0.9 -16.6
2002 6.3 -5.01 0.95 70.1 8 41.4 60
2003 7.7 10.35 58.6 14.4 15.1 -24.2 -12.5
2004 11 5.62 27.5 -4.3 -4.1 -9 14.2
2005 7.1 11.02 52.5 163.5 -3.1 -6.3 18.7
2006 -23.6 -12.57 3.8 -4.5 -0.5 -4 15.7
2007 35.8 2.96 17.4 21.5 -2.1 -1.8 0
2008 9.4 4.03 25.62 27.9 -5.7 1.8 22.7
2009 12.6 -8.67 -11.9 31 25.5 20.9 -7.4
2010 3.9 -18.87 42.9 -28.8 0.9 -0.4 -4
2011 41.7 3.96 29.6 50.2 2.4 -0.3 0
2012 3 -6.15 -4.9 -18.1 2.4 9.9 12.5
2013 2.9 -3.98 -0.7 -21.41 -0.1 1.1 -7.4
2014 16.3 -3.09 -0.6 -15.6 0.7 20.2 8
Source: Author’s computation (August, 2016)
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APPENDIX IV
The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ TRT, INT, TOT, FDI, EXR,
LIR, CPI, TAX and GDP at levels.
Null Hypothesis: TRT has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.481940 0.8850
Test critical values: 1% level -3.588509
5% level -2.929734
10% level -2.603064
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(TRT)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:24
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2014
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
TRT(-1) -0.007577 0.015722 -0.481940 0.6324
C 0.185675 0.055997 3.315834 0.0019
R-squared 0.005500 Mean dependent var 0.165616
Adjusted R-squared -0.018179 S.D. dependent var 0.246255
S.E. of regression 0.248483 Akaike info criterion 0.097507
Sum squared resid 2.593245 Schwarz criterion 0.178606
Log likelihood -0.145145 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.127582
F-statistic 0.232266 Durbin-Watson stat 2.276147
Prob(F-statistic) 0.632351
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ INT
Null Hypothesis: INT has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.138035 0.2314
Test critical values: 1% level -3.588509
5% level -2.929734
10% level -2.603064
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(INT)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:25
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2014
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INT(-1) -0.200605 0.093827 -2.138035 0.0384
C 0.709886 0.336260 2.111125 0.0408
R-squared 0.098155 Mean dependent var -0.004023
Adjusted R-squared 0.076682 S.D. dependent var 0.274001
S.E. of regression 0.263286 Akaike info criterion 0.213235
Sum squared resid 2.911413 Schwarz criterion 0.294334
Log likelihood -2.691169 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.243311
F-statistic 4.571194 Durbin-Watson stat 2.352311
Prob(F-statistic) 0.038377
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ TOT
Null Hypothesis: TOT has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.909097 0.7761
Test critical values: 1% level -3.588509
5% level -2.929734
10% level -2.603064
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(TOT)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:26
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2014
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
TOT(-1) -0.015142 0.016656 -0.909097 0.3685
C 0.301853 0.105976 2.848316 0.0068
R-squared 0.019298 Mean dependent var 0.217501
Adjusted R-squared -0.004052 S.D. dependent var 0.338940
S.E. of regression 0.339626 Akaike info criterion 0.722443
Sum squared resid 4.844512 Schwarz criterion 0.803543
Log likelihood -13.89375 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.752519
F-statistic 0.826457 Durbin-Watson stat 2.237195
Prob(F-statistic) 0.368486
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ FDI
Null Hypothesis: FDI has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.769437 0.8176
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(FDI)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:27
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
FDI(-1) -0.020634 0.026817 -0.769437 0.4462
D(FDI(-1)) -0.365167 0.146098 -2.499467 0.0166
C 0.327622 0.116259 2.818043 0.0075
R-squared 0.151000 Mean dependent var 0.199310
Adjusted R-squared 0.108550 S.D. dependent var 0.614567
S.E. of regression 0.580254 Akaike info criterion 1.816512
Sum squared resid 13.46778 Schwarz criterion 1.939387
Log likelihood -36.05501 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.861824
F-statistic 3.557120 Durbin-Watson stat 2.054242
Prob(F-statistic) 0.037858
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ EXR
Null Hypothesis: EXR has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.300627 0.9165
Test critical values: 1% level -3.588509
5% level -2.929734
10% level -2.603064
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(EXR)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:28
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2014
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
EXR(-1) -0.005697 0.018950 -0.300627 0.7652
C 0.135578 0.060071 2.256967 0.0293
R-squared 0.002147 Mean dependent var 0.122915
Adjusted R-squared -0.021611 S.D. dependent var 0.281058
S.E. of regression 0.284078 Akaike info criterion 0.365257
Sum squared resid 3.389424 Schwarz criterion 0.446356
Log likelihood -6.035645 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.395332
F-statistic 0.090376 Durbin-Watson stat 1.607599
Prob(F-statistic) 0.765182
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ LIR
Null Hypothesis: LIR has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.177208 0.6757
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LIR)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:29
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LIR(-1) -0.091369 0.077615 -1.177208 0.2461
D(LIR(-1)) -0.331120 0.145596 -2.274248 0.0284
C 0.290502 0.220957 1.314746 0.1961
R-squared 0.168671 Mean dependent var 0.023333
Adjusted R-squared 0.127104 S.D. dependent var 0.220844
S.E. of regression 0.206332 Akaike info criterion -0.251449
Sum squared resid 1.702911 Schwarz criterion -0.128575
Log likelihood 8.406160 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.206137
F-statistic 4.057859 Durbin-Watson stat 2.150921
Prob(F-statistic) 0.024858
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ CPI
Null Hypothesis: CPI has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.437368 0.8933
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(CPI)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:30
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CPI(-1) -0.034435 0.078732 -0.437368 0.6642
D(CPI(-1)) -0.319361 0.154095 -2.072490 0.0447
C 0.040051 0.034251 1.169334 0.2492
R-squared 0.125386 Mean dependent var 0.023099
Adjusted R-squared 0.081655 S.D. dependent var 0.156196
S.E. of regression 0.149683 Akaike info criterion -0.893379
Sum squared resid 0.896201 Schwarz criterion -0.770504
Log likelihood 22.20764 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.848066
F-statistic 2.867220 Durbin-Watson stat 2.055796
Prob(F-statistic) 0.068601
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ TAX at levels
Null Hypothesis: TAX has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.658789 0.8464
Test critical values: 1% level -3.588509
5% level -2.929734
10% level -2.603064
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(TAX)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:15
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2014
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
TAX(-1) -0.011918 0.018091 -0.658789 0.5136
C 0.275579 0.092762 2.970807 0.0049
R-squared 0.010228 Mean dependent var 0.224142
Adjusted R-squared -0.013338 S.D. dependent var 0.330037
S.E. of regression 0.332231 Akaike info criterion 0.678417
Sum squared resid 4.635856 Schwarz criterion 0.759517
Log likelihood -12.92518 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.708493
F-statistic 0.434003 Durbin-Watson stat 2.225901
Prob(F-statistic) 0.513627
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ GDP at levels
Null Hypothesis: GDP has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.734399 0.8272
Test critical values: 1% level -3.588509
5% level -2.929734
10% level -2.603064
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GDP)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:15
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2014
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
GDP(-1) -0.007788 0.010605 -0.734399 0.4668
C 0.273048 0.076429 3.572558 0.0009
R-squared 0.012679 Mean dependent var 0.221551
Adjusted R-squared -0.010829 S.D. dependent var 0.200589
S.E. of regression 0.201672 Akaike info criterion -0.319957
Sum squared resid 1.708210 Schwarz criterion -0.238858
Log likelihood 9.039061 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.289882
F-statistic 0.539342 Durbin-Watson stat 2.268739
Prob(F-statistic) 0.466786
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ TRT at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
.
Null Hypothesis: D(TRT) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.414842 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(TRT,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:34
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(TRT(-1)) -1.143082 0.154161 -7.414842 0.0000
C 0.186680 0.045778 4.077971 0.0002
R-squared 0.572827 Mean dependent var -0.003020
Adjusted R-squared 0.562408 S.D. dependent var 0.376307
S.E. of regression 0.248930 Akaike info criterion 0.102103
Sum squared resid 2.540607 Schwarz criterion 0.184019
Log likelihood -0.195219 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.132311
F-statistic 54.97988 Durbin-Watson stat 1.985201
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ INT at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(INT) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.809676 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(INT,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:35
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(INT(-1)) -1.307582 0.148426 -8.809676 0.0000
C -0.007631 0.040596 -0.187977 0.8518
R-squared 0.654330 Mean dependent var -0.005616
Adjusted R-squared 0.645899 S.D. dependent var 0.447349
S.E. of regression 0.266201 Akaike info criterion 0.236266
Sum squared resid 2.905384 Schwarz criterion 0.318182
Log likelihood -3.079713 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.266474
F-statistic 77.61039 Durbin-Watson stat 1.965441
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ TOT at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(TOT) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.220361 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(TOT,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:36
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(TOT(-1)) -1.122404 0.155450 -7.220361 0.0000
C 0.241256 0.062815 3.840734 0.0004
R-squared 0.559772 Mean dependent var -0.008710
Adjusted R-squared 0.549035 S.D. dependent var 0.511811
S.E. of regression 0.343701 Akaike info criterion 0.747309
Sum squared resid 4.843359 Schwarz criterion 0.829225
Log likelihood -14.06714 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.777517
F-statistic 52.13361 Durbin-Watson stat 1.967927
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ FDI at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(FDI) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.459792 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(FDI,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:37
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(FDI(-1)) -1.372351 0.145072 -9.459792 0.0000
C 0.274165 0.092751 2.955924 0.0051
R-squared 0.685794 Mean dependent var -0.001723
Adjusted R-squared 0.678130 S.D. dependent var 1.017669
S.E. of regression 0.577360 Akaike info criterion 1.784693
Sum squared resid 13.66712 Schwarz criterion 1.866609
Log likelihood -36.37090 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.814901
F-statistic 89.48766 Durbin-Watson stat 2.052093
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ EXR at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(EXR) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.298184 0.0001
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(EXR,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:38
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(EXR(-1)) -0.811349 0.153137 -5.298184 0.0000
C 0.102744 0.047064 2.183084 0.0348
R-squared 0.406406 Mean dependent var 0.000841
Adjusted R-squared 0.391928 S.D. dependent var 0.361211
S.E. of regression 0.281669 Akaike info criterion 0.349227
Sum squared resid 3.252834 Schwarz criterion 0.431143
Log likelihood -5.508375 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.379435
F-statistic 28.07075 Durbin-Watson stat 2.019963
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ LIR at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(LIR) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.999830 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.596616
5% level -2.933158
10% level -2.604867
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LIR,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:38
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2014
Included observations: 42 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LIR(-1)) -1.769964 0.252858 -6.999830 0.0000
D(LIR(-1),2) 0.291348 0.150852 1.931347 0.0607
C 0.043292 0.031877 1.358095 0.1822
R-squared 0.709724 Mean dependent var 0.006667
Adjusted R-squared 0.694838 S.D. dependent var 0.367573
S.E. of regression 0.203053 Akaike info criterion -0.281953
Sum squared resid 1.607986 Schwarz criterion -0.157834
Log likelihood 8.921017 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.236459
F-statistic 47.67749 Durbin-Watson stat 1.912599
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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The Results of Unit Root teat conducted on the data series’ CPI at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(CPI) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.333007 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(CPI,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:40
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(CPI(-1)) -1.341904 0.143780 -9.333007 0.0000
C 0.028935 0.022733 1.272808 0.2103
R-squared 0.679950 Mean dependent var 0.006030
Adjusted R-squared 0.672144 S.D. dependent var 0.258824
S.E. of regression 0.148200 Akaike info criterion -0.935119
Sum squared resid 0.900487 Schwarz criterion -0.853203
Log likelihood 22.10506 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.904911
F-statistic 87.10502 Durbin-Watson stat 2.081276
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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APPENDIX V
The Results of Unit Root test conducted on the data series’ TAX at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(TAX) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.431105 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(TAX,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:19
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(TAX(-1)) -1.131183 0.152223 -7.431105 0.0000
C 0.244572 0.060752 4.025767 0.0002
R-squared 0.573899 Mean dependent var -0.009269
Adjusted R-squared 0.563506 S.D. dependent var 0.498634
S.E. of regression 0.329436 Akaike info criterion 0.662525
Sum squared resid 4.449648 Schwarz criterion 0.744441
Log likelihood -12.24429 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.692733
F-statistic 55.22133 Durbin-Watson stat 1.994714
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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APPENDIX V
The Results of Unit Root test conducted on the data series’ GDP at 1ST DIFFERENCE
[1(1)]
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.296949 0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.592462
5% level -2.931404
10% level -2.603944
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:20
Sample (adjusted): 1972 2014
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(GDP(-1)) -1.133930 0.155398 -7.296949 0.0000
C 0.251196 0.046673 5.381986 0.0000
R-squared 0.564966 Mean dependent var -0.003118
Adjusted R-squared 0.554355 S.D. dependent var 0.304944
S.E. of regression 0.203570 Akaike info criterion -0.300217
Sum squared resid 1.699074 Schwarz criterion -0.218300
Log likelihood 8.454657 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.270008
F-statistic 53.24547 Durbin-Watson stat 2.010037
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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APPENDIX VI
The result of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression (objective II)
Dependent Variable: TRT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 06:41
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.236375 0.544231 0.434328 0.6665
INT -0.290849 0.085867 -3.387206 0.0017
TOT 0.712343 0.051605 13.80371 0.0000
FDI -0.115703 0.059430 -1.946893 0.0590
EXR 0.373885 0.079989 4.674190 0.0000
LIR -0.330609 0.150294 -2.199747 0.0340
CPI -0.374482 0.148831 -2.516158 0.0162
R-squared 0.994517 Mean dependent var 2.728321
Adjusted R-squared 0.993652 S.D. dependent var 2.443829
S.E. of regression 0.194715 Akaike info criterion -0.292529
Sum squared resid 1.440723 Schwarz criterion -0.011493
Log likelihood 13.58191 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.187762
F-statistic 1148.838 Durbin-Watson stat 1.805762
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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APPENDIX VII
The results of Buoyancy of Tax estimation
(a) Buoyancy of Trade Tax (TRT) to its base Total Foreign Trade (TOT)
Dependent Variable: TRT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:22
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.653911 0.077419 -21.36307 0.0000
TOT 0.772801 0.011970 64.56270 0.0000
R-squared 0.989789 Mean dependent var 2.728321
Adjusted R-squared 0.989552 S.D. dependent var 2.443829
S.E. of regression 0.249797 Akaike info criterion 0.107089
Sum squared resid 2.683134 Schwarz criterion 0.187385
Log likelihood -0.409503 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.137023
F-statistic 4168.342 Durbin-Watson stat 0.936036
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
(b) Buoyancy of Total Tax (TAX) to its Base Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Dependent Variable: TAX
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:24
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.012065 0.161615 -12.44973 0.0000
GDP 0.957972 0.022060 43.42556 0.0000
R-squared 0.977706 Mean dependent var 4.424079
Adjusted R-squared 0.977188 S.D. dependent var 2.862208
S.E. of regression 0.432301 Akaike info criterion 1.204037
Sum squared resid 8.036017 Schwarz criterion 1.284333
Log likelihood -25.09083 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.233971
F-statistic 1885.779 Durbin-Watson stat 0.654492
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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(c) Buoyancy of TRT Base Total Foreign Trade (TOT) to Income; Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)
Dependent Variable: TOT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/15 Time: 07:25
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.428236 0.148489 -9.618463 0.0000
GDP 1.056606 0.020268 52.13070 0.0000
R-squared 0.984424 Mean dependent var 5.670581
Adjusted R-squared 0.984061 S.D. dependent var 3.146114
S.E. of regression 0.397190 Akaike info criterion 1.034623
Sum squared resid 6.783677 Schwarz criterion 1.114919
Log likelihood -21.27901 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.064556
F-statistic 2717.609 Durbin-Watson stat 0.475268
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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APPENDIX VIII
The Results of Johansen Cointegration Test
Date: 10/16/15 Time: 00:39
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2014
Included observations: 42 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.762588 177.1415 125.6154 0.0000
At most 1 * 0.696709 116.7473 95.75366 0.0009
At most 2 0.469602 66.63866 69.81889 0.0873
At most 3 0.352740 40.00532 47.85613 0.2223
At most 4 0.239012 21.73499 29.79707 0.3135
At most 5 0.203079 10.26322 15.49471 0.2610
At most 6 0.017213 0.729227 3.841466 0.3931
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.762588 60.39418 46.23142 0.0009
At most 1 * 0.696709 50.10869 40.07757 0.0027
At most 2 0.469602 26.63334 33.87687 0.2835
At most 3 0.352740 18.27032 27.58434 0.4728
At most 4 0.239012 11.47178 21.13162 0.6002
At most 5 0.203079 9.533992 14.26460 0.2444
178
At most 6 0.017213 0.729227 3.841466 0.3931
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
6.135800 1.836225 -6.886852 2.387736 -2.128751 4.805899 4.799719
-8.147604 -3.810503 5.234067 -2.055354 6.722235 -6.045018 -8.106863
6.554580 0.680391 -4.474363 0.001159 -0.888352 -1.384158 3.553733
-3.505681 -2.072965 0.382860 2.004289 1.002112 -3.730417 0.455483
-0.416424 3.098102 0.022559 -0.429597 0.309883 1.640531 3.055677
3.960241 2.403831 -3.339055 2.559535 -3.458522 0.829764 -0.647561
-1.788529 0.744812 0.148260 1.275470 0.927282 -6.473570 -5.713143
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):
D(TRT) -0.006300 0.010294 -0.066994 0.075017 0.024441 -0.007027 0.000772
D(INT) 0.059354 0.061488 -0.023652 0.060725 -0.021794 -0.034612 0.011378
D(TOT) 0.155437 0.020901 -0.066599 0.072779 0.025914 -0.032123 0.007701
D(FDI) 0.057894 0.159026 -0.082850 -0.107541 -0.046313 -0.096654 -0.024414
D(EXR) 0.005759 -0.034010 -0.073938 0.011686 -0.084470 0.037924 -0.009510
D(LIR) 0.002608 -0.028735 0.052517 0.046983 -0.042437 -0.015356 -0.008446
D(CPI) 0.033651 0.048414 0.006169 0.003580 -0.006975 0.041582 -0.002136
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 118.0514
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
1.000000 0.299264 -1.122405 0.389148 -0.346939 0.783255 0.782248
(0.07516) (0.06368) (0.07225) (0.07199) (0.14715) (0.13624)
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
D(TRT) -0.038653
(0.20298)
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D(INT) 0.364185
(0.22050)
D(TOT) 0.953729
(0.25226)
D(FDI) 0.355226
(0.50245)
D(EXR) 0.035338
(0.28448)
D(LIR) 0.016005
(0.19462)
D(CPI) 0.206475
(0.13623)
2 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 143.1058
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
1.000000 0.000000 -1.975313 0.632376 0.502625 0.856672 0.404211
(0.20353) (0.22790) (0.20841) (0.45835) (0.43400)
0.000000 1.000000 2.850018 -0.812752 -2.838845 -0.245323 1.263221
(0.50629) (0.56692) (0.51844) (1.14020) (1.07961)
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
D(TRT) -0.122527 -0.050794
(0.33678) (0.13967)
D(INT) -0.136794 -0.125312
(0.34528) (0.14319)
D(TOT) 0.783437 0.205774
(0.41724) (0.17303)
D(FDI) -0.940459 -0.499664
(0.77228) (0.32027)
D(EXR) 0.312441 0.140172
(0.46797) (0.19407)
D(LIR) 0.250124 0.114283
(0.31837) (0.13203)
D(CPI) -0.187986 -0.122692
(0.20471) (0.08489)
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3 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 156.4225
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -0.453196 -0.177994 -1.208886 0.417759
(0.16801) (0.25112) (0.54009) (0.52523)
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.753531 -1.856834 2.734902 1.243674
(0.24372) (0.36427) (0.78344) (0.76188)
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 -0.549570 -0.344563 -1.045686 0.006859
(0.13010) (0.19445) (0.41821) (0.40670)
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
D(TRT) -0.561642 -0.096376 0.397019
(0.36727) (0.12978) (0.29501)
D(INT) -0.291823 -0.141405 0.018896
(0.40656) (0.14366) (0.32657)
D(TOT) 0.346910 0.160461 -0.663087
(0.47001) (0.16608) (0.37754)
D(FDI) -1.483505 -0.556035 0.804349
(0.89662) (0.31683) (0.72021)
D(EXR) -0.172192 0.089865 0.113150
(0.52776) (0.18649) (0.42392)
D(LIR) 0.594354 0.150016 -0.403345
(0.35725) (0.12624) (0.28696)
D(CPI) -0.147550 -0.118495 -0.005947
(0.24289) (0.08583) (0.19510)
4 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 165.5576
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -0.869625 -1.602160 1.348908
(0.17272) (0.77798) (0.74699)
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -0.706857 3.388800 -0.304551
(0.23434) (1.05557) (1.01353)
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 -1.183270 -1.522590 1.136019
(0.17999) (0.81076) (0.77847)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 -1.526117 -0.867777 2.054626
(0.23139) (1.04224) (1.00073)
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Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
D(TRT) -0.824629 -0.251884 0.425740 0.114079
(0.33420) (0.12603) (0.25808) (0.09888)
D(INT) -0.504706 -0.267286 0.042145 0.137026
(0.39563) (0.14919) (0.30552) (0.11705)
D(TOT) 0.091770 0.009592 -0.635222 0.473976
(0.45489) (0.17154) (0.35129) (0.13459)
D(FDI) -1.106502 -0.333107 0.763176 -0.404259
(0.89459) (0.33735) (0.69084) (0.26468)
D(EXR) -0.213161 0.065640 0.117624 0.106992
(0.54861) (0.20689) (0.42366) (0.16231)
D(LIR) 0.429645 0.052621 -0.385357 0.159517
(0.35323) (0.13321) (0.27278) (0.10451)
D(CPI) -0.160100 -0.125916 -0.004577 -0.011977
(0.25268) (0.09529) (0.19513) (0.07476)
5 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 171.2935
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -7.287633 4.471763
(1.32506) (1.93479)
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -1.232525 2.233800
(0.58452) (0.85349)
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -9.258629 5.385186
(1.69516) (2.47520)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 -10.84529 7.534969
(2.16372) (3.15936)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 -6.537846 3.591037
(1.23550) (1.80402)
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
D(TRT) -0.834807 -0.176164 0.426291 0.103579 0.224875
(0.32886) (0.14789) (0.25382) (0.09789) (0.18709)
D(INT) -0.495630 -0.334805 0.041654 0.146388 0.362097
(0.39215) (0.17636) (0.30267) (0.11672) (0.22309)
D(TOT) 0.080979 0.089876 -0.634638 0.462844 -0.050259
(0.45059) (0.20264) (0.34778) (0.13412) (0.25635)
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D(FDI) -1.087216 -0.476590 0.762131 -0.384363 0.897252
(0.88769) (0.39921) (0.68515) (0.26422) (0.50502)
D(EXR) -0.177986 -0.196058 0.115718 0.143281 -0.189667
(0.50749) (0.22823) (0.39169) (0.15106) (0.28871)
D(LIR) 0.447317 -0.078853 -0.386315 0.177748 -0.211436
(0.33744) (0.15175) (0.26044) (0.10044) (0.19197)
D(CPI) -0.157195 -0.147527 -0.004734 -0.008980 0.249764
(0.25223) (0.11343) (0.19468) (0.07508) (0.14350)
6 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 176.0605
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
TRT INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -8.875430
(2.13208)
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -0.023551
(0.48219)
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -11.57186
(2.66279)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -12.32803
(2.95593)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 -8.382932
(1.86951)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 -1.831485
(0.46797)
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
D(TRT) -0.862636 -0.193056 0.449756 0.085592 0.249179 -0.245356
(0.34417) (0.16037) (0.26793) (0.11826) (0.20735) (0.23093)
D(INT) -0.632703 -0.418007 0.157226 0.057797 0.481805 -0.344711
(0.40104) (0.18687) (0.31220) (0.13780) (0.24161) (0.26909)
D(TOT) -0.046237 0.012657 -0.527376 0.380623 0.060840 0.457212
(0.46482) (0.21659) (0.36185) (0.15972) (0.28004) (0.31188)
D(FDI) -1.469988 -0.708929 1.084863 -0.631751 1.231531 -0.323415
(0.89587) (0.41745) (0.69741) (0.30783) (0.53973) (0.60111)
D(EXR) -0.027797 -0.104895 -0.010913 0.240349 -0.320829 0.184911
(0.52267) (0.24355) (0.40689) (0.17960) (0.31489) (0.35070)
D(LIR) 0.386504 -0.115766 -0.335041 0.138445 -0.158328 -0.144083
(0.35139) (0.16374) (0.27355) (0.12074) (0.21170) (0.23578)
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D(CPI) 0.007479 -0.047571 -0.143578 0.097450 0.105952 -0.129777
(0.24131) (0.11244) (0.18786) (0.08292) (0.14538) (0.16191)
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APPENDIX IX
The result of Error Correction Method (ECM)
Error Correction Estimates
Date: 10/16/15 Time: 00:25
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2014
Included observations: 42 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1
TRT(-1) 1.000000
INT(-1) 0.299264
(0.07516)
[ 3.98171]
TOT(-1) -1.122405
(0.06368)
[-17.6246]
FDI(-1) 0.389148
(0.07225)
[ 5.38577]
EXR(-1) -0.346939
(0.07199)
[-4.81909]
LIR(-1) 0.783255
(0.14715)
[ 5.32291]
CPI(-1) 0.782248
(0.13624)
[ 5.74176]
C -0.120800
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Error Correction: D(TRT) D(INT) D(TOT) D(FDI) D(EXR) D(LIR) D(CPI)
CointEq1 -0.038653 0.364185 0.953729 0.355226 0.035338 0.016005 0.206475
(0.20298) (0.22050) (0.25226) (0.50245) (0.28448) (0.19462) (0.13623)
[-0.19043] [ 1.65165] [ 3.78077] [ 0.70698] [ 0.12422] [ 0.08224] [ 1.51561]
D(TRT(-1)) -0.530832 -0.617390 -0.595600 -0.080424 -0.024366 0.151636 -0.249525
(0.23500) (0.25528) (0.29205) (0.58171) (0.32935) (0.22532) (0.15772)
[-2.25890] [-2.41849] [-2.03938] [-0.13825] [-0.07398] [ 0.67298] [-1.58206]
D(TRT(-2)) -0.044965 0.111182 -0.236074 -1.205739 -0.004679 -0.011195 -0.087164
(0.21610) (0.23475) (0.26857) (0.53494) (0.30287) (0.20721) (0.14504)
[-0.20807] [ 0.47361] [-0.87901] [-2.25397] [-0.01545] [-0.05403] [-0.60096]
D(INT(-1)) 0.109616 -0.136340 -0.121798 0.322279 0.347403 -0.186924 0.231605
(0.25476) (0.27675) (0.31662) (0.63064) (0.35705) (0.24427) (0.17099)
[ 0.43027] [-0.49264] [-0.38469] [ 0.51103] [ 0.97297] [-0.76522] [ 1.35451]
D(INT(-2)) 0.130026 -0.151379 0.041822 1.051825 0.535009 0.232357 -0.006195
(0.24945) (0.27098) (0.31001) (0.61748) (0.34960) (0.23918) (0.16742)
[ 0.52126] [-0.55864] [ 0.13491] [ 1.70341] [ 1.53033] [ 0.97149] [-0.03700]
D(TOT(-1)) 0.262910 0.171866 0.229639 -0.097448 -0.377681 -0.086354 0.019411
(0.21610) (0.23475) (0.26856) (0.53492) (0.30286) (0.20720) (0.14504)
[ 1.21664] [ 0.73213] [ 0.85507] [-0.18217] [-1.24704] [-0.41677] [ 0.13383]
D(TOT(-2)) 0.006198 0.104470 0.060354 -0.451366 -0.327445 -0.050367 0.015928
(0.19130) (0.20781) (0.23774) (0.47354) (0.26811) (0.18342) (0.12839)
[ 0.03240] [ 0.50272] [ 0.25386] [-0.95318] [-1.22132] [-0.27460] [ 0.12405]
D(FDI(-1)) -0.026845 0.013504 -0.065526 -0.509450 0.036765 -0.032831 -0.007656
(0.10283) (0.11171) (0.12780) (0.25455) (0.14412) (0.09860) (0.06902)
[-0.26106] [ 0.12089] [-0.51272] [-2.00134] [ 0.25510] [-0.33297] [-0.11093]
D(FDI(-2)) 0.007039 0.054794 0.022431 -0.134041 -0.010837 0.041984 -0.026062
(0.07963) (0.08651) (0.09897) (0.19712) (0.11161) (0.07635) (0.05345)
[ 0.08839] [ 0.63341] [ 0.22665] [-0.67999] [-0.09710] [ 0.54986] [-0.48763]
D(EXR(-1)) 0.386524 0.363146 0.417070 0.150229 0.241865 0.191742 -0.051160
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(0.16685) (0.18125) (0.20736) (0.41303) (0.23385) (0.15998) (0.11199)
[ 2.31656] [ 2.00352] [ 2.01131] [ 0.36373] [ 1.03428] [ 1.19851] [-0.45684]
D(EXR(-2)) 0.249872 0.183120 0.175355 0.705952 0.101966 -0.001297 -0.092193
(0.15462) (0.16796) (0.19215) (0.38274) (0.21670) (0.14825) (0.10377)
[ 1.61608] [ 1.09025] [ 0.91258] [ 1.84449] [ 0.47055] [-0.00875] [-0.88841]
D(LIR(-1)) -0.593787 -0.796144 -1.068540 0.348846 -0.183648 -0.527693 -0.132045
(0.24654) (0.26782) (0.30640) (0.61029) (0.34553) (0.23639) (0.16547)
[-2.40849] [-2.97269] [-3.48745] [ 0.57161] [-0.53150] [-2.23231] [-0.79800]
D(LIR(-2)) -0.146475 -0.456666 -0.688062 -0.333012 -0.159139 -0.396404 -0.140820
(0.22706) (0.24666) (0.28218) (0.56206) (0.31823) (0.21771) (0.15239)
[-0.64510] [-1.85143] [-2.43834] [-0.59248] [-0.50008] [-1.82080] [-0.92405]
D(CPI(-1)) -0.234933 -0.141921 -0.547259 -1.151837 -0.096924 -0.355263 -0.591696
(0.34053) (0.36992) (0.42321) (0.84295) (0.47726) (0.32651) (0.22855)
[-0.68990] [-0.38365] [-1.29312] [-1.36643] [-0.20308] [-1.08806] [-2.58888]
D(CPI(-2)) -0.599117 -0.265235 -0.104446 -0.032078 -0.460273 -0.439108 -0.318407
(0.29276) (0.31803) (0.36384) (0.72471) (0.41031) (0.28071) (0.19649)
[-2.04643] [-0.83399] [-0.28706] [-0.04426] [-1.12176] [-1.56428] [-1.62045]
C 0.156867 -0.034323 0.276615 0.588035 0.262893 0.042920 0.116989
(0.08117) (0.08817) (0.10087) (0.20092) (0.11375) (0.07782) (0.05448)
[ 1.93268] [-0.38928] [ 2.74226] [ 2.92675] [ 2.31105] [ 0.55150] [ 2.14756]
R-squared 0.533245 0.560006 0.621393 0.538048 0.297909 0.459861 0.442779
Adj. R-squared 0.263963 0.306163 0.402967 0.271538 -0.107144 0.148243 0.121305
Sum sq. resids 1.195020 1.410219 1.845733 7.322666 2.347328 1.098647 0.538315
S.E. equation 0.214388 0.232893 0.266439 0.530699 0.300469 0.205562 0.143890
F-statistic 1.980246 2.206113 2.844858 2.018864 0.735481 1.475718 1.377340
Log likelihood 15.15423 11.67700 6.025234 -22.91482 0.976813 16.91999 31.90118
Akaike AIC 0.040275 0.205857 0.474989 1.853087 0.715390 -0.043809 -0.757199
Schwarz SC 0.702244 0.867827 1.136958 2.515056 1.377359 0.618161 -0.095230
Mean dependent 0.167256 -0.005559 0.218792 0.196784 0.130506 0.026157 0.017402
S.D. dependent 0.249891 0.279594 0.344825 0.621791 0.285561 0.222733 0.153501
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 2.45E-10
Determinant resid covariance 8.54E-12
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Log likelihood 118.0514
Akaike information criterion 0.045169
Schwarz criterion 4.968567
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Appendix X
The result of Error Correction Method (ECM) (From System of Equation)
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Date: 12/04/07 Time: 23:48
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2014
Included observations: 41 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1
TRT(-1) 1.000000
INT(-1) 0.041977
(0.01328)
[ 3.15993]
TOT(-1) -0.026196
(0.00053)
[-49.2978]
FDI(-1) 0.252693
(0.00996)
[ 25.3687]
EXR(-1) -0.728545
(0.01493)
[-48.8105]
LIR(-1) 0.316597
(0.01907)
[ 16.5983]
CPI(-1) 3.629237
(1.04017)
[ 3.48908]
C -19.20466
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Error Correction: D(TRT) D(INT) D(TOT) D(FDI) D(EXR) D(LIR) D(CPI)
CointEq1 -0.960104 -0.029261 74.28491 5.644984 0.581719 -0.257840 0.015161
(0.24973) (0.30198) (18.7885) (1.74099) (0.44320) (0.12721) (0.00537)
[-3.84453] [-0.09689] [ 3.95375] [ 3.24239] [ 1.31255] [-2.02683] [ 2.82327]
D(TRT(-1)) 0.613728 0.168375 -43.64403 -7.012893 -0.750618 0.328151 -0.017174
(0.29930) (0.36192) (22.5174) (2.08653) (0.53116) (0.15246) (0.00644)
[ 2.05056] [ 0.46523] [-1.93823] [-3.36103] [-1.41316] [ 2.15235] [-2.66839]
D(TRT(-2)) 1.022056 -0.095671 -55.82209 -2.461209 0.058439 0.122374 -0.010668
(0.16970) (0.20521) (12.7674) (1.18306) (0.30117) (0.08645) (0.00365)
[ 6.02267] [-0.46621] [-4.37224] [-2.08037] [ 0.19404] [ 1.41561] [-2.92337]
D(TRT(-3)) 0.288547 0.149087 -7.133170 -6.875534 -0.520827 0.192589 -0.009119
(0.21067) (0.25475) (15.8497) (1.46868) (0.37388) (0.10732) (0.00453)
[ 1.36966] [ 0.58523] [-0.45005] [-4.68144] [-1.39304] [ 1.79460] [-2.01294]
D(INT(-1)) 0.055075 -0.367308 -16.30226 1.718798 -0.081668 -0.200818 0.003276
(0.20041) (0.24234) (15.0774) (1.39711) (0.35566) (0.10209) (0.00431)
[ 0.27482] [-1.51569] [-1.08124] [ 1.23025] [-0.22962] [-1.96713] [ 0.76021]
D(INT(-2)) -0.151315 0.011619 8.977276 -0.122630 -0.277328 0.240220 -0.003976
(0.21129) (0.25549) (15.8959) (1.47296) (0.37497) (0.10763) (0.00454)
[-0.71616] [ 0.04548] [ 0.56475] [-0.08325] [-0.73961] [ 2.23193] [-0.87508]
D(INT(-3)) -0.380588 0.186049 -17.61634 0.239432 -0.325164 0.036789 -0.001131
(0.18896) (0.22850) (14.2163) (1.31733) (0.33535) (0.09626) (0.00406)
[-2.01411] [ 0.81423] [-1.23916] [ 0.18176] [-0.96963] [ 0.38219] [-0.27842]
D(TOT(-1)) -0.014426 -0.001025 1.111998 0.113890 0.007007 -0.003666 0.000256
(0.00422) (0.00510) (0.31724) (0.02940) (0.00748) (0.00215) (9.1E-05)
[-3.42115] [-0.20098] [ 3.50522] [ 3.87430] [ 0.93639] [-1.70671] [ 2.82375]
D(TOT(-2)) -0.010085 -0.001481 0.570301 0.064761 0.006701 -0.004633 0.000245
(0.00421) (0.00509) (0.31640) (0.02932) (0.00746) (0.00214) (9.0E-05)
[-2.39792] [-0.29112] [ 1.80244] [ 2.20884] [ 0.89787] [-2.16243] [ 2.71186]
D(TOT(-3)) -0.014129 -0.001720 0.379460 0.022432 0.002039 -0.001258 0.000152
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(0.00267) (0.00323) (0.20120) (0.01864) (0.00475) (0.00136) (5.8E-05)
[-5.28306] [-0.53198] [ 1.88596] [ 1.20317] [ 0.42966] [-0.92341] [ 2.64679]
D(FDI(-1)) 0.121784 -0.006167 -14.01287 -1.939222 -0.139879 0.071937 -0.003833
(0.07048) (0.08523) (5.30244) (0.49134) (0.12508) (0.03590) (0.00152)
[ 1.72795] [-0.07236] [-2.64272] [-3.94681] [-1.11833] [ 2.00370] [-2.52912]
D(FDI(-2)) 0.295066 0.000825 -1.020854 -0.787596 -0.123996 0.047765 -0.003101
(0.05910) (0.07146) (4.44604) (0.41198) (0.10488) (0.03010) (0.00127)
[ 4.99301] [ 0.01155] [-0.22961] [-1.91172] [-1.18230] [ 1.58671] [-2.44032]
D(FDI(-3)) 0.322206 -0.034303 1.295509 0.757465 0.062667 -0.009960 -8.67E-05
(0.03946) (0.04772) (2.96910) (0.27513) (0.07004) (0.02010) (0.00085)
[ 8.16441] [-0.71882] [ 0.43633] [ 2.75316] [ 0.89476] [-0.49545] [-0.10211]
D(EXR(-1)) 0.074874 -0.262335 30.47012 3.180821 0.527088 -0.234515 0.003374
(0.24393) (0.29497) (18.3522) (1.70057) (0.43291) (0.12426) (0.00525)
[ 0.30694] [-0.88935] [ 1.66030] [ 1.87044] [ 1.21755] [-1.88729] [ 0.64331]
D(EXR(-2)) 0.290320 0.228864 55.07807 1.796236 0.020806 -0.099025 0.001411
(0.16459) (0.19903) (12.3828) (1.14743) (0.29210) (0.08384) (0.00354)
[ 1.76390] [ 1.14991] [ 4.44795] [ 1.56545] [ 0.07123] [-1.18109] [ 0.39864]
D(EXR(-3)) -0.235865 -0.132214 -8.136206 7.176855 0.522058 -0.170182 0.018684
(0.25171) (0.30438) (18.9372) (1.75478) (0.44671) (0.12822) (0.00541)
[-0.93705] [-0.43438] [-0.42964] [ 4.08989] [ 1.16868] [-1.32726] [ 3.45186]
D(LIR(-1)) -0.361086 -0.264263 1.577060 -5.028943 -0.598507 0.064053 -0.003672
(0.49922) (0.60367) (37.5585) (3.48028) (0.88596) (0.25430) (0.01074)
[-0.72330] [-0.43776] [ 0.04199] [-1.44498] [-0.67554] [ 0.25188] [-0.34209]
D(LIR(-2)) -0.090030 0.219055 -53.78750 -3.300563 -0.092744 -0.263151 0.003567
(0.39034) (0.47202) (29.3673) (2.72126) (0.69274) (0.19884) (0.00839)
[-0.23064] [ 0.46408] [-1.83154] [-1.21288] [-0.13388] [-1.32342] [ 0.42492]
D(LIR(-3)) 0.435391 0.646407 35.32912 -3.620755 -0.365739 0.620632 -0.004936
(0.49748) (0.60157) (37.4275) (3.46814) (0.88287) (0.25342) (0.01070)
[ 0.87520] [ 1.07454] [ 0.94394] [-1.04401] [-0.41426] [ 2.44907] [-0.46142]
D(CPI(-1)) 3.566493 28.14103 -8.196452 99.83185 -2.715507 0.452743 -0.373071
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(10.0997) (12.2129) (759.845) (70.4095) (17.9239) (5.14480) (0.21718)
[ 0.35313] [ 2.30421] [-0.01079] [ 1.41788] [-0.15150] [ 0.08800] [-1.71780]
D(CPI(-2)) -0.762170 4.637166 -793.3439 138.2395 -0.841629 -1.594216 0.145285
(11.0783) (13.3963) (833.471) (77.2319) (19.6607) (5.64331) (0.23822)
[-0.06880] [ 0.34615] [-0.95186] [ 1.78993] [-0.04281] [-0.28250] [ 0.60987]
D(CPI(-3)) 0.711210 4.081275 -945.1121 87.59354 -1.299680 1.980535 0.023064
(9.02938) (10.9186) (679.320) (62.9477) (16.0244) (4.59957) (0.19416)
[ 0.07877] [ 0.37379] [-1.39126] [ 1.39153] [-0.08111] [ 0.43059] [ 0.11879]
C -7.118691 0.373824 608.3905 65.83125 8.891064 -1.820208 0.145020
(2.97731) (3.60026) (223.996) (20.7561) (5.28382) (1.51665) (0.06402)
[-2.39098] [ 0.10383] [ 2.71607] [ 3.17165] [ 1.68269] [-1.20015] [ 2.26512]
R-squared 0.962288 0.538570 0.925248 0.926326 0.378988 0.615816 0.735321
Adj. R-squared 0.916195 -0.025401 0.833885 0.836279 -0.380026 0.146258 0.411824
Sum sq. resids 1215.760 1777.739 6881460. 59087.08 3829.091 315.4765 0.562173
S.E. equation 8.218407 9.937971 618.3068 57.29411 14.58517 4.186463 0.176725
F-statistic 20.87713 0.954961 10.12711 10.28721 0.499317 1.311479 2.273039
Log likelihood -127.6623 -135.4518 -304.8073 -207.2770 -151.1811 -100.0070 29.75862
Akaike AIC 7.349381 7.729354 15.99060 11.23302 8.496639 6.000340 -0.329689
Schwarz SC 8.310653 8.690626 16.95187 12.19430 9.457911 6.961613 0.631583
Mean dependent 13.17522 -0.139512 573.0683 18.00024 3.849756 0.487805 0.031707
S.D. dependent 28.38912 9.814110 1517.047 141.5984 12.41561 4.530893 0.230433
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.40E+12
Determinant resid covariance 4.41E+09
Log likelihood -862.4797
Akaike information criterion 50.26730
Schwarz criterion 57.28877
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APPENDIX XI
TABLE 4: WORKSHEET FOR PAIRED MEANS / REPEATED MEASURES TEST
YEAR X YEAR Y D D2
1975 0.76 1995 37.4 36.64 1342.49
1976 0.882 1996 55 54.118 2928.758
1977 1.15 1997 63 61.85 3825.423
1978 1.7 1998 57.7 56 3136
1979 1.14 1999 87.9 86.76 7527.298
1980 1.81 2000 101.5 99.69 9938.096
1981 2.32 2001 170.6 168.28 28318.16
1982 2.33 2002 181.4 179.07 32066.06
1983 1.98 2003 195.5 193.52 37449.99
1984 1.61 2004 217.2 215.59 46479.05
1985 2.18 2005 232.8 230.62 53185.58
1986 1.7 2006 177.7 176 30976
1987 3.5 2007 241.4 237.9 56596.41
1988 5.6 2008 264.1 258.5 66822.25
1989 5.8 2009 297.5 291.7 85088.89
1990 8.6 2010 309.2 300.6 90360.36
1991 11.5 2011 438.3 426.8 182158.2
1992 16.1 2012 451.5 435.4 189573.2
1993 15.5 2013 464.9 449.4 201960.4
1994 18.2 2014 540.7 522.5 273006.3
4480.94 1402738
Source:
Author’s
computation
(August,
2016)
To know how effective INT have impacted TRT trend, the researcher conducted the
Paired means / Repeated measures test. The data were selected into two equal measures of
twenty series each using 1995 the year Nigeria joined the WTO as bench mark, taking the
first period 1975 to 1994 (pre WTO, X) as the period of relative protectionist policies and
the second period 1995 to 2014 (post WTO, Y) as the period that the country witnessed more
outward trade policy.
In calculating the sample differences; D = Y – X for each pair of data resulted in
positive values, meaning that INT resulted in more trade tax revenue for the period of the
study. However, to know how effective this is and to be able to conclude at the 95%
confidence level that INT is effective in generating more TRT revenue, we calculate thus;
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t statistics.
Where;
t =   t    
εd  t
 εd  
n
n n t t 
d =224.04,    = 4480.94,     = 1402,738, t-student statistic = 6.92
Given, df = 19 at 0.05 significance level
t = student t statistic
d = sample mean differences
    = sum of differences squared
     = summation of differences
n = number of sample differences
  = hypothesized mean difference
Decision Rule: Reject H0, if t statistic > critical t at 0.05 significance level with (n- 1) degrees
of freedom.
Given that, t-statistics = 6.92 is greater than the critical value of 2.09, we reject the null
hypothesis at the 0.05 significance level. The trend is significant difference in the trend of
trade tax revenue in Nigeria. Therefore, we can conclude that economic integration is not
effective in the trend of trade tax in Nigeria for the period of the study.
194
APPENDIX XII
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: UNTITLED
Specification: TRT C INT TOT FDI EXR LIR CPI TAX GDP
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values
Value df Probability
t-statistic 1.666411 35 0.1046
F-statistic 2.776925 (1, 35) 0.1046
Likelihood ratio 3.435769 1 0.0638
F-test summary:
Sum of Sq. df
Mean
Squares
Test SSR 0.095433 1 0.095433
Restricted SSR 1.298265 36 0.036063
Unrestricted SSR 1.202831 35 0.034367
Unrestricted SSR 1.202831 35 0.034367
LR test summary:
Value df
Restricted LogL 15.92453 36
Unrestricted LogL 17.64242 35
Unrestricted Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: TRT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/28/07 Time: 05:48
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.374687 5.655082 -0.243089 0.8094
INT 0.041097 1.261749 0.032572 0.9742
TOT 0.320018 1.241969 0.257670 0.7982
FDI -0.064560 0.071400 -0.904200 0.3721
EXR 0.234737 0.112740 2.082106 0.0447
LIR -0.135302 0.208583 -0.648674 0.5208
CPI -0.570140 0.176657 -3.227383 0.0027
TAX 0.092977 0.089944 1.033730 0.3084
GDP 0.245126 1.276595 0.192016 0.8488
FITTED^2 0.022420 0.013454 1.666411 0.1046
R-squared 0.995423 Mean dependent var 2.728321
Adjusted R-squared 0.994246 S.D. dependent var 2.443829
S.E. of regression 0.185382 Akaike info criterion -0.339663
Sum squared resid 1.202831 Schwarz criterion 0.061818
Log likelihood 17.64242 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.189995
F-statistic 845.7127 Durbin-Watson stat 2.073270
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 0.267907 Prob. F(1,35) 0.6080
Obs*R-squared 0.341836 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.5588
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/28/07 Time: 05:45
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.491766 5.032976 0.097709 0.9227
INT -0.104003 1.104573 -0.094157 0.9255
TOT 0.106747 1.089555 0.097973 0.9225
FDI 0.008288 0.069596 0.119094 0.9059
EXR -0.011372 0.091217 -0.124674 0.9015
LIR 0.005378 0.159056 0.033814 0.9732
CPI -0.000787 0.148950 -0.005281 0.9958
TAX 0.006423 0.093044 0.069037 0.9454
GDP -0.114095 1.112837 -0.102526 0.9189
RESID(-1) 0.092868 0.179422 0.517598 0.6080
R-squared 0.007596 Mean dependent var 6.04E-17
Adjusted R-squared -0.247593 S.D. dependent var 0.171773
S.E. of regression 0.191863 Akaike info criterion -0.270938
Sum squared resid 1.288403 Schwarz criterion 0.130543
Log likelihood 16.09610 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.121270
F-statistic 0.029767 Durbin-Watson stat 1.943694
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999997
196
APPENDIX XIV
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 0.898598 Prob. F(36,8) 0.6221
Obs*R-squared 36.07796 Prob. Chi-Square(36) 0.4650
Scaled explained SS 24.82251 Prob. Chi-Square(36) 0.9199
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/28/07 Time: 05:47
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 45
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 4.748423 3.651063 1.300559 0.2296
INT^2 0.978986 0.615355 1.590928 0.1503
INT*TOT -1.322749 0.664665 -1.990098 0.0818
INT*FDI 0.094712 0.148086 0.639577 0.5403
INT*EXR 0.048865 0.268427 0.182042 0.8601
INT*LIR -0.810545 0.504270 -1.607363 0.1466
INT*CPI -0.103739 0.386849 -0.268165 0.7954
INT*TAX 0.376308 0.216235 1.740272 0.1200
INT*GDP 0.877350 0.580790 1.510616 0.1693
INT -3.920161 3.063386 -1.279682 0.2365
TOT^2 0.483785 0.430067 1.124905 0.2932
TOT*FDI -0.171666 0.263368 -0.651812 0.5328
TOT*EXR -0.013431 0.461313 -0.029114 0.9775
TOT*LIR 0.944272 0.660683 1.429235 0.1908
TOT*CPI 0.642010 0.707799 0.907051 0.3909
TOT*TAX -0.953376 0.580826 -1.641414 0.1393
TOT*GDP -0.036605 0.365507 -0.100150 0.9227
FDI^2 0.070963 0.080028 0.886725 0.4011
FDI*EXR -0.065991 0.175746 -0.375489 0.7171
FDI*LIR 0.239662 0.289291 0.828446 0.4314
FDI*CPI 0.085308 0.308662 0.276380 0.7893
FDI*TAX 0.246040 0.266070 0.924719 0.3822
FDI*GDP -0.215296 0.230885 -0.932480 0.3784
EXR^2 -0.143595 0.156216 -0.919209 0.3849
EXR*LIR -0.550176 0.399863 -1.375911 0.2061
EXR*CPI 0.038575 0.456072 0.084581 0.9347
EXR*TAX 0.066471 0.307823 0.215938 0.8344
EXR*GDP 0.327629 0.299812 1.092780 0.3063
LIR^2 0.710262 0.514330 1.380947 0.2046
LIR*CPI 0.512212 0.802624 0.638173 0.5412
LIR*TAX -0.048927 0.381140 -0.128369 0.9010
LIR*GDP -0.909742 0.587332 -1.548940 0.1600
CPI^2 -0.215751 0.318905 -0.676536 0.5178
CPI*TAX 0.100490 0.290361 0.346086 0.7382
CPI*GDP -0.825365 0.726164 -1.136609 0.2886
TAX^2 0.209389 0.248604 0.842258 0.4241
TAX*GDP 0.225183 0.246778 0.912492 0.3882
R-squared 0.801732 Mean dependent var 0.028850
Adjusted R-squared -0.090472 S.D. dependent var 0.042782
S.E. of regression 0.044675 Akaike info criterion -3.461581
Sum squared resid 0.015967 Schwarz criterion -1.976103
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Log likelihood 114.8856 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.907810
F-statistic 0.898598 Durbin-Watson stat 2.231194
Prob(F-statistic) 0.622112
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Chow Breakpoint Test: 1995
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints
Varying regressors: All equation variables
Equation Sample: 1970 2014
F-statistic 1.301279 Prob. F(9,27) 0.2817
Log likelihood ratio 16.21350 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0626
Wald Statistic 11.71151 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.2301
